Boosting algorithms for network intrusion detection: A comparative evaluation of Real AdaBoost, Gentle AdaBoost and Modest AdaBoost

In 2012 we presented the rst systematic study of the costs of cybercrime. In this paper,
we report what has changed in the seven years since. The period has seen major platform
evolution, with the mobile phone replacing the PC and laptop as the consumer terminal
of choice, with Android replacing Windows, and with many services moving to the cloud.
The use of social networks has become extremely widespread. The executive summary is
that about half of all property crime, by volume and by value, is now online. We hypothesised
in 2012 that this might be so; it is now established by multiple victimisation studies.
Many cybercrime patterns appear to be fairly stable, but there are some interesting changes.
Payment fraud, for example, has more than doubled in value but has fallen slightly as a
proportion of payment value; the payment system has simply become bigger, and slightly
more ecient. Several new cybercrimes are signicant enough to mention, including business
email compromise and crimes involving cryptocurrencies. The move to the cloud means that
system misconguration may now be responsible for as many breaches as phishing. Some
companies have suered large losses as a side-eect of denial-of-service worms released by
state actors, such as NotPetya; we have to take a view on whether they count as cybercrime.
The infrastructure supporting cybercrime, such as botnets, continues to evolve, and specic
crimes such as premium-rate phone scams have evolved some interesting variants. The overall
picture is the same as in 2012: traditional oences that are now technically `computer
crimes' such as tax and welfare fraud cost the typical citizen in the low hundreds of Euros/
dollars a year; payment frauds and similar oences, where the modus operandi has been
completely changed by computers, cost in the tens; while the new computer crimes cost in
the tens of cents. Defending against the platforms used to support the latter two types of
crime cost citizens in the tens of dollars. Our conclusions remain broadly the same as in 2012:
it would be economically rational to spend less in anticipation of cybercrime (on antivirus,
rewalls, etc.) and more on response. We are particularly bad at prosecuting criminals who
operate infrastructure that other wrongdoers exploit. Given the growing realisation among
policymakers that crime hasn't been falling over the past decade, merely moving online, we
might reasonably hope for better funded and coordinated law-enforcement action.

/pdf/measuring-the-changing-cost-of-cybercrime-1m15e66ehw.pdf

Measuring the changing cost of cybercrime

Political ideology moderates consumer response to brand crisis apologies for data breaches

Companies collect customer information in marketing research to understand customers and generate customer insights. Various public policy and ethical issues are associated with the process. The issues include intrusions on consumer privacy; misuse, misinterpretation, and misrepresentation of research findings; ethical and social dilemma in the collection of customer information; and ethical dilemma in generating customer insights through neuromarketing and its applications. In this digital age, it is easier to invade consumer privacy. Companies abide by the various laws and regulations enforced to protect customers and adopt a number of initiatives to convince their customers. Understanding of the various public policy and ethical issues and addressing such issues by adopting proper initiatives will help companies convince customers, build effective customer relationships, and achieve business excellence. The understanding might also help policymakers to appreciate the customer requirements and devise policies, rules, and regulations accordingly.

Public Policy Issues and Technoethics in Marketing Research in the Digital Age

In view of effectiveness, ease of access and profitability, the advancement in e-Commerce is an immense step in forward. The development is went with further unusual vulnerabilities to worry. The significant issue all through the world in credit card management is credit card fraud. Because of extortion and fraudsters persistently look for better approaches to confer unlawful activities the organizations, users and establishment finds tremendous loss yearly. In the common Credit Card extortion process, fraudulent transaction will be distinguished only after the transaction is finished. In recent Studies, the security of Credit Card Transaction from unauthorized admittance or usage are addressed by diverse access control methods. This paper illustrates a new scheme of Authentication using Primary PIN and Multifactor authentication to secure credit card transactions.

/pdf/authentication-using-robust-primary-pin-personal-3li003nk35.pdf

Authentication using Robust Primary PIN (Personal Identification Number), Multifactor Authentication for Credit Card Swipe and Online Transactions Security

When card data is exposed in a data breach but has not yet been used to attempt fraud, the overall social costs of that breach depend on whether the financial institutions that issued those cards immediately cancel them and issue new cards or instead wait until fraud is attempted. This article empirically investigates the social costs and benefits of those options. We use a parameterized model and Monte Carlo simulation to compare the cost of reissuing cards to the total expected cost of fraud if cards are not reissued. The ranges and distributions in our model are informed by publicly available information, from which we extrapolate estimates of the number of credit card records historically exposed in data breaches, the probability that a card exposed in a breach will be used for fraud, and the associated expected cost of existing-account credit card fraud. We find that automatically reissuing cards may have lower social costs than the costs of waiting until fraud is attempted, although the range of results is considerably broad.

James T. Graves

Papers

Should Credit Card Issuers Reissue Cards in Response to a Data Breach?: Uncertainty and Transparency in Metrics for Data Security Policymaking