Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy

Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1

국제정치이론 = Theory of international politics

20th anniversary edition of "The End of History and the Last Man", a landmark of political philosophy by Francis Fukuyama, author of "The Origins of Political Order". With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 the threat of the Cold War which had dominated the second half of the twentieth century vanished. And with it the West looked to the future with optimism but renewed uncertainty. "The End of History and the Last Man" was the first book to offer a picture of what the new century would look like. Boldly outlining the challenges and problems to face modern liberal democracies, Frances Fukuyama examined what had just happened and then speculated what was going to come next. Tackling religious fundamentalism, politics, scientific progress, ethical codes and war, "The End of History and the Last Man" remains a compelling work to this day, provoking argument and debate among its readers. "Awesome ...a landmark ...profoundly realistic and important ...supremely timely and cogent ...the first book to fully fathom the depth and range of the changes now sweeping through the world." (George Gilder, "The Washington"). Post Francis Fukuyama was born in Chicago in 1952. His work includes "America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy" and "After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong". He now lives in Washington D.C. with his wife and children, where he also works as a part time photographer.

http://library.um.ac.id/free-contents/downloadpdf.php/buku/the-end-of-history-and-the-last-man-kemenangan-kapitalisme-dn-demokrasi-liberal-oleh-francis-fukuyama-penerjemah-m-h-amrullah-10836.pdf

The end of history and the last man : kemenangan kapitalisme dn demokrasi liberal / oleh Francis Fukuyama, penerjemah M.H. Amrullah

Preface Introduction Setting the Stage How Armies Learn The Hard Lesson of Insurgency The British and American Armies: Separated by a Common Language Malaya The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1951 The Empire Strikes Back, 1952-1957 Vietnam The Advisory Years, 1950-1964 The Fighting Years, 1965-1972 Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Comparing British and American Counterinsurgency Learning Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Bibliography Index

Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife/Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Book)

Since the end of the Cold War, the debates about NATO burden-sharing have changed considerably, yet descriptions of the basic burden-sharing dynamics have changed little since the Cold War era. This article shows that burden-sharing disputes remain a basic alliance problem, but they have changed fundamentally since 1989. The most salient burden-sharing disputes are worse today, illustrated most profoundly by experiences in Afghanistan. This article contrasts the major disparities between in alliance contributions during the Cold War and today. Working within the framework of collective goods theory, the article shows that NATO's ability to project military power is best accounted for by traditional security functions that the alliance still serves. Because of disputes and uncertainty over its strategic roles, and the tendency for many members to still perceive it as a vehicle for ‘keeping the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in’, collective action problems related to out-of-area operation...

NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War

This article seeks to explain variations in public support for the deployment of military troops to Afghanistan by means of the strategic narratives employed by national governments. Focusing on the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark, we argue that strong narratives about the why-what-and-how of overseas military missions increase the likelihood of popular support, while weak story lines are likely to result in a souring public opinion environment. Contrary to most current studies of public opinion and the support for international missions, we thus emphasise the role played by political leaders in shaping public attitudes towards the projection of military power. Surely, politicians are affected by polls and the wishes of public opinion – but popular attitudes are far from immune from political elites’ attempts to rationalise the use of military force via strategic narratives.

Shaping public attitudes towards the deployment of military power: NATO, Afghanistan and the use of strategic narratives

Preface by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 1. Introduction, Beatrice De Graaf, George Dimitriu and Jens Ringsmose Part I: Theoretical Debates 2. The Possibilities and Limits of Strategic Narratives, Lawrence Freedman 3. Searching for El Dorado: The Legendary Golden Narrative of the Afghanistan War, David Betz 4. Great Power Politics & Strategic Narratives of War, Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin and Laura Roselle Part II: Country Perspectives 5. The War in Afghanistan: Australia's Strategic Narratives, William Maley 6. Elite Consensus and Ineffective Strategic Narratives: The Domestic Politics Behind Canada's Commitment to Afghanistan, Justin Massie 7. Czech Strategic Narrative on Afghanistan: Ideological Reactiveness and Domestic Political Contestation, Nik Hynek 8. "For our own security and for the sake of the Afghans" : How the Danish public was persuaded to support an unprecedented costly military endeavour in Afghanistan, Peter Jakobsen & Jens Ringsmose 9. French Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and the War in Afghanistan. 2001-2012, Ronald Hatto 10. "War-like Circumstances" - Germany's Unforeseen Combat Mission in Afghanistan and Its Strategic Narratives, Robin Schroeder and Martin Zapfe 11. Hungary in Afghanistan: A default narrative for a Particularly Prudent Public, Peter Marton and Peter Wagner 12. The winter of our consent? Framing Italy's "peace mission" in Afghanistan, Fabrizio Coticchia and Carolina De Simone 13. "Fighting" versus "Reconstructing". Framing the Dutch mission in Afghanistan, Beatrice De Graaf and George Dimitriu 14. Poland's Strategic Narrative on Afghanistan: Getting the Best of Both Worlds, Gorka Winter 15. A Catch-All Strategic Narrative: Target Audiences and Swedish Troop Contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan, Erik Noreen & Jan Angstrom 16. Communicating Afghanistan: Strategic Narratives and the Case of UK Public Opinion, Rikke Bjerg Jensen 17. The Longest War Story: Elite Rhetoric, News Coverage, and the War in Afghanistan (USA), Tim Groeling and Matthew A. Baum 18. Conclusion, Beatrice De Graaf, George Dimitriu and Jens Ringsmose

Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War

In this article we broaden the conventional understanding of prestige and show that prestige-seeking played a major role in the Danish and Norwegian decisions to provide military support to post-Cold War US-led wars Both countries made costly military contributions in the hope of increasing their standing and prestige in Washington Both governments regarded prestige as a form of soft power, which they could later convert into access, influence, and US support Our findings are far from trivial They make a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that small powers understand and seek prestige in ways that differ fundamentally from the ways great powers do They also help to explain why smaller US allies made costly contributions to the Balkan, Afghan, Iraq, and Libyan wars at a time when there was no direct threat to their national security and their security dependence on the United States was low The high value that small US allies attach to their visibility and prestige in Washington suggests that it is far easier for the United States to obtain military support from smaller allies than Realist studies of burden-sharing and collective action problems would lead us to expect

Prestige-seeking small states: Danish and Norwegian military contributions to US-led operations

In this article, we argue that Realism recently has eschewed big and important questions of war and peace and that revived Classical Realism can help bring Realism back on track. Modern Realists tend to assume that states are either all status quo players or all revisionists, and the result is a slippery grasp of the sources and dynamics of international change. To revive Classical Realism, we examine three dominant sets of criticism. We notably return to the classical texts of Realism to show that the classics were in fact not reductionist: they did not reduce either systemic or national phenomena (third and second image theory) to human nature (first image). Classical Realists understood the many intricate and delicate connections between these levels, and it is modern era Realists who are reductionists because they reduce explanations to systemic phenomena. We show how Classical Realism can respond in strength to its critics and ask the kind of research questions that again will advance our understanding of international change.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fpalgrave.ip.8800217.pdf

Jens Ringsmose

Papers

NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War

Shaping public attitudes towards the deployment of military power: NATO, Afghanistan and the use of strategic narratives

Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War

Prestige-seeking small states: Danish and Norwegian military contributions to US-led operations

Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change