J
James G. March
Researcher at Stanford University
Publications - 176
Citations - 98674
James G. March is an academic researcher from Stanford University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Organizational learning & Politics. The author has an hindex of 72, co-authored 176 publications receiving 94815 citations. Previous affiliations of James G. March include Carnegie Mellon University & University of Bergen.
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An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence
TL;DR: The science of politics is a science of human behavior as mentioned in this paper, which concerns itself with a specific segment of the activities of humans, those which either take place in, or have a clearly discernible effect upon, the formal governmental machinery of the community.
Posted Content
Parochialism in the Evolution of a Research Community: The Case of Organization Studies
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider some ways of thinking about how research boundaries can be both sustained and violated, with particular attention to the emergence of Chinese scholarship in the study of organizations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Almost Random Careers: The Wisconsin School Superintendency, 1940-1972.
James G. March,James G. March +1 more
Journal ArticleDOI
Parochialism in the Evolution of a Research Community: The Case of Organization Studies
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider some ways of thinking about how research boundaries can be both sustained and violated, with particular attention to the emergence of Chinese scholarship in the study of organizations.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Pursuit of Relevance in Management Education
Mie Augier,James G. March +1 more
TL;DR: The history of North American management education can be viewed as an extended debate over the proper balance between experiential knowledge and academic knowledge in the pursuit of relevance as discussed by the authors, including arguments that relevance is usually ambiguous and myopic and consequently potentially pernicious, as well as claims that relevance as it is usually conceived is fundamentally irrelevant.