The rapid reshaping of the global economic order requires fundamental shifts in international business scholarship and management practice. New forms of protectionist policies, new types of internationalization motives, and new tools of techno-nationalism may lead to what we call “bifurcated governance” at the macro-level and “value chain decoupling” at the micro-level. As a result, innovation networks will require novel reconfigurations. We examine the emerging constraints on multinational enterprises, imposed by a bifurcated world order. We also discuss how the dynamic capabilities framework can guide scholars and managers alike to achieve new forms of evolutionary fitness.

/pdf/the-structural-reshaping-of-globalization-implications-for-55yjbk5e59.pdf

The structural reshaping of globalization: Implications for strategic sectors, profiting from innovation, and the multinational enterprise

China’s massive ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) – designed to build infrastructure and coordinate policymaking across Eurasia and eastern Africa – is widely seen as a clearly-defined, top-down ‘gr...

Understanding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: beyond ‘grand strategy’ to a state transformation analysis

This dissertation explores the question of why China responded particularly harshly to pro-U.S. military actions taken by South Korea, when this nation was identified as a friend to China, while responding less harshly to similar pro-U.S. military actions taken by Japan, who was not identified as a friend. My argument is that these divergent responses were caused by China’s different expectations, according to whether different nations had a perceived identity as a friend or a rival. China’s behaviors are essentially based on its own proclaimed identity and on the perceived identities of others. China has advanced the proclaimed identity of a “responsible great power” since the 1990s. Also, China has had the perceived identity of being friends to both North Korea from the beginning of its establishment, and South Korea through the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1992, whereas it has not perceived Japan as being a friend. The identity of friends can be measured by social bonds, social contacts, and expression of intimacy by words and behaviors. In responding to the actions of states identified as friends, Chinese face culture influenced the Chinese political elite to experience frustration and humiliation by the actions unexpectedly taken by its South Korean friend, leading them to adopt harsh responses and excessive retaliation. Relatedly, Chinese face culture shapes China’s reactions to others through three dynamics of seeking, saving, and losing face. In particular, China becomes furious and retaliates when it is humiliated and frustrated by losing face by the actions of its friends. iii These arguments are tested through three case studies of Sino-North Korean relations, Sino-South Korean relations, and Sino-Japanese relations. These cases are, respectively: North Korea’s Taepodong-2 missile launch and first nuclear test in 2006, South Korea’s decision to allow the United States to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) around 2016, and Japan’s decision to deploy two U.S. X-band radars in 2005 and 2014. Multiple sources are relied on in these case studies, including several memoirs by diplomats and reporters. Two main resources are used throughout the case studies: official remarks by spokespersons from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China at their regular press conferences (2001-2018), and the database of the People’s Daily (1946-2019) (the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China). My findings from these three cases support the argument that identity and Chinese face culture shape state actions, while rejecting the possible counterargument that national interests primarily shape state

/pdf/china-s-lost-face-and-the-two-koreas-the-effects-of-culture-226xm1zh44.pdf

China's Lost Face and the Two Koreas: The Effects of Culture and Identity on Chinese Foreign Policy

The field of strategic management has developed with an implicit assumption that market economies are structurally more or less similar. In the past 30 years, though, the global economy has evolved. The Soviet Union collapsed, market-based orthodoxy spread, and now China is ascendant. These developments require changing our mental models from the Cold War era, in which two economic blocs were quite distinct, to a bifurcated global economy of two engaged but incompatible systems: one side favoring transparency and the rule of law and the other side favoring opaqueness and strategic direction of the economy by government. China's government uses a wide range of policies to support the development of domestic firms while hindering the activities of competitors from abroad and, directly or indirectly, misappropriating their technology when they can do so, which is often. To cope with this situation â€” as well as with political uncertainty elsewhere in the world â€” firms need to develop strong dynamic capabilities for formulating viable strategies to create and capture value under potentially adverse and volatile conditions, and to shape the business environment in more favorable ways through market and non-market activity.

Fundamental Issues in Strategy: Time to Reassess?

In “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” Iain Johnston argues that China’s recent foreign policy is not as assertive as many scholars and pundits contend. Johnston’s study is a welcome addition to the literature on Chinese foreign policy in three respects.1 First, it is the most comprehensive study by a leading China scholar on China’s new assertiveness. Second, it challenges the conventional understanding that this assertiveness is both unprecedented and aggressive by design. Third, it addresses potential problems of overestimating the threat from China. In this letter, we argue that Johnston’s deanition of assertiveness is too narrow. In addition, he underestimates the signiacance of China’s new assertiveness in foreign policy more broadly.2

Debating China's Assertiveness

A series of moves in China's foreign policies since the global financial crisis in 2008 seems to suggest that China is now more confident than ever in its external behaviour. Indeed, some Western observers argue that China's new confidence even borders on arrogance. Domestically, there is an emerging debate over the famous "tao guang yang hui" (TGYH) strategy. Is China beginning to behave in an arrogant way? Will China change the TGYH strategy? This article documents the evolution of the TGYH strategy and explains why there is an emerging interest in it today. It argues that the TGYH strategy will be continued as a national strategy, though some modifications to it will be highly likely in coming years.

Lying Low No More? China's New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy

Many observers see mutual distrust as a major reason for increasing tensions in East Asia, but few studies systematically explore exactly how trust, or the lack of it, influences international cooperation in the region. We examine the microfoundations of international trust in East Asia by analyzing an original survey of Chinese urban residents’ attitudes toward Japan and South Korea. We find that generalized trust, or the belief that other nations have benign intentions, provides the most important driving force of trust toward Japan and South Korea. This, in turn, has a positive effect on preferences for interstate cooperation. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, nationalism and historical memory have little or no effect on international trust. Our analysis enhances our broader understanding of international trust by clarifying its sources and consequences. It also suggests some important policy implications for Sino–Japanese relations and Chinese foreign policy.

Chinese Citizens’ Trust in Japan and South Korea: Findings from a Four-City Survey

ABSTRACT China’s long-term cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) has received a great number of academic debates for being part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and component of China-EU relations. It’s noted China is not the only external “game player” in the CEEC region. After the end of the Cold War, Japan also enhanced its relations in the region through diplomacy and the provision of developmental assistance, which led to a deepening cooperation in the region within the Japan-EU framework of the 2010s. This article aims to form a comparative study of the strategies that China and Japan deploy in the CEEC in the historical review up to the present day, and to evaluate the approaches from institutional perspective as well as the infrastructure aspect when the two Asian countries dealing with the CEEC. It argues that China-launched cooperative scheme with the CEEC also draws the attention from Japan and Japan’s relevant policies in CEEC cast significant implications on the development of China-CEEC cooperation. The comparison also rises some greater political landscape by not only involving the BRI and PQI, but also in QUAD and EU-relevant strategies. In discussing the above approaches and comparisons, the article concludes that China’s various domestic and foreign policies towards CEEC present a “charming attraction” to Japan even in the context of China-US rivalry. Both Japan and CEEC need to be more pragmatic and positive towards cooperative mechanisms with China and embrace more opportunities to mutually support both China’s and Japan’s regional presences and influence for the continued development of the CEEC region.

https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2022.2049028

Jianwei Wang

Papers

Lying Low No More? China's New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy

Chinese Citizens’ Trust in Japan and South Korea: Findings from a Four-City Survey

China and Japan in CEEC: competition, cooperation and co-existence?