世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

Series Editor's Preface. Introduction by John Breuilly. Acknowledgements. 1. Definitions. State and nation. The nation. 2. Culture in Agrarian Society. Power and culture in the agro-literature society. The varieties of agrarian rulers. 3. Industrial Society. The society of perpetual growth. Social genetics. The age of universal high culture. 4. The Transition to an Age of Nationalism. A note on the weakness of nationalism. Wild and garden culture. 5. What is a Nation. The course of true nationalism never did run smooth. 6. Social Entropy and Equality in Industrial Society. Obstacles to entropy. Fissures and barriers. A diversity of focus. 7. A Typology of Nationalisms. The varieties of nationalist experience. Diaspora nationalism. 8. The Future of Nationalism. Industrial culture - one or many?. 9. Nationalism and Ideology. Who is for Nuremberg?. One nation, one state. 10. Conclusion. What is not being said. Summary. Select bibliography. Bilbliography of Ernest Gellner's writing: Ian Jarvie. Index

Nations and Nationalism

Against our will: Men, women, and rape

4. UNHCR notes with concern that although the country acceded to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol in 1999, incorporation of the 1951 Convention obligations into national legislation and normative acts has been slow and to date Kazakhstan has failed to comply with its obligation to give full effect to the Covenant in the domestic legal order, inter alia providing for effective judicial and other remedies for violations of these rights

United Nations High Commission for Refugees

Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence — from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, Judith Lewis Herman. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 276 pp. $27.00. ISBN 0-465-08765–5.Shattered Assumptions: Toward A New Psychology of Trauma, Ronnie Janoff-Bulman. New York: The Free Press, 1992, 256 pp. $24.95. ISBN 0-02-916015–4.

Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence — from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror

The end of the Cold War has provided scholars of international relations with a unique opportunity to evaluate the explanatory power of their models in a rapidly changing environment. We provide a ...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2648001.pdf

Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War

One of the most intriguing claims that has been made about the behavior of American presidents is that they have been motivated by deteriorating political conditions at home to engage in conflict abroad. However, we identify three problems with this literature: (1) the use of increments of time rather than international crises as the unit of analysis; (2) the assump tion that presidents can respond to international crises whenever they wish; and (3) the assumption that there are significant political payoffs for diver sionary uses of force. We argue that few if any relationships are likely to be found between presidential popularity, congressional support, economic conditions and elections and the use of force. We test our hypotheses by looking at the political use of military force by American presidents in the post-World War II era (1953-88). We also test to determine if the causal order is not reversed and if it is domestic conditions which precipitate international crises. Ultimately, we find little e...

The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents

This article examines the effects of civil wars on economies. The “war renewal” school of thought maintains that wars can produce beneficial effects as they improve efficiency in the economy, especially by reducing the power of special interests, bring technological innovation, and advance human capital. The “war ruin” school of thought sees mostly detrimental effects resulting from war. We seek to address two critical questions. First, which perspective on wars and economic growth is more accurate? Second, to what extent do policy choices at both the domestic and international levels exert influence on economic growth? We develop several hypotheses to assess these arguments, and utilizing a 2SLS model, test them on data for all nations for the period 1960–2002. We find that generally wars exercise negative economic effects and that economic fundamentals, as well as the response by the international community to civil wars, exert powerful effects on economic growth.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00309.x

Civil War Destruction and the Prospects for Economic Growth

During the Cold War American presidents have used military force in support of U.S. foreign policy over 200 times (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978; Zelikow, 1986). In order to explain and predict this activity, I develop a model of presidential decision making that incorporates the concept of an "opportunity to use force" which most previous research has neglected. I hypothesize that presidents are led to use greater levels of military force the greater the threat to the nation's overseas defense commitments and their own domestic reputation for taking forceful action, and the less likely the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union. I examine 458 international crises from 1948 through 1988, and using tobit analysis I find that most of the hypothesized relationships are statistically significant. The findings support the value of using opportunities to use force as the unit of analysis and the greater impact of international versus domestic conditions in presidents' decision making.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2600874

Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force

All through history, when United States presidents have sought to explain or defend US military interventions in foreign lands, no goal, with the exception of the national security of the United States, has been advanced with such regularity and frequency as the promotion of democracy. Interestingly, however, this readiness to use force in the name of democracy does not appear to square with some of the emerging findings on the pacific relations among democratic nations. If states do not war on each other because they are democratic, does it make sense that they wage war or use force to compel others to become democratic? In this article the author attempts to answer two central questions related to the use of force by the United States in the ostensible quest to promote democracy. First, why would the United States intervene in the affairs of other nations to promote democracy? And second, is the use of force an effective tool in the promotion of democracy? The article finds that in the majority of cases, regardless of the manner in which democratic change is measured, US military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of democracy. Most nations retain their current level of democracy. However, when a comparison is made between nations which have experienced intervention, with those that have not, it is shown that the former group is more likely to experience democratic growth. Probit analyses of the effects of military intervention on democratization generally support the notion that the use of US ground forces does lead to increased democratization. A probit model is also developed to predict which military interventions are most likely to promote democracy. The predictive success of the models is quite high. The author finds that when the president declares democracy is a goal of the intervention, and if the US government is opposed to the targeted regime, democracy is more likely to be promoted.

James Meernik

Papers

Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War

The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents

Civil War Destruction and the Prospects for Economic Growth

Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force

United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy