H
Henri Servaes
Researcher at London Business School
Publications - 75
Citations - 21399
Henri Servaes is an academic researcher from London Business School. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate social responsibility & Mutual fund. The author has an hindex of 42, co-authored 74 publications receiving 19215 citations. Previous affiliations of Henri Servaes include Economic Policy Institute & Center for Economic and Policy Research.
Papers
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Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
John J. McConnell,Henri Servaes +1 more
TL;DR: The authors investigated the relation between Tobin's Q and the structure of equity ownership for a sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 firms for 1986 and found a significant curvilinear relation between Q and common stock owned by corporate insiders.
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Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance: The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility during the Financial Crisis
TL;DR: This paper found that firms with high social capital, measured as corporate social responsibility (CSR) intensity, had stock returns that were four to seven percentage points higher than firms with low social capital during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
Posted Content
The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness
TL;DR: It is shown that corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm value are positively related for firms with high customer awareness, as proxied by advertising expenditures, and this evidence is consistent with the view that CSR activities can add value to the firm but only under certain conditions.
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International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings
TL;DR: This article found that corporations in countries where shareholders rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as companies in countries with good shareholders protection, and that when shareholders protection is poor, factors that generally drive the need for cash holdings, such as investment opportunities and asymmetric information, actually become less important.
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The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that if divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities, funds will be transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities, leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms.