Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Facility location and supply chain management - A review

This book opens a fresh chapter in the debate on local enterprise clusters and their strategies for upgrading in the global economy. The authors employ a novel conceptual framework in their research on industrial clusters in Europe, Latin America and Asia and provide new perspectives and insights for researchers and policymakers alike.

Governance in global value chains

Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract

Manufacturing strategy has attracted serious research attention in the recent past. In this paper, an attempt is made to review the status of literature in manufacturing strategy. A literature classification scheme is suggested. A total of 260 articles from 31 referred journals and international conferences are classified into content (manufacturing capabilities, strategic choices, best practices, trans‐national comparison, literature survey, and performance measurement) and process‐related issues. We have categorized the methodology used in the literature into conceptual, descriptive, empirical, exploratory cross‐sectional and exploratory longitudinal approaches. Based on this, some possible research issues are also identified, viz., resource‐based operations strategy, sector specific manufacturing strategy, relevance of manufacturing strategy to small and medium enterprises, manufacturing strategy in the context of green manufacturing, effect of organizational culture on formulation of manufacturing strategy, and performance measurement.

Manufacturing strategy: Literature review and some issues

Supply chain contracts with capacity investment decision

In recent times, India has emerged as one of the fastest growing telecom markets in the world and witnessed a telecommunication revolution brought about by a collaboration of government, industry, and the scientific community. From a situation where an applicant had to wait three years to obtain a telephone connection to a position where telephone companies are wooing consumers, it has been a success of indigenous technology development and effective diffusion management. Derived from the insight gained in the course of literature research and interaction with industry experts, in this paper, a system dynamics integrated model of Indian telecommunication sector (Mobile Telephony) has been calibrated to demonstrate the nature of interactions among system variables and the resultant outcome which assume degrees of importance at different stages of the diffusion/adoption process in the Indian telecom sector. From a supply chain perspective, the study has encompassed system modeling of the entire ‘supply-line’ of Telecom diffusion i.e. Supply-side dynamics (R&D, Infrastructure, Production & Promotion), Adoption-dynamics (Potential Adopters, Rate of Adoption and Number of Adopters) and Market-side dynamics (Subscription demand, Revenue and Profitability)The work done here proves how the application of system dynamics modeling and simulation can contribute in a meaningful way to improve the holistic understanding of the dynamic structural complexities and forces driving and arising from the supply line of telecom diffusion. Several model simulations show the potential of using system dynamics as a promising modeling approach to capture, integrate and predict the structural behavior of innovation diffusion process. In the end, a novel interface of neural net has been explored to perform sensitivity analysis and a scenario projection of multiple usage situations has also been conducted.

System Dynamics Integrative Modeling in the Diffusion Dynamics of Indian Telecom Sector

Managing variability in both arrival and production processes has been a central challenge for both manufacturing and service industries. Models have been proposed to study the negative impact of higher process variability on operational performance. In the make to order context, the variability can influence the lead time decision and hence both the tardiness costs and the chances of winning customer orders. In this paper, we investigate the strategic role of process variability. Specifically, we consider two make to order firms that have different variability characteristics and study how they affect the firm’s strategic decisions namely lead time and price and subsequently profits. We first show that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium by using super modularity and contraction-mapping methods. We then propose an algorithm that efficiently computes the Nash equilibrium. Numerical experiments demonstrate how the strategic influence of variability depends upon business and operational characteristics.

Pricing and Lead Time Competition in the Presence of Process Variability

In this paper, we show how ordering time can be used as a mechanism to mitigate the supply risks of the unreliable newsboy. We consider the situation where a firm has an option of placing a series of sequential orders such that a new order is placed only after the yield from the previous order is known and derive an optimal order quantity for each ordering stage. The effectiveness of our approach is assessed by comparing its expected cost with the expected cost of the conventional reliable newsboy problem. It is demonstrated that the adverse effect of supply side risks can be almost completely negated by adopting our approach when the combined purchasing and holding costs for a low cost supplier at an earlier stage are equal to those of a high cost supplier at the next stage. Computational experiments suggest that the sequential ordering policy performs better than a simultaneous ordering strategy when customer service level norms become stringent and inventory holding costs decrease.

Sequential unreliable newsboy ordering policies

Emergence of ‘sustainability’ as the new paradigm of conducting business has led to increased focus on operations of firms in emerging economies such as India. With growing concerns on the environmental impact of products and processes of firms in emerging economies, it becomes imperative to understand the factors steering green initiatives in India. This chapter aims to answer the question regarding what drives firms in India towards greening? Through research and discussions with managers, we observe certain common underlying factors determining firms’ greening initiatives. The chapter aims to outline these common factors and takes a look at various approaches of firms in India in line with those factors. The current work aims to provide a better understanding of environmental friendly practices in India to both practitioners and researchers alike and establishes a platform for green supply chain research.

Janat Shah

Papers

Supply chain contracts with capacity investment decision

System Dynamics Integrative Modeling in the Diffusion Dynamics of Indian Telecom Sector

Pricing and Lead Time Competition in the Presence of Process Variability

Sequential unreliable newsboy ordering policies

Green Supply Chain Initiatives: The India Perspective