Showing papers by "Ingo Vogelsang published in 1997"

Telecommunications Competition:: The Last Ten Miles

Abstract: The "last ten miles" - the local and short distance telecommunications markets - of the telecommunications industry where competition is still held back are the target of this study. The authors argue that more competitive conditions are inevitable because of developing technological, market, and regulatory factors. In this book they review all the current information a communications analyst should know about telecommunications technology and network structure and their relationship to the evolution of the local market. They also explain the regulatory landscape and policy logic surrounding the local market, and include a case study of the British experience with local market regulation. Technology has diminished distance sensitivity, moderated economies of scale, and reduced total costs. At the same time, market demands have vastly increased. As a result, technical barriers to entry are falling quickly, leaving the subsidized rate systems for local exchange carriers as the largest remaining hurdle for local competition. Vogelsang and Mitchell predict that a key to effective local competition will be the interconnection framework that gives new competitors access to customers of established local exchange carriers and the regulatory background to protect such access. As those arrangements evolve, the authors argue that cross-subsidies will lose their viability and local competition will grow.

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment in the UK: The Case of Telecommunications

Abstract: This paper tries to solve the following puzzle. Given that UK governments have, in principle, so much administrative discretion, how were the Conservative governments of the 1980s able to privatize the telecommunications, electricity, water, gas, and airport sectors so prone for administrative expropriation? The answer resides in the subtle use of processes and other institutional arrangements that limit regulatory discretion. We model these processes and contrast the workings of our model to the evolution of regulation in te UK telecommunications sector. Under simple assumptions about preferences of the relevant players, the model is consistent with the evolution of telecommunications regulation.