Showing papers by "Isaac Levi published in 1984"
Book•
28 Dec 1984
TL;DR: The author examines the role of inductive inference in cognitive decision making and its role in inference and decision making in the context of classical liberalism.
Abstract: Preface Part I Cognitive Decision Making: 1 Must the scientist make value judgements? 2 On the seriousness of mistakes 3 Corroboration and rules of acceptance 4 Deductive cogency in inductive inference 5 Information and inference 6 Epistemic utility and the evaluation of experiments 7 Abduction and demands for information Part II Knowledge and Ignorance: 8 Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge 9 Four types of ignorance 10 Escape from boredom: edification according to Rorty 11 Serious possibility Part III: Chance and Surprise: 12 Subjectives, dispositions and chances 13 Direct inference 14 Potential surprise: its role in inference and decision making Part IV Decision Making: 15 Newcomb's many problems 16 Conflict and social agency 17 Liberty and welfare Bibliography of Isaac Levi Bibliography Index of names Index of subjects
28 citations
12 citations
TL;DR: By reviewing different types of ignorance, some understanding of different senses of information may be obtained and some applications to the choice of prior probabilities are briefly explored.
Abstract: Ignorance is sometimes understood to be deprivation of information. By reviewing different types of ignorance, some understanding of different senses of information may be obtained. This paper surveys some possibilities along these lines. Reliance on entropy based measures of information is held to be inappropriate to several important senses of ignorance. Some applications to the choice of prior probabilities are briefly explored.
5 citations
01 Jan 1984
TL;DR: In this article, two views of the role of truth as an aim of inquiry are contrasted: the Peirce-Popper or messianic view of approach to the truth and the myopic view according to which a concern to avoid error is a proximate aim common to many otherwise diverse inquiries.
Abstract: Two views of the role of truth as an aim of inquiry are contrasted: The Peirce-Popper or messianic view of approach to the truth as an ultimate aim of inquiry and the myopic view according to which a concern to avoid error is a proximate aim common to many otherwise diverse inquiries. The messianic conception is held to be responsible for the tendency to conflate fallibilism with corrigibilism and for the consequent problems faced by Peirceans and Popperians alike in squaring the alleged relevance of the fruits of scientific inquiry for practice while insisting on the corrigibility of knowledge. Myopic realism is advocated as promising escape from these difficulties.
5 citations
1 citations