How to Do Things With Words

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

語用論(Pragmatics)を考える

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a survey of 84 participants at the 1969 meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Society and the American Psychological Association (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The respondents, including several authors of statistics texts, were asked realistic questions about the robustness of statistical estimates and the replicability of research results. The article commented tongue-in-heek on the prevalence of a belief that the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well: Respondents placed too much confidence in the results of small samples, and their statistical judgments showed little sensitivity to sample size. The mathematical psychologists who participated in the survey not only should have known better – they did know better. Although their intuitive guesses were off the mark, most of them could have computed the correct answers on the back of an envelope. These sophisticated individuals apparently had access to two distinct approaches for answering statistical questions: one that is spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast; and another that is deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and slow. The persistence of large biases in the guesses of experts raised doubts about the educability of statistical intuitions. Moreover, it was known that the same biases affect choices in the real world, where researchers commonly select sample sizes that are too small to provide a fair test of their hypotheses (Cohen, 1969, 1992).

Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.

Exploring the processing costs of the "exactly" and "at least" readings of bare numerals with event-related brain potentials.

The approximate number system (a) views number as an imprecise signal that (b) functions equivalently regardless of a number’s initial presentation. These features do not readily account for exact readings when a task calls for them. While profiting from insights in areas neighboring the number cognition literature, we propose that linguistic-pragmatic and cultural pressures operate on a number’s upper bound in order to provide exact readings. With respect to (a), Experimental Pragmatic findings indicate that numbers appear to be semantically lower-bounded (Eleven candidates are coming means at least eleven) but fluid at its upper-bound; exactly readings emerge as a consequence of an additional pragmatic process that solidifies the upper bound. With respect to (b), studies from cognitive anthropology underline how symbolic representations of number are distinct from written codes. Here, we investigate a novel hypothesis proposing that symbolic expressions of number (such as “11”) explicitly provide exactly readings unlike verbal (oral and written) ones, which engender at least readings. We then employ a Numerical Magnitude Task (NMT), in which French-speaking participants determine whether a presented number is lesser or greater than a benchmark (12) in one of three presentation conditions: i) Symbolic/Hindu-Arabic (e.g. “11” via screen), ii) Oral (e.g. “/ˈon.zə/” via headphones), or; iii) spelled-out-in-Letters (e.g. “onze” via screen). Participants also carry out a Number Identification Task (NIT) so that each participant’s recognition speed per number can be removed from their NMT times. We report that decision reaction times to “onze” take longer to process (and prompt more errors) than “treize” whereas “11” and “13” are comparable. One prediction was not supported: Decision times to the critical oral forms (“/ˈon.zə/” and “[tʁ̥ɛːzə̆]”) were comparable, making these outcomes resonate with those in the Symbolic condition.

When eleven does not equal 11: Investigating exactness at a number’s upper bound

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/00/01/65/PDF/Metaphor.pdf

Ira A. Noveck

Papers

Exploring the processing costs of the "exactly" and "at least" readings of bare numerals with event-related brain potentials.

When eleven does not equal 11: Investigating exactness at a number’s upper bound

The Costs and Benets of Metaphor

A deflationary account of invited inferences

To what extent does the development of conceptual categories depend on language