Showing papers by "Jay Pil Choi published in 2006"
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TL;DR: It is shown that the effects of piracy depend crucially on the nature of piracy costs, and policy implications concerning copyright protection are also discussed.
166 citations
TL;DR: A model of broadcast competition in the presence of free entry is developed that addresses the nature of market failure in the industry with respect to the provision of variety of programming and the level of advertising.
81 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated how different damage rules in patent infringement cases shape competition when intellectual property rights are probabilistic and developed a simple model of oligopolistic competition to compare two main liability doctrines that have been used in the US to assess infringement damages.
Abstract: This paper investigates how different damage rules in patent infringement cases shape competition when intellectual property rights are probabilistic. I develop a simple model of oligopolistic competition to compare two main liability doctrines that have been used in the US to assess infringement damages - the unjust enrichment rule and the lost profit rule. It also points out the logical inconsistency in the concept of the "reasonable royalty rates" when intellectual property rights are not ironclad.
43 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine a mechanism by which bundling may inefficiently deter entry into the market and show that the incumbent can practice bundling to buttress its monopoly position by keeping specialist innovators out of the market.
Abstract: We examine a mechanism by which bundling may inefficiently deter entry into the market. The model considers an incumbent monopolist in two complementary components that faces a series of entry attempts by rivals. It is shown that the incumbent can practice bundling to buttress its monopoly position by keeping specialist innovators out of the market. Bundling prevents specialist rivals from coordinating in the dynamic entry process, reducing the probability of an eventual displacement of the incumbent. The specialization decisions of rivals are also distorted. Bundling may lead to lower customer and total economic welfare.
27 citations
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TL;DR: The authors analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive contents available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent.
21 citations