All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

Two Treatises of Government.

Study in administration

The Theory of Incentives I: The Principal-Agent Model

Career concerns and multitasking local bureaucrats: Evidence of a target-based performance evaluation system in China

This research focuses on innovation and its diffusion in public services in authoritarian China. A mechanism between vertical government intervention and diffusion of innovation in public services is established by conducting a comparative case study between Sichuan and Tianjin. Administrative commands facilitate the formation of the ‘mandatory policy diffusion’ that rapidly diffuses policy instruments. Competition in the performance evaluation-based personnel system contributes to the formation of ‘championship policy diffusion’, which leads to the divergence of policy instruments in neighbouring local governments. Therefore, classic theoretical hypotheses on geographical proximity, competition, and vertical intervention concerning innovation diffusion need to be modified.

Mandate Versus Championship: Vertical government intervention and diffusion of innovation in public services in authoritarian China

This article examines why performance measurement, a tool adopted by western countries chiefly to improve government services, has been designed and implemented as an instrument for building state capacity and for ensuring policy compliance in China. Under China's performance measurement system, the central government translates its macro reform goals into specific policy objectives, which it then assigns downwards through the administrative hierarchy. Local governments at the county level convert the policy objectives allocated to them into a variety of prioritised performance targets for local officials to achieve. Using the experience of an inland Chinese county as a case study, this article argues that performance measurement accrues significant political benefits to its users. It forces local Chinese officials to concentrate their efforts on realising the policy priorities set by the higher-level authorities. However, the way that performance measurement is conducted—governing by goals and numbers—does not address the substantial governance issues and fundamental social and political tensions that exist in Chinese society. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Governing by goals and numbers: A case study in the use of performance measurement to build state capacity in China

The implementation of China's reform era target-based cadre evaluation system has instigated various types of gaming behaviour on the part of local officials. How do these gaming strategies differ from each other? Why do local officials sacrifice the public interest for target fulfilment in some cases but not in others? This article argues that gaming is not monolithic and should not be treated as such. It develops a typology that distinguishes between pernicious and benign gaming, and looks into the symptoms and motives of pernicious gaming in particular. It finds that the distinct design of the measurement system – the combination of result-oriented targets imposed from above and high-powered incentives for target fulfilment – induces pernicious gaming. In addition, the system's implementation practically compels local officials to misrepresent their performance, even though they are aware of the negative impact of such behaviour on the public interest. This study shows that to understand the strategies, motivations and implications of gaming better, a more nuanced approach is needed.

Pernicious Manipulation of Performance Measures in China's Cadre Evaluation System*

Summary
During the past decade, there has been an explosion in the literature on performance-oriented reforms around the globe. What are the major topics discussed in this literature? What can scholars and practitioners learn from it? This study provides an overview of the major themes, strategies, challenges, and outcomes of performance measurement and management reforms by reviewing the literature produced during this period. It shows that useful strategies and tools have been developed for public sector organizational performance improvement. Apart from continuing efforts to examine the role of measurement per se, there has been a shift in focus from performance measurement to performance management in this literature. Nevertheless, research evidence from both developed and developing countries shows that most reforms achieve only mixed results, with both costs and gains and with daunting challenges, such as gaming, remaining. The paper concludes by discussing issues that deserve attention from future research. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Performance Measurement and Management in the Public Sector: Some Lessons from Research Evidence

Conventional wisdom argues that a good set of performance measures builds accountability and that improved accountability generates better productivity in the organisation. By way of an analysis of a case study in one inland Chinese county, this article shows that the assumed relationship between performance and accountability is more rhetoric than real. In practice, the implementation of performance measurement in local China leads to an accountability paradox, in which enhanced accountability tends to hinder the improvement of government productivity. The implementation of the Chinese target-based responsibility system risks boosting the short term accountability of public employees while undermining the long term productivity of government agencies. With the deepening of China's market-oriented reform, this choice appears to put the cart before the horse.

Putting the Cart before the Horse: Accountability or Performance?

A striking feature of the performance measurement system in Chinese local governments is the emphasis on non-mission-based targets. Drawing on data collected in a 5-year field research project in one inland Chinese county, this article examines the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the rise of non-mission-based targets in local China. It argues that non-mission-based targets are largely an expedient policy adopted by Chinese reformers to deal with the pressing political need to ensure effective governance in local areas. However, the implementation of a performance measurement system with non-mission-based targets has unexpectedly given rise to serious governing problems. In the long run, the widespread use of non-mission-based targets may create daunting challenges that jeopardize the basis of governance.

Jie Gao

Papers

Governing by goals and numbers: A case study in the use of performance measurement to build state capacity in China

Pernicious Manipulation of Performance Measures in China's Cadre Evaluation System*

Performance Measurement and Management in the Public Sector: Some Lessons from Research Evidence

Putting the Cart before the Horse: Accountability or Performance?

Hitting the Target but Missing the Point The Rise of Non-Mission-Based Targets in Performance Measurement of Chinese Local Governments