Other affiliations: University of Stuttgart
Bio: Jarmila Mildorf is an academic researcher from University of Paderborn. The author has contributed to research in topic(s): Narrative & Narratology. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 40 publication(s) receiving 227 citation(s). Previous affiliations of Jarmila Mildorf include University of Stuttgart.
TL;DR: Parker as discussed by the authors argues that authors' self-commentaries may help us understand better the possible functions of second-person narration in fictional texts and points out that authors are men and women with professional experience as writers, who are capable of speaking quite eloquently on their own reasons for writing in second person.
Abstract: In his article "In Their Own Words: On Writing in Second Person," Joshua Parker reflects on second-person narration and looks at the issue from the perspective of authors who use such narration in their works. In Parker's view, authors' self-commentaries may help us understand better the possible functions of second-person narration in fictional texts. Parker's main claim is that these authors are men and women "with professional experience as writers, who are capable of speaking quite eloquently on their own reasons for writing in second person" (167). One argument that seems to follow from this, although it is not expressly mentioned in the text, is that authors' viewpoints ought to be favored over narratological or other literary-theoretical approaches or ought at least to be taken more seriously than has hitherto been the case. As Parker puts it, there is "a surprising dissonance between what theorists often tend to assume about the form and what authors themselves experience in creating it" (167). He even proposes, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, a "writer response theory" in analogy to reader response theories (167). Parker presents authors' self-reflexive comments, quoting writers such as, among others, Chuck Palahniuk, Denis Johnson, David Foster Wallace, Pam Houston, Lolo Houbein, Peter Bibby, and John Encarnacao, who talked in interviews or wrote in non-fictional writing about their use of secondperson narration. The main result of Parker's survey of these com*Reference: merits and of a number of texts written in second person is the following: "Seeing the self as 'other' often only takes place during descriptions of certain events or over periods of text. This self, like its experiences, is unstable. What is inscribed in second person, then, is the author's relationship to this self, a relationship often in flux" (171). Before I address Parker's main claims in more detail, I will outline four aspects that, to my mind, need to inform any research on writing in second person not only because they already appear individually or in combination in most scholarly work addressing this type of narration (e.g., Fludernik, "The Category of 'Person'"; Kacandes; Richardson) but also because they allow for interdisciplinary approaches to the topic (see Mildorf): 1. the anthropological dimension; 2. generic distinctions; 3. structural typologies; 4. functions and effects. Parker mixes up these aspects or does not follow them up assiduously enough, which explains why some of his claims are essentially flawed.1. The Anthropological DimensionParker begins his article with the example of the cave paintings at Lascaux, arguing that "their author conceived of an experiencing point of view other than his own" and that he created these paintings "with the consciousness of designing images [...] for an Other" (165). This is then linked by Parker to "what any writer working today might likewise pursue" (165). One can object to this associative connection by quoting Denis Dutton, who said that "[t]he state of the arts today can no more be inferred from looking inside prehistoric caves than today's weather can be predicted from the last Ice Age" (Dutton 3). It is also not unproblematic to link painting and writing without paying due attention to their respective medial expressivity. And one may question the underlying presupposition that art is always created for an "other." Could I not simply paint or write for my own pleasure, without having any specific audience other than myself in mind?Leaving these points of criticism aside, however, one can see in Parker's argument an attempt to bring into sharper relief something more fundamental concerning the relationship of human beings to fellow human beings, which is also expressed in the very use of the personal pronouns "I" and "you": namely, that we are ultimately "relational beings," as psychologist Kenneth J. Gergen has it. Gergen argues that "there is no isolated self or fully private experience" and that instead "we exist in a world of co-constitution" (xv). …
TL;DR: The authors argue for a point of view focusing more on the narrative dimension of fictionality than on the fictive story content, arguing that the procedures used to present and engage with other minds travel between fictional and non-fictional narratives, and between stories artistically designed and those occurring in conversational or documentary environments.
Abstract: This article discusses the recent trends in Fictionality Studies and argues for a point of view focusing more on the narrative dimension of fictionality than on the fictive story content. With the analysis of two case studies, where a non-fictional third-person narrator represents the experience of nonfictional protagonists, the authors maintain Fictionality Studies should take into account not just prototypical cases of fictionality but also those that are more hybrid in nature, cases where signposts of fictionality are used locally in narratives that are globally marked as nonfiction. The examples—an interview and an online museum exhibition—show that the employment of fictional modes of mind representation and cognitive attribution occur in conversational and documentary storytelling even if the reference is to the actual world. The results indicate that the procedures used to present and engage with other minds travel between fictional and nonfictional narratives, and between stories artistically designed and those occurring in conversational or documentary environments.
TL;DR: For instance, the authors introduced the notion of cross-fictionality to characterize a narrative where the frame of reference is non-fictional but the narrative modes include those that are conventionally regarded as fictional.
Abstract: One of the key issues in the interplay between artistic and everyday narrative practices is the question whether some modes of telling are specific or exclusive to one or the other Whereas in contemporary narrative studies it is a commonplace to understand everyday oral narratives as a prototype of all narrative forms, the traffic from artistic, fictional narratives toward everyday storytelling has received much less attention However, socionarratology, for example, reminds us of the cultural and conventional basis for all human interaction and narrative sense-making In 1999, David Herman postulated this integrated, narrative-analytical approach which he termed socionarratology, a conceptual model that "situates stories in a constellation of linguistic, cognitive, and contextual factors" (Herman 219) Matti Hyvarinen ("Expectations and Experientiality"), drawing on the idea of socionarratology, points out how the expected in the form of generic models and cultural scripts shapes both literary and everyday narratives Yet, he has also concluded that there might, after all, be significant differences in literary and everyday narratives especially when it comes to mind reading or mind attribution (Hyvarinen, "Mind Reading" 238) Jarmila Mildorf ("Thought Presentation") showed how storytellers may circumvent the problems surrounding mind attribution in everyday storytelling by resorting to other, more indirect means of thought presentation, such as constructed dialogue Fictionality, understood--among other things--as specific ways to represent minds in narratives also outside of fiction, clearly needs to be further studied The signposts of fictionality are usually understood to include paratextual signals, the synchronic relation between story and discourse, the dissociation of the author and the narrator, and the representation of thought and consciousness (Cohn, "Signposts" 800; Grishakova 65) To offer a rough outline, one could say that fictionality studies today emphasize either paratextuality (eg, Walsh, The Rhetoric), authors and their communicative intentions (eg, Nielsen and Phelan), or narrative modes of consciousness representation; our approach falls into the last category (Hatavara and Mildorf) Since the last category is the only one to do with narrative discourse modes per se, that is what our article concentrates on in the effort to study the traffic from the fictional to the everyday in narrative means of mind representation We understand fictionality as a conglomeration of narrative discourse modes characteristic of generic fiction but not confined to it This partly follows and extends the tradition of discourse-narratological studies on fictionality Even though this tradition searched for "fiction-specific" narrative modes (Cohn, Distinction 2; "Signposts" 779), it is worth noticing that the possibility of expanding fictional modes beyond fiction was recognized from an early stage on Dorrit Cohn pointed out almost thirty years ago that narratology was unaware "of the places where its findings are specific to the fictional domain and need to be modified before they can apply to neighboring narrative precincts" (Cohn, "Signposts" 800) Using a life story interview as our test case we identify signposts of fictionality, analyze how they function in a nonfictional environment and try to point out issues requiring further theoretical modification In order to account for cognitive and contextual as well as linguistic factors of stories, and to do justice to the nature of life story interviews both as personal testimony and as a semiotic object, we introduce the term cross-fictionality to characterize a narrative where the frame of reference is nonfictional but the narrative modes include those that are conventionally regarded as fictional Therefore, cross-fictionality denotes narrative features that are characteristic of fiction but are also able to cross to other narrative environments …
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present data from a pilot study with GPs working in a city locality about their experiences of disclosure and the actual processes through which they suspect and explore domestic abuse.
Abstract: Research has demonstrated that women are more likely to disclose domestic violence to a GP during the consultation in primary health care than in Accident and Emergency. Little is known of the process of disclosure in the context of primary health care, especially from the perspective of the GP. In this article we present data from a pilot study with GPs working in a city locality about their experiences of disclosure and the actual processes through which they suspect and explore domestic abuse. We draw upon the work of, amongst others, Strong (1979) and his analysis of medical encounters to consider the consultation in which domestic abuse is disclosed in terms of a ceremonial order. The concepts of time (Adam 2000) and myths (Barthes 1972) provide crucial dimensions to our analysis. GPs employed various concepts of time as vehicles for explaining the reasons for, and circumstances surrounding, violence as well as presenting barriers to further involvement. GPs mythologised time by asserting they did not have enough time and yet revealing their ability to control and suspend time in the consultation if they consider it to be appropriate. In the process of mythologising time, the ceremonial order can become paramount. In conclusion, we contend that the sociology of health and illness might gain further conceptual and analytical understanding of the consultation by merging notions of ceremonial order with a fuller appreciation of sociological theory on time and myths, especially as this poses barriers to the disclosure of domestic abuse and other sensitive matters.
TL;DR: This article explored areas of intersection between sociolinguistic narrative analysis and literary narratology, focusing on a phenomenon that has recently received some attention in narration but hardly any in the study of narratives told in face-to-face interaction, namely, second-person narration.
Abstract: This article explores areas of intersection between sociolinguistic narrative analysis and literary narratology. Specifi cally, I focus on a phenomenon that has recently received some attention in narratology but hardly any in the study of narratives told in face-toface interaction: namely, second-person narration. Manfred Jahn (2005) defi nes second-person narration as a “story in which the protagonist is referred to by the pronoun you. Second-person stories can be homodiegetic (protagonist and narrator being identical) or heterodiegetic (protagonist and narrator being different)” (522). This initial defi nition, though a useful starting point, requires further elaboration and specifi cation—especially when it comes to literary you-narratives. In particular, studies have shown that in literary contexts the referential scope of you can be much wider than Jahn’s defi nition indicates and may include real readers as well as larger audiences (Herman 1994; Phelan 1994). Indeed, my own research suggests that
01 Jan 2009
TL;DR: In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature as discussed by the authors, and this final volume, a comprehensive reexamination and synthesis of the ideas developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeure's most complete and satisfying presentation of his own philosophy.
Abstract: In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature. This final volume, a comprehensive reexamination and synthesis of the ideas developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeur's most complete and satisfying presentation of his own philosophy.
01 Oct 2006
01 Jan 1983