Jan Mahrt-Smith

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate how corporate governance impacts firm value by examining both the value and the use of cash holdings in poorly and well governed firms, and show that firms with poor corporate governance dissipate cash quickly and in ways that significantly reduce operating performance.

TL;DR: This article found that corporations in countries where shareholders rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as companies in countries with good shareholders protection, and that when shareholders protection is poor, factors that generally drive the need for cash holdings, such as investment opportunities and asymmetric information, actually become less important.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate how corporate governance impacts firm value by comparing the value and use of cash holdings in poorly and well-governed firms, and they show that governance has a substantial impact on value through its impact on cash: $1.42 to $0.88.

TL;DR: In this paper, a model of the interaction of firms' capital and ownership structures is developed to trade off managerial discipline versus managerial initiative, and empirical predictions are made: equity ownership should be concentrated when debt is closely held, effective debt covenants are present, bankruptcy procedures and the institutional environment are creditor friendly, and board representation of lenders is commonplace.

TL;DR: The authors developed a model to answer the question whether a bank should hold a share of the equity of a borrowing firm and showed that a small equity stake held by the bank can have a significant and positive impact on the lending relationship.