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Modern Applied Statistics With S

In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Thinking fast and slow.

The organization of behavior: A neuropsychological theory

In this paper, we question the simplicity of the common prescription that more thinking leads to better 26 moral choices In three studies, we discover that the relationship between how complexly one reasons 27 before making a decision with moral consequences is related to the outcome of that decision in a curvi

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Do we consciously cause our actions, or do they happen to us? Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, theologians, and lawyers have long debated the existence of free will versus determinism. In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the issue. Like actions, he argues, the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain. Yet if psychological and neural mechanisms are responsible for all human behavior, how could we have conscious will? The feeling of conscious will, Wegner shows, helps us to appreciate and remember our authorship of the things our minds and bodies do. Yes, we feel that we consciously will our actions, Wegner says, but at the same time, our actions happen to us. Although conscious will is an illusion, it serves as a guide to understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality. Approaching conscious will as a topic of psychological study, Wegner examines the issue from a variety of angles. He looks at illusions of the will -- those cases where people feel that they are willing an act that they are not doing or, conversely, are not willing an act that they in fact are doing. He explores conscious will in hypnosis, Ouija board spelling, automatic writing, and facilitated communication, as well as in such phenomena as spirit possession, dissociative identity disorder, and trance channeling. The result is a book that sidesteps endless debates to focus, more fruitfully, on the impact on our lives of the illusion of conscious will.

The Illusion of Conscious Will

The illusion of control consists of overestimating the influence that our behavior exerts over uncontrollable outcomes. Available evidence suggests that an important factor in development of this illusion is the personal involvement of participants who are trying to obtain the outcome. The dominant view assumes that this is due to social motivations and self-esteem protection. We propose that this may be due to a bias in contingency detection which occurs when the probability of the action (i.e., of the potential cause) is high. Indeed, personal involvement might have been often confounded with the probability of acting, as participants who are more involved tend to act more frequently than those for whom the outcome is irrelevant and therefore become mere observers. We tested these two variables separately. In two experiments, the outcome was always uncontrollable and we used a yoked design in which the participants of one condition were actively involved in obtaining it and the participants in the other condition observed the adventitious cause-effect pairs. The results support the latter approach: Those acting more often to obtain the outcome developed stronger illusions, and so did their yoked counterparts.

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Illusion of control: The role of personal involvement.

Similarities between Pavlovian conditioning in nonhumans and causal judgment by humans suggest that similar processes operate in these situations. Notably absent among the similarities is backward blocking (i.e., retrospective devaluation of a signal due to increased valuation of another signal that was present during training), which has been observed in causal judgment by humans but not in Pavlovian responding by animals. The authors used rats to determine if this difference arises from the target cue being biologically significant in the Pavlovian case but not in causal judgment. They used a sensory preconditioning procedure in Experiments 1 and 2, in which the target cue retained low biological significance during the treatment, and obtained backward blocking. The authors found in Experiment 3 that forward blocking also requires the target cue to be of low biological significance. Thus, low biological significance is a necessary condition for a stimulus to be vulnerable to blocking.

Biological significance in forward and backward blocking: Resolution of a discrepancy between animal conditioning and human causal judgment

Experiments in which subjects are asked to analytically assess response-outcome relationships have frequently yielded accurate judgments of response-outcome independence, but more naturalistically set experiments in which subjects are instructed to obtain the outcome have frequently yielded illusions of control The present research tested the hypothesis that a differential probability of responding p(R), between these two traditions could be at the basis of these different results Subjects received response-independent outcomes and were instructed either to obtain the outcome (naturalistic condition) or to behave scientifically in order to find out how much control over the outcome was possible (analytic condition) Subjects in the naturalistic condition tended to respond at almost every opportunity and developed a strong illusion of control Subjects in the analytic condition maintained their p(R) at a point close to 5 and made accurate judgments of control The illusion of control observed in the naturalis...

Illusion of Control: Detecting Response-Outcome Independence in Analytic but Not in Naturalistic Conditions:

The research reported in this article replicated the well-established phenomenon of competition between causes (C) as well as the more controversial presence and absence of competition between effects (E). The test question was identified as a crucial factor leading to each outcome. Competition between causes was obtained when the test question asked about the probability of E given C, p(E/C), implicitly compared with the probability of E given some alternative cause, p(E/C'). competition between effects was obtained when the test question asked about p(C/E) implicitly compared with p(C/E'). Under these conditions, effects competed for diagnostic value just as causes competed for predictive value. Additionally, some conditions in which neither causes nor effects competed were identified. These results suggest a bidirectional and noncompetitive learning process, the contents of which can be used in different ways (competitively or noncompetitively and forward or backward) as a function of test demands.

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Test question modulates cue competition between causes and between effects.

Illusions of causality occur when people develop the belief that there is a causal connection between two events that are actually unrelated. Such illusions have been proposed to underlie pseudoscience and superstitious thinking, sometimes leading to disastrous consequences in relation to critical life areas, such as health, finances, and wellbeing. Like optical illusions, they can occur for anyone under well-known conditions. Scientific thinking is the best possible safeguard against them, but it does not come intuitively and needs to be taught. Teaching how to think scientifically should benefit from better understanding of the illusion of causality. In this article, we review experiments that our group has conducted on the illusion of causality during the last 20 years. We discuss how research on the illusion of causality can contribute to the teaching of scientific thinking and how scientific thinking can reduce illusion.

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Helena Matute

Papers

Illusion of control: The role of personal involvement.

Biological significance in forward and backward blocking: Resolution of a discrepancy between animal conditioning and human causal judgment

Illusion of Control: Detecting Response-Outcome Independence in Analytic but Not in Naturalistic Conditions:

Test question modulates cue competition between causes and between effects.

Illusions of causality: How they bias our everyday thinking and how they could be reduced