American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

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Current index to legal periodicals

In the 1990s no-fly zones were introduced as a new way to utilize airpower in the context of Peace Support Operations (PSOs). During that time, they were put to use over Iraq and over Bosnia. However, it is unclear to what extent the no-fly zones were successful in those two instances. This article examines the capabilities of no-fly zones and analyzes the Iraq and Bosnia cases of enforcement. It concludes that no-fly zones can be very effective if properly implemented and offers guidance for policy-makers on how to achieve maximum efficacy.

Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of No-Fly Zones

The situation in Syria from 2011. The Syrian conflict and international law. Humanitarian intervention in Syria and the responsability to protect the civilian population. Failing to protect the Syrian population.

The Syrian conflict: an analysis of the crisis in the light of international law

Predicting terrorist attacks with prediction markets has been accused of being immoral. While some of these concerns are about the likely effectiveness of prediction markets on terrorism PMsoT, this paper discusses the three main reasons why even effective prediction markets on terrorism might be considered immoral. The authors argue that these three reasons establish only that PMsoT cause offense and/or fleeting mild harm, and that, even taken together, they do not constitute serious harm. The moral issues considered are that PMsoT: 1 create character-affecting perverse incentives, 2 desensitise society to tragic events, and 3 disrespect important ideals. In addition to arguing against the force of these three potential moral problems, it is also argued that societies and governments already endorse intelligence-gathering methods that are clearly more immoral than PMsoT in the relevant respects. The authors also argue that some circumstances require governments to cause non-serious harm to some people in order to protect and promote the rights and welfare of its citizens. The authors conclude that a government's obligation to protect and promote the rights and welfare of its citizens outweighs the non-serious harm that could be caused by effective PMsoT. As a result, we recommend that the likelihood of PMsoT being effective is investigated more closely.

A Moral Analysis of Effective Prediction Markets on Terrorism

In recent years the UN Secretary-General has promoted mass atrocity prevention as the priority agenda for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN, redirecting debates on R2P away from military interventionism towards improved state capacity to prevent atrocity crimes and protect populations. This focus has been illustrated in the UNSG’s annual reports on R2P since 2009, and the 2014 “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes”, that emphasise state institutional capacity and the identification of atrocity-risk indicators. Through a case-study of Pakistan, this article problematizes the relationship between internal security and the UN agenda on atrocity prevention to evaluate the viability of promoting atrocity prevention as currently conceived by the Office of the UNSG in high-risk contexts. It argues that an atrocity prevention agenda informed by a responsive regulation framework would be more effective in taking into account the relational dynamics of atrocity crimes. This includes accounting for the interaction between the microdynamics of political violence with macro-dynamics created by lengthy historical conflicts and strategic repertoires.

/pdf/evaluating-the-united-nation-s-agenda-for-atrocity-16to0a8132.pdf

Evaluating the United Nation's Agenda for Atrocity Prevention: prospects for the international regulation of internal security

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a complicated and “emerging norm” of international law that seeks to provide a means for the international community to prevent mass atrocity crimes occurring within the boundaries of a sovereign state. Since its emergence in 2001, in the wake of humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur, R2P has been hailed as a way of resolving what one commentator called the “problem from hell.” Under R2P, however, the use of force is reserved for actions within the UN Charter’s Chapter VII framework. As the Syria crisis has demonstrated, this position continues to hinder efforts by the international community to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes. At the time of writing, attacks by Syrian government forces and militias have killed upward of 75,000 civilians, and approximately 1,000,000 refugees have fled into neighboring states. Diplomacy and sanctions have not worked. Although the UN Human Rights Council has concluded that Syria’s humanitarian crisis is being driven by a “state policy” of deliberate attacks against civilians, the Security Council remains deadlocked and ineffective in the crisis. Reports from a number of Western governments that the Syrian government has deliberately used chemical weapons against civilians underscore the gravity of the crisis.This article argues that when peaceful measures have been exhausted and the Security Council is deadlocked, R2P’s third pillar should allow the use of only those low-intensity military options, such as no-fly zones and humanitarian safe havens, that are focused on protecting populations. This approach would advance R2P’s development by establishing specific criteria that allow for the limited use of force when the Security Council fails to act. In doing so, R2P will be able to fulfill its primary purpose of preventing mass atrocities within a sovereign state, thus preventing humanitarian tragedies similar to those witnessed in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, and now Syria.

/pdf/preventing-mass-atrocity-crimes-the-responsibility-to-3se4vor892.pdf

Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis

/pdf/preventing-mass-atrocity-crimes-the-responsibility-to-52kdo0nsoa.pdf

The Right Way to Create Safe Zones in Syria

Author's note: This article was written in 2004, before Abu Ghraib, waterboarding, and the so-called "torture memos" had come to light. It examines the legal status of "stress and duress" ("S&D") techniques that were reportedly used at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan and at other undisclosed locations after 9/11. In 2009, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13491, prohibiting any U.S. Government agent or agency from using S&D, waterboarding, and other abusive interrogation techniques. ------------------- It has been said of torture that "[n]o other practice except slavery is so universally and unanimously condemned in law and human convention." Perhaps no country embodied this ideal more than the United States. For much of its history, the US shunned torture and other forms of coercive interrogation. Then came September 11th, 2001. The shock of that disaster, coupled with the threat of further attacks by al-Qaeda and the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, fueled an unprecedented re-examination of torture's legal and moral status. As a result, torture and other forms of coercive interrogation quickly lost their stigma in the post 9/11 environment. This growing acceptance of torture and coercive interrogation had real-world consequences. By all accounts, US interrogation policy underwent dramatic changes after September 11th. At the time, these reports raised crucial and unresolved questions about the legality of "moderate" forms of mental and physical coercion generally, and US interrogation practices in particular. Does S&D amount to torture under international and domestic law? If not, does it nevertheless violate important human rights norms? Legality aside, should the US employ harsher methods, as Judge Posner argues, when "the stakes are high enough"? Or is the US committed to a doctrinaire interpretation of human rights, no matter how grave the risk to national security? Are there effective methods of interrogation that are consistent with US law and international human rights? This article analyzes these issues in the context of September 11th and the ongoing war on terror. Section II discusses the recent shift in US interrogation policy, and examines how the unique threat posed by al-Qaeda led the US to consider harsher interrogation techniques. Section III discusses the status of S&D under international law, looking in particular at recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Israel. Section IV discusses the legality of S&D under US law. Section V analyzes the legality of US interrogation practices. Section VI evaluates a common hypothetical used to justify S&D: the "ticking time bomb" scenario. Section VII offers my conclusions and recommendations. Although alleged US interrogation practices examined here probably do not rise to the legal definition of torture, they are nevertheless illegal under international and domestic law.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=2178171

Tortured Logic: The (Il)Legality of United States Interrogation Practices in the War on Terror

/pdf/tortured-logic-the-il-legality-of-united-states-4arz8opuhm.pdf

J. Trevor Ulbrick

Papers

Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis

Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis

The Right Way to Create Safe Zones in Syria

Tortured Logic: The (Il)Legality of United States Interrogation Practices in the War on Terror

Tortured Logic: The (Il)legality of United States Interrogation Practices in the War on Terror