Showing papers by "Jean Tirole published in 1981"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the problems of gradual tax reform using the gradient projection algorithm, which leads to intuitively and economically appealing rules such as a tax reform analog of the classical optimal taxation result on production efficiency.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the litterature sur le taux d'actualisation en situation d'opti-mum second is considered, and the notion of cout d'opportunite des fonds publics is discussed.
Abstract: Cet article considere la litterature sur le taux d'actualisation en situation d'optimum second. Apres examen des raisons pour lesquelles l'approche en termes d'optimum premier est inadequate, et des quelques arguments s'y rattachant, distinction est faite entre modeles « de politique optimale » et modeles « de reforme ». L'accent est mis sur la notion importante de cout d'opportunite des fonds publics. Celle-ci ne doit pas etre confondue avec la notion de cout de rarete des fonds publics, dont cet article donne une presentation rigoureuse.
5 citations
Dissertation•
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the properties of fixed-price equilibria and related concepts, and show that they possess two basic properties: implementability (they are decentralized by a set of quantity constraints) and order (only one side of a given market is constrained).
Abstract: Essay I This Essay studies the properties of fixed-price equilibrium and related concepts. Fixed-price allocations possess two basic properties: implementability (they are decentralized by a set of quantity constraints) and order (only one side of a given market is constrained). Their characterization as social Nash optima stresses the lack of coordination between markets, and furthermore provides easy proof of existence and study of dimensionality. Then optimality properties are examined. Constrained Pareto optima are generically not implementable, and thus are not K-equilibria. On the other hand, even a K-equilibrium which is not dominated by any other K-equilibrium need not be optimal in the class of implementable allocations, and moreover an implementable Pareto optimum need not be orderly. Essay II This Essay analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its headstart by strategic investment. The answer depends crucially on the solution used. We argue that "perfect equilibrium" is the most appropriate concept for the study of dynamic rivalry. Our analysis is based on Spence's (1979) paper, "Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market". We establish the existence of the set of perfect equilibria in the no-discounting case, and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable. This equilibrium, also valid with discounting, involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady-state reaction curve, in contrast to Spence's proposed solution. Finally, we consider entry deterrence.