다중혈관 관상동맥 환자에서 y-문합을 이용하여 양쪽 내흉동맥만을 사용한 우회술의 조기 성적

In this book, Andrew Harvey sets out to provide a unified and comprehensive theory of structural time series models. Unlike the traditional ARIMA models, structural time series models consist explicitly of unobserved components, such as trends and seasonals, which have a direct interpretation. As a result the model selection methodology associated with structural models is much closer to econometric methodology. The link with econometrics is made even closer by the natural way in which the models can be extended to include explanatory variables and to cope with multivariate time series. From the technical point of view, state space models and the Kalman filter play a key role in the statistical treatment of structural time series models. The book includes a detailed treatment of the Kalman filter. This technique was originally developed in control engineering, but is becoming increasingly important in fields such as economics and operations research. This book is concerned primarily with modelling economic and social time series, and with addressing the special problems which the treatment of such series poses. The properties of the models and the methodological techniques used to select them are illustrated with various applications. These range from the modellling of trends and cycles in US macroeconomic time series to to an evaluation of the effects of seat belt legislation in the UK.

Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Highway Capacity Manual改訂の動向--テイラ-教授の講演より

Energy is a vital input for social and economic development. As a result of the generalization of agricultural, industrial and domestic activities the demand for energy has increased remarkably, especially in emergent countries. This has meant rapid grower in the level of greenhouse gas emissions and the increase in fuel prices, which are the main driving forces behind efforts to utilize renewable energy sources more effectively, i.e. energy which comes from natural resources and is also naturally replenished. Despite the obvious advantages of renewable energy, it presents important drawbacks, such as the discontinuity of generation, as most renewable energy resources depend on the climate, which is why their use requires complex design, planning and control optimization methods. Fortunately, the continuous advances in computer hardware and software are allowing researchers to deal with these optimization problems using computational resources, as can be seen in the large number of optimization methods that have been applied to the renewable and sustainable energy field. This paper presents a review of the current state of the art in computational optimization methods applied to renewable and sustainable energy, offering a clear vision of the latest research advances in this field.

Optimization methods applied to renewable and sustainable energy: A review

Price forecasting is becoming increasingly relevant to producers and consumers in the new competitive electric power markets. Both for spot markets and long-term contracts, price forecasts are necessary to develop bidding strategies or negotiation skills in order to maximize benefit. This paper provides a method to predict next-day electricity prices based on the ARIMA methodology. ARIMA techniques are used to analyze time series and, in the past, have been mainly used for load forecasting, due to their accuracy and mathematical soundness. A detailed explanation of the aforementioned ARIMA models and results from mainland Spain and Californian markets are presented.

/pdf/arima-models-to-predict-next-day-electricity-prices-1udz7ihu0r.pdf

ARIMA models to predict next-day electricity prices

In the framework of competitive electricity markets, power producers and consumers need accurate price forecasting tools. Price forecasts embody crucial information for producers and consumers when planning bidding strategies in order to maximize their benefits and utilities, respectively. This paper provides two highly accurate yet efficient price forecasting tools based on time series analysis: dynamic regression and transfer function models. These techniques are explained and checked against each other. Results and discussions from real-world case studies based on the electricity markets of mainland Spain and California are presented.

/pdf/forecasting-next-day-electricity-prices-by-time-series-2agcuphp5d.pdf

Forecasting next-day electricity prices by time series models

Price forecasting is becoming increasingly relevant to producers and consumers in the new competitive electric power markets. Both for spot markets and long-term contracts, price forecasts are necessary to develop bidding strategies or negotiation skills in order to maximize profits. This paper provides an approach to predict next-day electricity prices based on the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) methodology that is already being used to analyze time series data in general. A detailed explanation of GARCH models is presented and empirical results from the mainland Spain and California deregulated electricity-markets are discussed.

/pdf/a-garch-forecasting-model-to-predict-day-ahead-electricity-505uq8y16k.pdf

A GARCH forecasting model to predict day-ahead electricity prices

https://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/15072.pdf

Javier Contreras

Papers

ARIMA models to predict next-day electricity prices

Forecasting next-day electricity prices by time series models

A GARCH forecasting model to predict day-ahead electricity prices

Forecasting electricity prices for a day-ahead pool-based electric energy market

Optimization of control strategies for stand-alone renewable energy systems with hydrogen storage