世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

Preface Introduction: Traditions of Nationhood in France and Germany I. The Institution of Citizenship 1. Citizenship as Social Closure 2. The French Revolution and the Invention of National Citizenship 3. State, State-System, and Citizenship in Germany II. Defining The Citizenry: The Bounds of Belonging 4. Citizenship and Naturalization in France and Germany 5. Migrants into Citizens: The Crystallization of Jus Soli in Late-Nineteenth-Century France 6. The Citizenry as Community of Descent: The Nationalization of Citizenship in Wilhelmine Germany 7. \"Etre Francais, Cela se Merite\": Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in France in the 1980s 8. Continuities in the German Politics of Citizenship Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.

Ethnic Groups in Conflict

Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country empirical study.

The Economic Effects of Constitutions. By Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003. 320p. $35.00.Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini have produced the most ambitious study yet that attempts to identify and estimate the effects of constitutional design on economic outcomes. They draw on data from more than 80 countries and control for demographic, historical, regional, and economic characteristics. The purpose is to determine whether the shape of political institutions has measurable impact on economic policies (e.g., fiscal balance, social welfare spending), on government performance (e.g., corruption indices, protection of property rights), and on direct measures of economic performance (e.g., productivity of capital and labor). The political institutions that draw the most attention are constitutional regime type and the method of electing legislators.

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

This article analyzes the “risk factors” of secessionism at the substate, regional level. It seeks to answer the question, What regions are more likely to support more successful secessionist parties? Using new data in cross-sectional regression analysis, the author finds that secessionism involves unique factors not common to other kinds of ethnic conflict. Specifically, in addition to “identity” variables such as regional language and history of independence, the following variables explain secessionist strength: lack of irredentist potential, relative affluence, geographical noncontiguity, population, and multiparty political system. These factors generally serve as activators of ethnic identity rather than a substitute for the same, although there are important cases of nonethnic secessionism.

The cross-sectional determinants of secessionism in advanced democracies

Several possible relationships between natural resources and civil conflict have been hypothesized and tested in the literature. The impact of resources on conflict should depend on the circumstanc...

Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion: The role of rebel constituencies:

Globalization, secessionism, and autonomy

This article introduces a new, public database of U.S. state and local public policies, now available at www.statepolicyindex.com. The database covers more than 170 different state or local policies, coded at the state level as of December 31, 2006, in most cases. We use principal components analysis and derive two orthogonal measures of state policy ideology, which we label policy liberalism and policy urbanism. Our policy liberalism measure passes several reliability and validity checks, while policy urbanism is strongly predicted by urbanization rate, percentage of African Americans in the population, and percentage of Christian adherents in the population.

U.S. State and Local Public Policies in 2006: A New Database:

Since the 1970s, a decentralizing trend has gathered pace in several Western European countries. Governments in Spain, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom have moved to bestow significant powers on certain regions, while France and Portugal have made more limited reforms. The fact that countries facing nationalist challenges in the periphery have been more likely to decentralize poses a puzzle, because research shows that greater autonomy does not necessarily decrease secessionist sentiment and may even increase some forms of nationalist agitation. Why then do governments decentralize? This paper argues that the explanation lies in partisan political calculations, which can also explain the timing and character of devolution.

Jason Sorens

Papers

The cross-sectional determinants of secessionism in advanced democracies

Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion: The role of rebel constituencies:

Globalization, secessionism, and autonomy

U.S. State and Local Public Policies in 2006: A New Database:

The Partisan Logic of Decentralization in Europe