https://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage

Building Theories From Case Study Research - This paper describes the process of inducting theory using case studies from specifying the research questions to reaching closure. Some features of the process, such as problem definition and construct validation, are similar to hypothesis-testing research. Others, such as within-case analysis and replication logic, are unique to the inductive, case-oriented process. Overall, the process described here is highly iterative and tightly linked to data. This research approach is especially appropriate in new topic areas. The resultant theory is often novel, testable, and empirically valid. Finally, framebreaking insights, the tests of good theory (e.g., parsimony, logical coherence), and convincing grounding in the evidence are the key criteria for evaluating this type of research.

Building theories from case study research

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

/pdf/the-iron-cage-revisited-institutional-isomorphism-and-xas5qn5nhy.pdf

The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields

The dynamic capabilities framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealth creation and capture by private enterprise firms operating in environments of rapid technological change. The competitive advantage of firms is seen as resting on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and combining), shaped by the firm's (specific) asset positions (such as the firm's portfolio of difftcult-to- trade knowledge assets and complementary assets), and the evolution path(s) it has aflopted or inherited. The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of increasing retums exist. Whether and how a firm's competitive advantage is eroded depends on the stability of market demand, and the ease of replicability (expanding intemally) and imitatability (replication by competitors). If correct, the framework suggests that private wealth creation in regimes of rapid technological change depends in large measure on honing intemal technological, organizational, and managerial processes inside the firm. In short, identifying new opportunities and organizing effectively and efficiently to embrace them are generally more fundamental to private wealth creation than is strategizing, if by strategizing one means engaging in business conduct that keeps competitors off balance, raises rival's costs, and excludes new entrants. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

/pdf/dynamic-capabilities-and-strategic-management-4iyi34iyh6.pdf

Dynamic capabilities and strategic management

This paper considers the relation between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning. It examines some complications in allocating resources between the two, particularly those introduced by the distribution of costs and benefits across time and space, and the effects of ecological interaction. Two general situations involving the development and use of knowledge in organizations are modeled. The first is the case of mutual learning between members of an organization and an organizational code. The second is the case of learning and competitive advantage in competition for primacy. The paper develops an argument that adaptive processes, by refining exploitation more rapidly than exploration, are likely to become effective in the short run but self-destructive in the long run. The possibility that certain common organizational practices ameliorate that tendency is assessed.

http://strategy.sjsu.edu/www.stable/pdf/March,%20J.%20G.%20%281991%29.%20Organization%20Science%202%281%29%2071-87.pdf

Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning

List of Tables and Figures. Acknowledgements. Preface to Second Edition. 1. Introduction. 2. Antecedents of the Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 3. Organizational Goals. 4. Organizational Expectations. 5. Organizational Choice. 6. A Specific Price and Output Model. 7. A Summary of Basic Concepts in the Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 8. Some Implications. 9. An Epilogue. Index.

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.

Organized anarchies are organizations characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Recent studies of universities, a familiar form of organized anarchy, suggest that such organizations can be viewed for some purposes as collections of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer, and decision makers looking for work. These ideas are translated into an explicit computer simulation model of a garbage can decision process. The general implications of such a model are described in terms of five major measures on the process. Possible applications of the model to more narrow predictions are illustrated by an examination of the model's predictions with respect to the effect of adversity on university decision making.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2392088.pdf

A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.

Provides a theory of decision making within business organizations. Contrary to the economic theory of the firm, which sees firms as profit-maximizing entities, the authors advocate a theory based on empirical observation of actual firm decision-making. Various features of firm decision-making are identified. First, firms are coalitions of participants whose individual goals may and often do conflict. How this conflict is resolved is determined by the firm's bargaining process. This process is constrained by past behavior and decisions. Second, the authors reject the notion that firms are one-dimensional profit-maximizers in favor of a view of firms as entities with many different objectives that will accept suboptimal outcomes if they are above a minimum level. Congruent with this, a firm's search activity occurs in response to a perceived problem and is limited in scope. The effect is that firm policies will change only incrementally. Also impeding radical policy change is the fact that firms react to uncertainty using standardized decision rules. Using this theory, two computer models of business decision-making are presented and compared with actual results. These models are shown to have especially good predictive power. (CAR)

James G. March

Papers

Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.

A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm