Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2016"
TL;DR: The authors argue that practice theory and relationalism represent the New Constructivism in International Relations (IR) and argue that a practice-relational turn became necessary because the meaning of constructivism narrowed over time, becoming tied to a specific scientific ontology focusing on the role of identity, norms, and culture in world politics.
Abstract: In this theory note, I address two new approaches in international relations theory gaining adherents and producing insightful applications: practice theory and relationalism. Practice theory draws attention to everyday logics in world politics. It stresses how international actors are driven less by abstract notions of the national interest, identities, or preferences than by context-dependent practical imperatives. Relationalism rejects the idea that entities—like states and international organizations—are the basic units of world politics. It replaces them with a focus on ongoing processes. Noting similarities in their arguments to those advanced by early constructivists, I argue that, taken together, practice theory and relationalism represent the New Constructivism in International Relations (IR). A practice–relational turn became necessary because the meaning of constructivism narrowed over time, becoming tied to a specific scientific ontology focusing on the role of identity, norms, and culture in world politics. This ontology unduly narrowed constructivism’s theoretical lenses, which practice theory and relationalism productively reopen.
166 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that people take foreign policy personally: the same basic values that people use to guide choices in their daily lives also travel to the domain of foreign affairs, and that conservation values are most strongly linked to "militant internationalism", a general hawkishness in international relations.
Abstract: Previous research shows that, when it comes to foreign policy, individuals have general orientations that inform their beliefs toward more specific issues in international relations. But such studies evade an even more important question: what gives rise to such foreign-policy orientations in the first place? Combining an original survey on a nationally representative sample of Americans with Schwartz's theory of values from political psychology, we show that people take foreign policy personally: the same basic values that people use to guide choices in their daily lives also travel to the domain of foreign affairs. Conservation values are most strongly linked to “militant internationalism,” a general hawkishness in international relations. The value of universalism is the most important value for predicting “cooperative internationalism,” the foreign-policy orientation marked by a preference for multilateralism and cosmopolitanism in international affairs. This relatively parsimonious and elegant system of values and foreign-policy beliefs is consistent across both high- and low-knowledge respondents, offering one potential explanation for why those people who are otherwise uninformed about world politics nonetheless express coherent foreign-policy beliefs.
133 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that drone strikes are associated with decreases in the incidence and lethality of terrorist attacks, as well as decreases in selective targeting of tribal elders, and that these strikes resulted in changes in terrorist activities.
Abstract: This study analyzes the effects of US drone strikes on terrorism in Pakistan. We find that drone strikes are associated with decreases in the incidence and lethality of terrorist attacks, as well as decreases in selective targeting of tribal elders. This matters for key ongoing debates. Some suggest that drone strikes anger Muslim populations and that consequent blowback facilitates recruitment and incites Islamist terrorism. Others argue that drone strikes disrupt and degrade terrorist organizations, reducing their ability to conduct attacks. We use detailed data on US drone strikes and terrorism in Pakistan from 2007–2011 to test each theory’s implications. The available data do not enable us to evaluate if drone strikes resulted in increased recruitment, but the data do allow us to examine if these strikes resulted in changes in terrorist activities. While our findings do not suggest long-term effects, the results still lend some credence to the argument that drone strikes, while unpopular, bolster US counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan.
117 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the securitization of sexual violence produced its "fetishization" in international advocacy, policy, and scholarship, and that the stages of this process operate as a process of fetishization by decontextualizing and homogenizing this violence, objectifying this violence and affecting inter-unit relations through the "selling back" to actors involved in conflict.
Abstract: Recent international relations scholarship tends to view sexual violence, especially rape, as an exceptional—if not aberrant—phenomenon in war and armed conflict. Indeed, it often treats it as the sole form of gender-based violence capable of threatening international peace and security. I challenge the isolation of this particular form of gender violence in the study and governance of international security. I argue that the securitization of sexual violence produced its “fetishization” in international advocacy, policy, and scholarship. The stages of securitization operate as a process of fetishization by first, decontextualizing and homogenizing this violence; second, objectifying this violence; and third, affecting inter-unit relations through the “selling back” of sexual violence to actors involved in conflict. As such, my argument helps specify why securitization fails to adequately address an issue like sexual violence and often results in further retrenchment of disparate power relations.
96 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the limitations of negative peace as a concept, discuss positive peace, and demonstrate empirically that Nobel Peace Prize winners have increasingly been those recognized for contributions to positive peace.
Abstract: Concern about war and large-scale violence has long dominated the study of international security. To the extent that peace receives any scholarly attention, it primarily does so under the rubric of “negative peace:” the absence of war. This article calls for a focus on peace in international studies that begins with a reconceptualization of the term. I examine the limitations of negative peace as a concept, discuss “positive peace,” and demonstrate empirically that Nobel Peace Prize winners have increasingly been those recognized for contributions to positive peace. Nevertheless, scholarly emphasis remains on war, violence, and negative peace—as demonstrated by references to articles appearing in a leading peace-studies journal and to papers presented at International Studies Association meetings. Peace is not the inverse or mirror image of war and therefore requires different theoretical orientations and explanatory variables. The article concludes with a series of guidelines on how to study peace.
95 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and corruption and finds that the effect of FDI on corruption is conditional on the host country's underlying economic and political climate.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and corruption. Previous studies report a negative eect of corruption on FDI inows; yet inward FDI has the potential to aect corruption levels in the host countries. We argue that the eects of FDI on corruption are conditional on the host country’s underlying economic and political climate. The underlying structure of the economy determines the possibility of extracting rents that could distributed among foreign investors and the incumbent. Political development, on the other hand, determines the level of accountability of the incumbent, and hence creates a check on the incumbent’s ability to appropriate those rents, and the probability of getting caught and sanctioned for engaging in corrupt behavior. Hence, in more democratic polities with a diversied economy, FDI inows are likely to be associated with lower corruption. In non-democratic countries with less diversied economies, a rise in FDI inows are more likely to be associated with higher corruption levels. Most empirical attempts to estimate the relationship between FDI and corruption overlook the latent endogeneity problem. We, on the other hand, construct an instrument for inward FDI per capita using a measure of remoteness, namely a weighted average of the geographical distance between the host country and the richest economies in the world. Ancillary tests suggest that the instrument -which is loosely related to a gravity model of investment- is strong and valid. We test our hypotheses on the conditional eects of FDI on corruption in a two-stage least-squares setting. Controlling for other factors identied in the extant literature as determinants of corruption, such as legal systems, religion, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and national resources endowments, we nd preliminary support for our hypotheses of the conditional eect of FDI. The eect of FDI on corruption is positive in authoritarian and poor countries, and turns negative as countries develop and become more democratic. Yet we also nd that the absolute eect of FDI on corruption in democratic and rich countries is smaller.
66 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have intervened in one of every nine competitive national level executive elections between 1946 and 2000, and they have been found to significantly increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate and that overt interventions are more effective than covert interventions.
Abstract: What are the electoral consequences of attempts by great powers to intervene in a partisan manner in another country’s elections? Great powers frequently deploy partisan electoral interventions as a major foreign policy tool. For example, the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have intervened in one of every nine competitive national level executive elections between 1946 and 2000. However, scant scholarly research has been conducted about their effects on the election results in the target. I argue that such interventions usually significantly increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate and that overt interventions are more effective than covert interventions. I then test these hypotheses utilizing a new, original dataset of all U.S. and USSR/Russian partisan electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000. I find strong support for both arguments.
63 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that the type of research most frequently published in IR journals differs in systematic ways from the types of research taught to graduate students, which raises important questions such as whether certain types of valuable research face a relative disadvantage when it comes to getting published in the first place.
Abstract: Recent debates about the state of International Relations (IR) raise the possibility that the field is losing its theoretical innovativeness due to professional incentives to churn out publications. Yet the claims made about IR far outstrip the availability of empirical data. Important assertions derive from a handful of examples rather than systematic evidence. This paper presents an investigation of what gets taught to doctoral students of IR in the United States. I find, among other things, that the type of research most frequently published in IR journals differs in systematic ways from the type of research taught to graduate students. In turn, this raises important questions such as whether certain types of valuable research face a relative disadvantage when it comes to getting published in the first place. The evidence also points to the partial separation of IR from Political Science in the United States. Further, it casts doubt on the growing practice of using Google Scholar to measure research influence. A new metric, which I call the Training Influence Score (TIS), supports the analysis.
59 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a theory that reconciles these disagreements, focusing on how the allocation of external resources affects the intra-group distribution of power between rebel leaders and their internal rivals, and argue that when sponsors contribute to a shift from an imbalance of power to balanced power, the rebel group more likely to split into competing organizations.
Abstract: Civil wars often feature insurgent groups with external sponsors. Yet, we know little about the impact of such sponsorship on insurgent cohesion. Indeed, researchers disagree about the conditions under which state sponsorship encourages or discourages organizational splits. This article presents a theory that reconciles these disagreements. I focus on how the allocation of external resources affects the intra-group distribution of power between rebel leaders and their internal rivals. Sponsors that help maintain an imbalance of power in favor of the leader foster cohesion; those that help flip the imbalance in favor of a rival increase the likelihood of an internal coup within the group. Only when sponsors contribute to a shift from an imbalance of power to balanced power is the rebel group more likely to split into competing organizations. I further argue that sponsors reallocate their resources in favor of a rebel leader’s internal rival in order to punish the leader for undesired behavior. Case studies of two major insurgent groups—the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and the Lebanese Hezbollah—illustrate the explanatory power of my argument.
57 citations
TL;DR: In 2004, a Swiss-led process created connections among stakeholders around the problem of regulating private military and security companies as discussed by the authors, which inspired various complementary non-binding instruments and instigated changes in government policy.
Abstract: In 2004 private military and security companies lacked effective transnational governance. Ten years later, however, an agreed-upon framework drew these services within established international law. It inspired various complementary non-binding instruments and instigated changes in government policy. Hegemonic-order theories, whether realist or liberal, would expect this change to reflect shifts in US preferences. But the United States displayed no initial interest in transnational coordination. I build an alternative explanation from pragmatism and network theory. A Swiss-led process created connections among stakeholders around the problem of regulating private military and security companies. Relatively open interactions among participants spurred original ideas, which in turn appeared useful for addressing the issue. Their usefulness, led more actors to “buy into” the process. This relational-pragmatic account offers new ways for understanding the nature and development of governance.
55 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the ability to take the perspective of others and understand their cognitive and affective states without necessarily sympathizing with them is critical in overcoming biases, transcending long-held enmities, and increasing the likelihood of cooperation.
Abstract: Why do some peace summits succeed while others fail? We offer an explanation that highlights the importance of empathy between leaders. Studies in negotiations and psychology show that empathy—the ability to take the perspective of others and understand their cognitive and affective states without necessarily sympathizing with them—is critical in overcoming biases, transcending long-held enmities, and increasing the likelihood of cooperation. We show that empathy is perceptual in nature. Actors can convey it through both words and expressive behaviors in face-to-face interactions. From these, leaders gain an understanding of whether the other side is willing to negotiate in good faith and what a potential agreement might look like. Additionally, we argue that all is not lost if the leaders of warring states prove unable to cultivate these beliefs about each other. A skilled mediator can step in and build relational empathy between disputants. We assess the empirical ramifications of conveyed and relational empathy by comparing two of the most salient Middle East peace process summits with divergent outcomes: success at Camp David 1978 and failure in 2000.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that narrow member-state security interests offer an important explanation for the willingness of member states to contribute the substantial numbers of troops needed to achieve peacekeeping goals.
Abstract: Recent research demonstrates that larger and better-equipped United Nations peacekeeping missions more effectively ensure peace and security. This raises an important question: what explains the willingness of member-states to contribute the substantial numbers of troops needed to achieve peacekeeping goals? We argue that narrow member-state security interests offer an important explanation. We find that states embroiled in an ongoing rivalry with another state in the international system contribute more personnel to ongoing missions. Additionally, we find that regimes concerned about coup attempts increase deployments to peacekeeping operations. In a more general sense, this article suggests that the provision of security by peacekeeping operations to their host states is partially dependent upon higher levels of insecurity elsewhere in the international system.
TL;DR: The authors argue that military dictators, as specialists in violence, often remain threats to their successors, and when democratic systems replace military dictatorships, that expertise presents less danger to new incumbents.
Abstract: What makes certain dictatorships more likely than others to democratize? I argue that military dictators , as specialists in violence, often remain threats to their successors. However, when democratic systems replace military dictatorships, that expertise presents less danger to new incumbents. Because democracies select leaders through elections, they reduce the importance of military expertise—and the role of associated violence—in contests for office. Thus, military dictatorships should prove more likely to transition quickly to democracy; military dictators will expect a lower likelihood of punishment—including death—at the hands of their successors than if they are replaced by other dictators. Therefore, incumbent military dictators see democratic systems as less dangerous to them; they face specific incentives to ensure a quick and effective transition to democracy. I provide support for my theory with evidence from the post-World War II period.
TL;DR: In this article, a five-year examination of the original coding work of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) project was conducted, and the authors found evidence linking 75 disputes to other cases and could not identify 19 cases in the historical record.
Abstract: This research note discusses a five-year examination of the original coding work of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) project. After strictly applying MID coding rules, we recommend dropping 251 cases (or over 10% of the dataset), as either we were unable to find a militarized incident in the historical record or the dispute appeared elsewhere in the data. We found evidence linking 75 disputes to other cases, and we could not identify 19 cases in the historical record. Among the remaining disputes, we recommend major changes (changes in dispute year, fatality level, and participants) in 234 disputes and minor changes in 1,009 disputes. We use this article to examine the potential impact of our suggestions on existing studies. Though we identified several systematic problems with the original coding effort, we also find that these problems do not affect current understandings of what predicts the onset of interstate conflict. However, estimates in our replications of three recent studies of dispute escalation, dispute duration, and dispute reciprocation all witness substantial changes when using corrected data—to the point of reversing previous conclusions in some cases.
TL;DR: This article examined different theoretical perspectives using a new dataset of diplomatic visits by the US President and Secretary of State and found that the degree of discretion or constraint in the diplomatic calendar falls along a spectrum, with strategic and domestic factors at opposite extremes while diplomatic routines fall in the middle.
Abstract: Face-to-face diplomacy is an important feature of international relations. But when and why do high-level diplomatic interactions occur? We examine different theoretical perspectives using a new dataset of diplomatic visits by the US President and Secretary of State. We argue for assessing these visits along two dimensions. First, we posit that the degree of discretion or constraint in the diplomatic calendar falls along a spectrum. Strategic and domestic factors are at opposite extremes while diplomatic routines fall in the middle. Second, we consider the convergence in the relative influence of these sets of factors across the President’s and the Secretary’s calendars. We develop and test hypotheses about the determinants of visits by the President and Secretary of State across twelve presidencies from 1946 to 2010. Overall, the travels of the President and Secretary converge to serve a set of priorities that derive from a fairly stable set of national interests and from diplomatic routine. We observe that the President effectively retraces the footsteps of the Secretary more than the reverse. We find some evidence of domestic (including individual-level) influences on diplomacy, but only limited evidence that times of crisis produce distinct patterns in face-to-face encounters.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the influence of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on state policies and conclude that NPT ratification is associated with a lower likelihood of developing nuclear weapons.
Abstract: How do international arms control treaties influence state policies? This article investigates this question by analyzing the efficacy of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite fierce debate over the last several decades, scholars still lack a full understanding of whether or not the treaty “works.” This debate persists, in part, because existing studies suffer from a key limitation: they are not designed to infer a causal connection between NPT membership and nuclear proliferation. Prior research cannot determine whether membership in the treaty restrains states from developing nuclear weapons or simply reflects existing preferences. To address this limitation, this article accounts for selection effects by using a measure of states’ ex ante treaty commitment preferences. Our analysis of nuclear proliferation from 1970 to 2000 provides evidence that the NPT has played a key role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Even after accounting for strategic selection into the treaty, NPT ratification is robustly associated with a lower likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons. Our results not only matter for debates over the NPT and nonproliferation but also have broad implications for the study of how international institutions affect international politics.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study what types of countries citizens prefer for preferential trade agreements (PTAs): culturally similar countries, democracies, and countries that maintain high environmental and labor standards.
Abstract: Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) constitute the most rapidly growing form of trade liberalization in the global economy. In contrast to, for example, the World Trade Organization, PTAs allow for discrimination among potential partner countries. This helps explain their proliferation. But it also raises an important question: which countries are preferred partners for PTAs? On the presumption that public opinion matters—both normatively and analytically—for trade policy, we study what types of countries citizens prefer for PTAs. We focus on developing countries, as they both play an increasingly important role in the expanding global network of PTAs and also remain understudied in the literature on international cooperation and trade policy. To account for the multidimensionality of PTA partner country choice, we develop and test a theoretical framework through conjoint experiments embedded in national surveys in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. The results show that, despite starkly divergent national contexts, citizens in all three countries opt for similar partner countries. Respondents prefer culturally similar countries, democracies, and countries that maintain high environmental and labor standards. Somewhat surprisingly, economic size and geographic distance prove less important in the choice of which countries to support as PTA partners.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define civilian defense forces as a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militias that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign.
Abstract: This article examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. We define civilian defense forces as a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification. This leads to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005 and a qualitative assessment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009 offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a theoretical account of the relationship between politics and knowledge and show that scientific knowledge achieves political relevance by distancing itself through theorizing from the particularities of politics.
Abstract: Two broad positions—the “gap-bridgers” and the “gap-minders”—dominate the current debate on the (lack of) political relevance of International Relations (IR) theory. Missing from this debate, however, is a broader theoretical framework for contextualizing—and moving beyond—their disagreements. Hence, this article provides a theoretical account of the relationship between politics and knowledge. It shows that, in the modern context, scientific knowledge achieves political relevance by distancing itself—through theorizing—from the particularities of politics. This paradoxical relationship gives rise to three different dimensions of political relevance, which operate at different levels of abstraction. Metatheory plays a crucial role in constituting the modern conception of politics; theories establish concrete political spaces; and empirical studies can influence specific policies. Taking this context into account, moreover, calls for a reassessment of core features of the discipline: its supposed poverty, fragmentation, and immaturity are common features of all modern sciences; they function as a driver of scientific progress; and metatheoretical debates address the political dimension of the modern sciences. Hence, the source of IR’s political relevance lies in its theoretical foundations. Abandoning theory in favor of policy-oriented studies would simultaneously undermine the discipline’s policy relevance and its standing as a modern science.
TL;DR: This article found that states with larger ideal point distance with the United States (China) are more likely to adopt RMB as a reserve currency, rather than economic concerns about transaction needs, optimal portfolio considerations, or instrumental calculations.
Abstract: This study identifies 37 central banks that added China’s renminbi (RMB) to their reserve portfolio since 2010. Why do some states diversify into new reserve currencies at an early stage while most continue to take a wait-and-see approach? We argue that state preferences regarding international order influence decisions to invest in RMB. While some states support the liberal, US-led status quo, others prefer an emerging Chinese alternative order. We contend that as state preferences for international order move away from the US model (and toward China), the likelihood of diversifying reserves into RMB should increase. Thus, the decision to invest in RMB is not simply an economic choice. It is also a political act that signals and symbolizes a state’s preferences for a diminution of American global influence and support for a revised order. Employing new United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ideal points data, we find that states with larger (smaller) ideal point distance with the United States (China) are more likely to adopt RMB as a reserve currency. Furthermore, political consideration—rather than economic concerns about transaction needs, optimal portfolio considerations, or instrumental calculations—best explains emergent demand for the RMB as a reserve currency.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss dyadic research designs from theoretical and statistical perspectives and highlight problems of model misspecification, erroneous assumptions about the independence of events, artificial levels of analysis, and incoherent treatment of multilateral/multiparty events on the theoretical side.
Abstract: Dyadic research designs concern data that comprise interactions among actors. They are, without a doubt, the most frequent designs employed in the empirical analysis of international politics. But what do such designs carry with them in terms of theoretical claims and statistical problems? These two issues closely intertwine. When testing hypotheses empirically, the statistical model must be a careful operationalization of the theory under consideration. Given that the theoretical and statistical cannot be separated, we discuss dyadic research designs from these two perspectives. We highlight problems of model misspecification, erroneous assumptions about the independence of events, artificial levels of analysis, and the incoherent treatment of multilateral/multiparty events on the theoretical side. On the statistical side, we stress difficult-to-escape challenges to valid inference.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors trace the co-constitutive relationship between migration policing, national performances, and transnational routes, revealing the makeshift nature of the identities that underscore distinctions between citizens and foreigners.
Abstract: To travel undetected by state authorities and criminal predators, Central Americans pass as Mexican during their journey to the United States. This ‘passing’ underscores the ambiguities of social roles, such as nationality. Over time, these performances partially reconstruct imagined communities, blurring the boundaries between foreigners and citizens. However, international-relations scholarship tends to overlook how uncoordinated everyday practice complicates borders in a globalized world. By tracing the co-constitutive relationship between migration policing, national performances, and transnational routes, this article reveals the makeshift nature of the identities that underscore distinctions between citizens and foreigners. I argue for the continued inclusion of ethnography as a method for exploring the dynamic relationship between territory, state, and nation. Migrants complicate borders, but also suffer the very real, material consequences of both state and nonstate violence. My analysis of clandestine transnationalism therefore chronicles challenges to, and reconfigurations of, sovereignty.
TL;DR: The authors examine the effects of international compromise, war, and foreign government rhetoric on presidential approval and find that, in certain conflicts, popular approval tracks fairness heuristics, leaders seeking to maximize voter approval prefer equitable divisions of disputed goods and are risk acceptant for divisions below this threshold.
Abstract: We conduct a survey experiment to examine the effects of international compromise, war, and foreign government rhetoric on presidential approval. We find that, in certain conflicts, popular approval tracks fairness heuristics—leaders seeking to maximize voter approval prefer equitable divisions of disputed goods and are risk acceptant for divisions below this threshold. Moreover, aggressive rhetoric by a foreign leader increases domestic leaders’ expected approval from war, decreases the value of compromise, and provides them with powerful incentives to fight harder. Thus, leaders motivated by popular approval have preferences that are inconsistent with the non-satiated, risk-averse preferences defined over shares of an objective good—that is, with those that much of the rationalist literature on conflict assumes. Fairness heuristics and the rhetorical framing of disputes during the conflict process may be at least as important as material factors in understanding why some disputes result in war.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a theory of mutual optimism in which conflicting bargaining power estimates arise from asymmetric information about which, if any, third parties will join either side in a military dispute.
Abstract: A prominent international-relations theory posits that mutual optimism, due to two sides holding divergent estimates of their relative bargaining power, causes interstate conflict. We develop a theory of mutual optimism in which conflicting bargaining power estimates arise from asymmetric information about which, if any, third parties will join either side in a military dispute. We contend that secret alliances can generate mutual optimism, which increases the probability of conflict. By exploiting secret alliances as a measurable source of private information, we provide the first systematic test of mutual optimism that directly assesses a state's secret capabilities. Optimism exists when a state's secret allies are more numerous or powerful than anticipated by opponents. Our empirical tests—as well as robustness checks—strongly support our theoretical expectation. We conclude that mutual optimism is an empirically, as well as theoretically, important cause of interstate conflict.
TL;DR: The more that states depend on oil exports, the less cooperative they become: they grow less likely to join intergovernmental organizations, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and to agree to binding arbitration for investment disputes as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The more that states depend on oil exports, the less cooperative they become: they grow less likely to join intergovernmental organizations, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and to agree to binding arbitration for investment disputes. This pattern is robust to the use of country and year fixed effects, to alternative measures of the key variables, and to the exclusion of all countries in the Middle East. To explain this pattern, we consider the economic incentives that foster participation in international institutions: the desire to attract foreign investment and to gain access to foreign markets. Oil-exporting states, we argue, find it relatively easy to achieve these aims without making costly commitments to international institutions. In other words, natural resource wealth liberates states from the economic pressures that would otherwise drive them toward cooperation.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that ambiguities in the definition of the term terrorist lead to an inconsistent and aggregated operationalization in the existing literature, and they test their claim by disaggregating the roles and responsibilities of members of various Islamist terrorist networks.
Abstract: For decades, practitioners and academics sought to identify a common terrorist “profile.” However, the consensus in both the policy realm and academia suggests that, so far, these efforts produced only modest insights. This research note identifies and addresses a major impediment to previous studies of terrorist profiles: conceptualization. We argue that ambiguities in the definition of the term terrorist lead to an inconsistent and aggregated operationalization in the existing literature. Previous studies attempt to identify the factors correlated with a willingness to commit violence rather than the factors that correlate with the willingness to join an organization that commits violence. We test our claim by disaggregating the roles and responsibilities of members of various Islamist terrorist networks. We provide initial evidence that disaggregation presents a promising first step toward identifying specific profiles for different types of terrorists.
TL;DR: This paper examined 31 variables that the extant literature considers significant determinants of proliferation and found that some variables perform better than others, most fail to offer strong explanations for existing patterns of proliferation, and few improve our ability to predict proliferation.
Abstract: This article examines whether the quantitative literature on the causes of nuclear proliferation successfully identifies variables that explain existing patterns of proliferation or improve our ability to predict proliferation. Using extreme bounds analysis, cross-validation, and random forests, I examine 31 variables that the extant literature considers significant determinants of proliferation. While some variables perform better than others, most fail to offer strong explanations for existing patterns of proliferation. Even fewer improve our ability to predict proliferation. It follows that the existing quantitative literature on proliferation produces more tentative findings than scholars typically understand.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the United Kingdom acted as a spoiler in the negotiations and became a champion of the new treaty, and that strategic action by small states and non-governmental organizations may prove crucial in engineering the conditions both for their success and the rhetorical entrapment of stronger actors such as the UK.
Abstract: In 2006, Norway launched a stand-alone process to negotiate a ban on cluster munitions. The United Kingdom (UK) reluctantly joined the process to keep it within acceptable bounds. The UK acted as a spoiler in the negotiations. Yet, in the end, it agreed to ban all cluster munitions and became a champion of the new treaty. Why? I argue that two factors constrained and enticed the UK to go along with the process. First, small states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) structured the negotiations to disadvantage potential opponents. Second, NGOs also used shaming and praising to define the “desirable” UK policy. Not only did the UK accept a comprehensive ban, but it also started championing it as a result of two mechanisms—“cooperative bargaining” at the end of negotiations that led to a fair compromise and “mobilization of pride” by NGOs praising it for supporting the new norm. Whereas usually the success of weak actors in international negotiations is attributed to the persuasive power of their arguments, I show that strategic action by small states and NGOs may prove crucial in engineering the conditions both for their success and the rhetorical entrapment of stronger actors, such as the UK.
TL;DR: The authors analyzed 965 individual survey questions concerning the use of US military force in twenty-four historical episodes, beginning in 1982 with military aid to El Salvador and continuing through the recent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.
Abstract: Recent scholarship indicates that gender correlates strongly with Americans' attitudes toward the use of military force. However, most of its evidence derives from the study of major wars, and the field needs more historical research to evaluate the evolution of gender difference over time. I redress these limitations by updating and extending my earlier (2003) analysis of public support for the use of force during the 1990s. I analyze 965 individual survey questions concerning the use of US military force in twenty-four historical episodes, beginning in 1982 with military aid to El Salvador and continuing through the recent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. I find that substantial gender difference characterizes a large number of historical episodes and types of military action. Nonetheless, the magnitude of gender difference varies substantially; in many cases, a substantial percentage of women supports the use of force. The difference between men and women varies most with the salience and level of violence, and women are more sensitive to humanitarian concerns. Women display more sensitivity to casualties in some historical cases, but during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the casualty sensitivity of men gradually increased as the wars dragged on, and gender differences therefore decreased. Thus, I argue that scholars should turn their attention to studying individual-level differences between and among men and women in support for using military force. I also discuss the political and policy implications of the findings.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a simple theory of civil conflict in which the act of negotiation itself carries costs and benefits, and suggest that cases exist in which parties would reach an agreement if only they could overcome the costs of negotiation and engage in talks.
Abstract: Why do some parties to intrastate conflict refuse to negotiate? I propose a simple theory of civil conflict in which the act of negotiation itself carries costs and benefits. Several hypotheses follow: parties to civil conflict will avoid negotiation when they (1) fear alienating external supporters or internal constituencies, (2) risk granting legitimacy to their opponents or signaling weakness to other potential claimants, or (3) find it difficult to identify reliable negotiating partners. Empirical tests find support for my argument. My findings suggest that cases exist in which the parties would reach an agreement if only they could overcome the costs of negotiation and engage in talks. Diplomats and mediators should consider the costs and benefits of talks when planning the timing and form of interventions designed to bring parties to the table.