All one needs to know about fog computing and related edge computing paradigms: A complete survey

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وضعیت برونداد علمی دانشگاه علوم پزشکی کردستان براساس شاخصهای علم سنجی تا پایان سال 2011 میلادی

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With the Internet of Things (IoT) becoming part of our daily life and our environment, we expect rapid growth in the number of connected devices. IoT is expected to connect billions of devices and humans to bring promising advantages for us. With this growth, fog computing, along with its related edge computing paradigms, such as multi-access edge computing (MEC) and cloudlet, are seen as promising solutions for handling the large volume of security-critical and time-sensitive data that is being produced by the IoT. In this paper, we first provide a tutorial on fog computing and its related computing paradigms, including their similarities and differences. Next, we provide a taxonomy of research topics in fog computing, and through a comprehensive survey, we summarize and categorize the efforts on fog computing and its related computing paradigms. Finally, we provide challenges and future directions for research in fog computing.

All One Needs to Know about Fog Computing and Related Edge Computing Paradigms: A Complete Survey

2010년 전국고중입시작문문제 고찰

Fog computing is a paradigm which brings computing, storage, and networking closer to end users and end devices for better service provisioning. One of the crucial factors in the success of fog computing is on how to incentivize the individual users’ edge resources and provide them to end users such that fog computing is economically beneficial to all involved economic players. In this paper, we model and analyze a market of fog computing, from which we aim at drawing practical implications to uncover how the fog computing market should operate. To this end, we conduct an economic analysis of such user-oriented fog computing by modeling a market consisting of Infrastructure and Service Provider (ISP), end Service Users (SUs), and Edge Resource Owners (EROs) as a non-cooperative game. In this market, ISP, which provides a platform for fog computing, behaves as a mediator or a broker which leases EROs’ edge resources and provides various services to SUs. In our model, a two-stage dynamic game is used where in each stage, there exists a dynamic game, one for between ISP and EROs and another for between ISP and SUs, to model the market more practically. Despite this complex game structure, we provide a closed-form equilibrium analysis which gives an insight on how much economic benefit is obtained by ISP, SUs, and EROs from user-oriented fog computing under what conditions, and we figure out the economic factors that have a significant impact on the success of fog computing.

Economics of Fog Computing: Interplay Among Infrastructure and Service Providers, Users, and Edge Resource Owners

Blockchain technology on the platform business becomes a new paradigm which gets security, irreversibility, and trustfulness closer to both of clients and service providers (SPs) for providing a better quality of service. To provide an economic analysis of such blockchain-based platform business, a game theoretic approach is used to model a competitive market against the incumbent platform operated by a centralizer as a trusted third party. In this market, the platforms behave as a mediator to deliver the services provided by SPs to clients. The crucial factors for the success of blockchain-based platform business are (i) how SPs' participation is reflected on its quality of service (QoS) and (ii) how to incentivize SPs to contribute their resources such as computing/storage infrastructure. In our game formulation, a non-cooperative two-stage dynamic game is used, where the first stage models how to incentivize SPs in a blockchain-based platform and the second stage models the competition between platforms to attract clients. As a result, we provide an equilibrium analysis, which gives a useful insight into how much the service quality of blockchain-based platform affects the competition between platforms and the equilibrium incentive strategy for SPs. Moreover, our numerical analysis shows that the equilibrium incentive increases with proportional to the QoS of a blockchain-based platform whereas the incentive becomes negative if it provides a non-increasing QoS with the number of participated SPs.

Economic Analysis of Blockchain Technology on Digital Platform Market

To cope with consumers' ever-increasing demand of high-quality contents in the Internet, content providers (e.g., YouTube) mainly pay to global pure-play CDN companies (e.g., Akamai) instead of ISPs for content delivery. This motivates ISPs to offer their own regional CDN services as Telco-CDNs that compete with the pure-play CDNs for CPs in the CDN market. Unlike the pure-play CDNs with global consumer coverage geographically, Telco-CDNs have the strength of better QoS due to integration of traffic engineering with content delivery. In this paper, we study their competition for CPs by using dynamic game theory, where Telco-CDNs can choose to federate with each other and to which extent. We first analyze the traditional case when Telco-CDNs do not federate and independently operate to locally compete with a typical pure-play CDN. We next study the case when Telco-CDNs form a federation by (i) physically pooling their resources and/or further (ii) economically sharing the total revenue. Depending on the degree of their cooperation (with only (i), called partial federation, or with both (i) and (ii), called full federation), we study how strongly and successfully Telco-CDNs are able to penetrate into the CDN market. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that Telco-CDNs' federation may not help themselves due to the threat of perfect competition with the pure-play CDN.

On the competition of CDN companies: Impact of new telco-CDNs' federation

Fog computing is a paradigm which brings computing, storage, and networking closer to end users and devices for better service provisioning. One of the crucial factors towards the success of fog computing is how to incentivize the individual users' edge resources, thereby opening the era of user- participated fog computing. In this paper, we provide an economic analysis of such user-oriented fog computing by modeling a market consisting of ISP (Infrastructure and Service Provider), SUs (end Service Users), and EROs (Edge Resource Owners) as a noncooperative game. In this market, ISP, which provides a platform of fog computing, behaves as a mediator or a broker to lease the edge resources from EROs and provide various services to SUs. In our game formulation, a two-stage dynamic game is used, where in each stage there exists another dynamic game, one for between ISP and EROs and another for between ISP and SUs, to model the market more practically. Despite this complex game structure, we provide a closed- form equilibrium analysis, which gives an insight of how much economic benefits are obtained by ISP, SUs, and EROs under what conditions.

On the Economics of Fog Computing: Inter-Play among Infrastructure and Service Providers, Users, and Edge Resource Owners

Successful operation of User-Provided Networks (UPN) requires that both of Internet Service Provider (ISP) and self network-operating users (hosts) cooperate appropriately in terms of resource sharing and pricing strategy since ISP and hosts have a multilateral reliance on each other with respect to virtual infrastructure expansion and Internet connectivity. However, it has been underexplored whether such cooperation provides sufficient incentive to ISP and hosts under a setup where ISP and hosts are fully included, having a high dependence on how to cooperate and how to distribute the resulting cooperation worth. In this paper, we model a market of UPN, consisting of ISP, hosts, and clients via game theory, where we model various heterogeneities in terms of (i) willingness to pay and mobility pattern of clients, (ii) hosts' QoS, and (iii) type of cooperation among ISP and hosts. The key technical challenges lie in the natural mixture of cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretic angles, where the worth function---one of the crucial components in coalitional game theory---comes from the equilibrium of an embedded, non-cooperative two-stage dynamic game. We consider the Shapley value as a mechanism of revenue sharing and overcome its hardness in characterization by taking the fluid limit when the number of hosts and clients is large. Our analytical studies reveal useful implications that in UPN when and how much economic benefits can be given to the players and when they maintain their grand coalition under what conditions, referred to as stability.

Hyojung Lee

Papers

Economics of Fog Computing: Interplay Among Infrastructure and Service Providers, Users, and Edge Resource Owners

Economic Analysis of Blockchain Technology on Digital Platform Market

On the competition of CDN companies: Impact of new telco-CDNs' federation

On the Economics of Fog Computing: Inter-Play among Infrastructure and Service Providers, Users, and Edge Resource Owners

Incentivizing Hosts via Multilateral Cooperation in User-Provided Networks: A Fluid Shapley Value Approach