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James Costain

Researcher at Bank of Spain

Publications -  60
Citations -  1516

James Costain is an academic researcher from Bank of Spain. The author has contributed to research in topics: Wage & Unemployment. The author has an hindex of 20, co-authored 59 publications receiving 1457 citations. Previous affiliations of James Costain include European Central Bank & Complutense University of Madrid.

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Business cycles, unemployment insurance, and the calibration of matching models

TL;DR: The authors theoretically and empirically document a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment, and show that either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical.
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Inflation dynamics with labour market matching : assessing alternative specifications

TL;DR: In this article, a review of recent approaches to modeling the labour market and assessing their implications for in-factation dynamics through both their effect on marginal cost and on price-setting behavior is presented.
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Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and Calibration of Matching Models

TL;DR: In this article, the authors point out an empirical failing of real business cycle models in which unemployment is endogenized through a matching function and propose two possible resolutions of the problem: improving the fit along one dimension makes it worse along the other.
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Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving

TL;DR: In this paper, a welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a general equilibrium job search model; the model is calibrated to U.S. data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies of unemployment spells.
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Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard

TL;DR: This article considered a dynamic matching model with imperfectly observable worker effort and showed that workers' shirking motive reduces the cyclical fluctuations in job destruction, because firms are forced to terminate some marginal jobs in booms which they cannot commit to maintain in recessions.