A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

A Treatise on the Family

We describe the theory and practice of real GDP comparisons across countries and over time. Effective with version 8, the Penn World Table (PWT) will be taken over by the University of California, Davis and the University of Groningen, with continued input from Alan Heston at the University of Pennsylvania. Version 8 will expand on previous versions of PWT in three respects. First, it will distinguish real GDP on the expenditure side from real GDP on the output side, which differ by the terms of trade faced by countries. Second, it will distinguish growth rates of GDP based on national accounts data from growth rates that are benchmarked in multiple years to cross-country price data. Third, data on capital stocks will be reintroduced. Some illustrative results from PWT version 8 are discussed, including new results that show how the Penn effect is not emergent but a stable relationship over time.

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w19255/w19255.pdf

The Next Generation of the Penn World Table

This paper investigates the impact of tax changes on economic activity. We use the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and Congressional reports, to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major post war tax policy actions. This analysis allows us to separate legislated changes into those taken for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and those taken for more exogenous reasons. The behavior of output following these more exogenous changes indicates that tax increases are highly contractionary. The effects are strongly significant, highly robust, and much larger than those obtained using broader measures of tax changes. (JEL E32, E62, H20, N12) Tax changes have been a major public policy issue in recent years. The tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 were passed amid firestorms of debate about their likely effects. Some policymakers claimed that the cuts would both stimulate the economy in the short run and increase normal output in the long run. Others argued that they would raise interest rates and lower confidence and thereby reduce output in both the short run and the long run. That views of the effects of tax changes vary so radically largely reflects the fact that measuring these effects is very difficult. Tax changes occur for many reasons. Some legislated tax changes are passed for philosophical reasons or to reduce an inherited budget deficit. Others are passed because the economy is weak and predicted to fall further, or because a war is in progress and government spending is rising. And many tax changes are not legislated at all, but occur automatically because the tax base varies with the overall level of income, or because of changes in stock prices, inflation, and other nonpolicy forces. Because the factors that give rise to tax changes are often correlated with other developments in the economy, disentangling the effects of the tax changes from the effects of these underlying factors is inherently difficult. There is pervasive omitted variable bias in any regression of output on an aggregate measure of tax changes. This paper suggests one way of dealing with this omitted variable bias. There exists a vast narrative record describing the history and motivation of tax policy changes. We first use this narrative history to separate legislated tax changes from those arising from nonpolicy develop ments. We then use the information on motivation to separate the legislated tax changes into those that are likely to be contaminated by other developments affecting output, and those that can legitimately be used to measure the macroeconomic effects of tax changes. Finally, we use the legitimate observations to derive estimates of the effects of tax changes on output that are likely to be less biased than previous estimates. Section I of the paper elaborates on the conceptual framework for this study. It emphasizes that what we seek to identify from the narrative record are tax changes that are not systematically

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The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks

Micro-level data have had a profound influence on research in inter national trade over the last ten years. In many regards, this research agenda has been very successful. New stylized facts have been uncovered and new trade models have been developed to explain these facts. In this paper we investigate to what extent answers to new micro-level questions have affected answers to an old and central question in the field: how large are the welfare gains from trade? A crude summary of our results is: “So far, not much.” (JEL

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New Trade Models, Same Old Gains?

In a recent study, Nunn (2008) examines the long-term impacts of Africa’s slave trade. He finds that the slave trade, which occurred over a period of more than 400 years, had a significant negative effect on long-term economic development. Although the article arguably identifies a negative causal relationship between the slave trade and income today, the analysis is unable to establish the exact causal mechanisms underlying this reduced-form relationship. In this article, we examine one of the channels through which the slave trade may affect economic development today. Combining contemporary individual-level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group, we ask whether the slave trade caused a culture of mistrust to develop within Africa. Initially, slaves were captured primarily through state organized raids and warfare, but as the trade progressed, the environment of ubiquitous insecurity caused individuals to turn on others—including friends and family members—and to kidnap, trick, and sell each other into slavery (Sigismund Wilhelm Koelle 1854; P. E. H. Hair 1965; Charles Piot 1996). We hypothesize that in this environment, a culture of mistrust may have evolved, which may persist to this day. We show that current differences in trust levels within Africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. Combining contemporary individual-level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group, we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today. Evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal. Examining causal mechanisms, we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual, such as cultural norms, beliefs, and values. (JEL J15, N57, Z13)

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The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa

Whether or not the marginal product of capital (MPK) differs across countries is a question that keeps coming up in discussions of comparative economic development and patterns of capital flows. Using easily accessible macroeconomic data we find that MPKs are remarkably similar across countries. Hence, there is no prima facie support for the view that international credit frictions play a major role in preventing capital flows from rich to poor countries. Lower capital ratios in these countries are instead attributable to lower endowments of complementary factors and lower efficiency, as well as to lower prices of output goods relative to capital. We also show that properly accounting for the share of income accruing to reproducible capital is critical to reach these conclusions. One implication of our findings is that increased aid flows to developing countries will not significantly increase these countries’ capital stocks and incomes. I. INTRODUCTION Is the world’s capital stock efficiently allocated across countries? If so, then all countries have roughly the same aggregate marginal product of capital (MPK). If not, the MPK will vary substantially from country to country. In the latter case, the world foregoes an opportunity to increase global GDP by reallocating capital from low to high MPK countries. The policy implications are far reaching. Given the enormous cross-country differences in observed capital-labor ratios (they vary by a factor of 100 in the data used in this paper) it may seem obvious that the MPK must vary dramatically as well. In this case we would have to conclude that there are important frictions in international capital markets that prevent an efficient cross-country allocation of capital. 1 However, as Lucas [1990] pointed out in his celebrated article, poor countries also have lower endowments of factors complementary with physical capital, such as human capital, and lower total

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The Marginal Product of Capital

This paper examines the relationship between workforce demographics and aggregate productivity. Changes in the age structure of the workforce are found to be significantly correlated with ...

Demographics and productivity

We track the geographic and temporal propagation of local economic shocks from new oil and gas production generated by hydrofracturing. Each million dollars of new production produces $80,000 in wage income and $132,000 in royalty and business income within a county. Within 100 miles, one million dollars of new production generates $257,000 in wages and $286,000 in royalty and business income. Roughly two-thirds of the wage income increase persists for two years. Assuming no general equilibrium effects, new extraction increased aggregate US employment by as many as 640,000, and decreased the unemployment rate by 0.43 during the Great Recession. (JEL D86, L14, L81, L82)

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Geographic Dispersion of Economic Shocks: Evidence from the Fracking Revolution

Establishing a robust causal relationship between trade and income has been difficult. Frankel and Romer (1999) use a geographic instrument to identify a positive effect of trade on income. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) show that these results are not robust to controlling for omitted variables such as distance to the equator or institutions. This paper solves the omitted variable problem by generating a time varying geographic instrument. Improvements in aircraft technology have caused the quantity of world trade carried by air to increase over time. Country pairs with relatively short air routes compared to sea routes benefit more from this change in technology. This heterogeneity can be used to generate a geography based instrument for trade that varies over time. The time series variation allows for controls for country fixed effects, eliminating the bias from time invariant variables such as distance from the equator or historically determined institutions. Trade has a significant effect on income with an elasticity of roughly one half. Differences in predicted trade growth can explain roughly 17 percent of the variation in cross country income growth between 1960 and 1995.

Trade and Income -- Exploiting Time Series in Geography

Only a few rich nations are currently at replacement levels of fertility and many are considerably below. We believe that changes in the status of women are driving fertility change. At low levels of female status, women specialize in household production and fertility is high. In an intermediate phase, women have increasing opportunities to earn a living outside the home yet still shoulder the bulk of household production. Fertility is at a minimum in this regime due to the increased opportunity cost in women's foregone wages with no decrease in time allocated to childcare. We see the lowest fertility nations (Japan, Spain, Italy) as being in this regime. At even higher levels of women's status, men begin to share in the burden of child care at home and fertility is higher than in the middle regime. This progression has been observed in the US, Sweden and other countries. Using ISSP and World Values Survey data we show that countries in which men perform relatively more of the childcare and household production (and where female labor force participation was highest 30 years ago) have the highest fertility within the rich country sample. Fertility and women's labor force participation have become positively correlated across high income countries. The trend in men's household work suggests that the low fertility countries may see increases in fertility as women's household status catches up to their workforce opportunities. We also note that as the poor nations of the world undergo the demographic transition they appear to be reducing fertility faster and further than the current rich countries did at similar levels of income. By examining fertility differences between the rich nations we may be able to gain insight into where the world is headed.

James Feyrer

Papers

The Marginal Product of Capital

Demographics and productivity

Geographic Dispersion of Economic Shocks: Evidence from the Fracking Revolution

Trade and Income -- Exploiting Time Series in Geography

Will the Stork Return to Europe and Japan? Understanding Fertility within Developed Nations