世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.2307%2F3343168.pdf

Development as Freedom

Capitalism and Freedom

Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of the leading perspectives in management and organizational studies, yet debate continues regarding its empirical support. In this paper, we take stock of the large body of extant research and provide a systematic assessment of empirical evidence. In all, 308 statistical tests from 63 articles, selected according to a set of clear criteria, were examined across various dimensions. We assess not only the level of empirical support for the theory, but also the degree of paradigm consensus present in the empirical literature. Our analysis shows that results are mixed: while we found support in some areas (e.g., with regard to asset specificity), we also found considerable disagreement on how to operationalize some of TCE's central constructs and propositions, and relatively low levels of empirical support in other core areas (e.g., surrounding uncertainty and performance). We conclude that a more thorough empirical grounding of the theory's foundation is crucial to its future development, and offer several strategies for doing this. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics

This paper studies the major institutional changes at the root of the increase in the west European unemployment trade in the last quarter century from below 3 percent to 11 percent. The institutional characteristics of wage bargaining and the legal rules hamper the self-equilibrating function of the labor market. The reservation wage, raised by the welfare state's rise, has affected the bargaining process, the wage level and the wage structure. Econometric evidence is presented. Since the mid-1980s, differences emerge, and the Scandinavian, the French-Mediterranean, the German, and the British-Dutch approach to the labor market can be distinguished.

https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.11.3.37

Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/559/1/042369533.pdf

Institutional competition : a concept for Europe?

The establishment of a single market in Europe raises the question of whether the institutional arrangements should be centralized in Brussels or left to national legislation. At issue are such areas as competition policy, consumer protection, taxation, social policy, environmental protection, and regulation for specific sectors such as transportation, electricity generation, banking, and insurance. The debate on centralization versus regulatory federalism also refers to the strategy of integration. Should harmonization occur ex-ante or can it be left to a process of institutional competition? Institutional competition has its origin in the 1979 creme de Dijon ruling of the European Court of Justice. A product legally brought to market in one country can be sold in any other country of the single market as well. This procedure will be extended to the service sector so that (e.g.) the British insurance firm can sell in Germany according to rates licenced in Great Britain and the Dutch trucker can operate in other European countries without cabotage restraints. According to this principle of mutual recognition, the rules of the country-of-origin apply. At the heart of institutional competition is locational arbitrage. Households can take advantage of value added tax differentials in other countries and firms can locate elsewhere. In the production area, the mobile factor of production can move. This will imply locational competition between countries (and regions) where countries compete for the mobile factors of production. The result could be substantial changes in the characteristics of the national economies, changes which in turti may necessitate revisions of regulations and tax rates. How will the process of institutional competition work? Will this competitive process lead to chaos or perhaps to the collapse of the national regulatory structures? To what extent can different national preferences come into play, for instance on public goods? In this paper we consider the case of environmental policies. Environmental quality is a public good, the preference for which may not be the same in all

Institutional Competition Versus ex-ante Harmonization: The Case of Environmental Policy

This paper analyses China's economic performance in the last 25 years and discusses its prospect for growth in the future. Exports and investment have been the two driving forces for the high annual GDP growth rates. FDI plays an important role. However, structural issues such as the loss-making state-owned firms and the fragile banking industry have to be solved. Monetary policy is complicated by the accumulation of reserves which, however, provide an insurance for the fragile banking system. Property rights, a crucial element in transforming a communist society, are far from being clearly developed. Major policy issues in the future include the correction of the distorted growth process and of the institutional deficits, especially with respect to the rule of law and the lack of democracy.

China: Coming to Grips with the New Global Player

Krugman's verdict that competitiveness of countries is a largely meaningless concept is a serious misjudgement of the economics profession. Countries compete for the mobile factors of production, most importantly for capital and technology. The exit-option of these factors and of firms changes the calculus of national governments. This paper sets out the main elements of the concept of competition between locations – locational competition – and analyses its impact on welfare and employment of the capital-exporting country. It also looks at whether competition between countries necessarily results in a race to the bottom or whether it can function as a controlling mechanism for governments and as a discovery device. The paper discusses under which conditions common rules are needed to reduce transaction costs and to prevent strategic, opportunistic behaviour of countries and which common rules thus reduce transaction costs. Finally, it deals with the question whether one institutional equilibrium in the world economy can be expected or whether many national equilibriums can coexist.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/twec_775.pdf?abstractid=877128&mirid=2

Locational Competition: A Neglected Paradigm in the International Division of Labour

It would be hard to devise a better controlled experiment for comparing different economic systems than the experience provided by East Germany and West Germany: two nations that formerly were one, occupied by people of the same background, the same culture, and the same genetic inheritance, torn apart by the accident of war. On one side of the Berlin Wall is a relatively free economic system; on the other side, a collectivist society. [Milton Friedman, in W. Breit and R. W. Spencer, 1986, p. 89]

Horst Siebert

Papers

Institutional competition : a concept for Europe?

Institutional Competition Versus ex-ante Harmonization: The Case of Environmental Policy

China: Coming to Grips with the New Global Player

Locational Competition: A Neglected Paradigm in the International Division of Labour

The Economic Integration of Post-Wall Germany