The Four Causes

M. F. Burnyeat taught for 14 years in the Philosophy Department of University College London, then for 18 years in the Classics Faculty at Cambridge, 12 of them as the Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy, before migrating to Oxford in 1996 to become a Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at All Souls College. The studies, articles and reviews collected in these two volumes of Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy were all written, and all but two published, before that decisive change. Whether designed for a scholarly audience or for a wider public, they range from the Presocratics to Augustine, from Descartes and Bishop Berkeley to Wittgenstein and G. E. Moore. Their subject-matter falls under four main headings: 'Logic and Dialectic' and 'Scepticism Ancient and Modern', which make up the first volume, with 'Knowledge' and 'Philosophy and the Good Life' contained in this, the second volume. The title 'Explorations' well expresses Burnyeat's ability to discover new aspects of familiar texts, new ways of solving old problems. In his hands the history of philosophy becomes itself a philosophical activity.

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Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy

There has been much controversy, since Gregory Vlastos' foundational paper (Vlastos, 1954) on the logic of the Third Man Argument (TMA), over the correct or most plausible reconstruction of the steps of this argument. My main concern in the present paper is to offer an account of Plato's conception of the Forms, and the relation of participation, in the effort to identify the roots of the TMA regress. The route to Plato's understanding of the Forms and of participation in the Forms is through the explanatory work to which he puts his Theory of Forms. I describe the model of explanation which, I argue, Plato is operating on when he undertakes to explain 'why different things are /' through his Theory. On the basis of this model I derive the logical analysis of the Dilemma of Participation-the argument preceding the TMA in the Parmenides. I further give the premisses of the TMA and offer an explanation, through the model, of why Plato is committed to them.

The Logic of the Dilemma of Participation and of the Third Man Argument

In his final argument for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo, Plato relies on the following principle: Whenever something A enters another thing B and as a result, B comes to be F, A does not admit the opposite of F. This principle seems to be either mistaken or unhelpful. For, on one reading, it says that A itself cannot exhibit the opposite of F, but it seems that in some cases, this is possible. On another reading, it says that as long as A is present in B, B cannot exhibit the opposite of F. For instance, saccharine makes your coffee sweet but is bitter in itself. This, however, would not lead to the desired conclusion that the soul, which brings life to the body, cannot be the opposite of alive. It rather shows that the ensouled body cannot be the opposite of alive. This paper will show that we can accept the first reading, and thus understand why Plato thought that a disembodied soul cannot perish, if we replace the distinction between things and their properties with a slightly different one.

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Plato’s Ingredient Principle: Phaedo 105a2-5

Resumen: este ensayo sostiene que uno de los desafíos más apremiantes que debe enfrentar una psicología de inspiración peripatética es el de conservar la relevancia causal del alma en los tres órdenes del cambio físico (traslación, alteración y crecimiento), sin hacer de ella un “motor” interno que desplace al organismo por hallarse en continuidad con él. En caso de no sortear con éxito este escollo, tal psicología no podrá afirmar que el alma sea un ítem inextenso e impasible, sino (a lo sumo) un cuerpo sutil que desplaza a otro más grosero. Mittelmann propone una lectura conjunta de los tratados de Alejandro y Aristóteles acerca del alma, con el fin de presentar la estrategia de Alejandro como un modo exitoso de hacer frente a esa dificultad patente. Según Mittelmann, Alejandro hallaría en los “estados disposicionales” de Aristóteles el paradigma apropiado para concebir la eficacia causal de las formas. Aquellos podrían oficiar de motores inmóviles en la medida en que reúnen una doble condición, que ni las formas platónicas ni los cuerpos sutiles pueden satisfacer: por una parte, su carácter incorpóreo no los convierte en substancias (separadas); por otra, su carácter inseparable no los convierte en cuerpos que desplacen a otros cuerpos por hallarse en contacto con ellos. De este modo, las  aristotélicas reunirían todas las ventajas explicativas de los  platónicos y del  estoico, evitando a la vez sus respectivos inconvenientes. Palabras clave: Aristóteles, Alejandro, alma, causa Abstract: this essay holds that one of the most compelling challenges that a psychology which is Peripatetic in inspiration must face is to keep the causal relevance of the soul within the three orders of physical change (movement, alteration, and growth) without turning the soul into an inner ‘mover’ that displaces the organism on account of being in contact with it. If this hindrance is not solved, such a psychology could not assert that the soul is both an unextense and impassive item, but (at best) a subtle body displacing another baser body. This paper suggests a combined reading of Alexander’s and Aristotle’s treatise on the soul for the sake of presenting Alexander’s strategy as a successful manner of facing that plain difficulty. According to Mittelman, Alexander would find in Aristotle’s ‘dispositional states’ the proper paradigm

Alexander and Aristotle on the efficient causality of the soul

According to Aristotle, questions concerning the basic framework within which a science proceeds are radically different from questions concerning the nature, existence and attributes of various kinds within a science. The former are pre-scientific and can only be dealt with dialectically. Dialectic is not itself a science, yet it provides the "path to the principles of all inquiries" (Top. 10lb4). These principles cannot be discussed within the sciences on pain of regress or petitio principii, since they are the protai, the "firsts," of everything within them (Top. 101 a36101 b4). Thus, it could only be the business of dialectic and not of any science to consider whether we should speak of "thises" (tode ti) and "suches" (toionde) and whether there are substances and qualities and quantities (Phys. 185a27-8). In a science, on the other hand, we ask such questions as: "Does the sun suffer eclipse?" "What causes an earthquake?" "Are there centaurs?" and "What is man?" (,4n. Post. B.l). Quine has pointed out that a radical distinction between framework questions and questions within the sciences is "of little concern ... apart from the adoption of something like the (Russellian) theory of types."' Without some such theory, there will be no distinction in principle between such questions as "Are there properties?" and "Are there substances" on the one hand, and "Are there centaurs?" on the other. With the adoption of some such type theory, however, although we can't know in advance, for example, what particular species there are, we can know that whatever we come across in the world will be assignable to one of an antecedently determined number of categories, so the division will make sense. There will be fundamental segregations of expression and entities, and attempts to violate type distinctions will lead to absurdity and paradox. In light of Quine's insight, it is perhaps not surprising to discover that a type distinction emerges early and remains fundamental throughout Aristotle's work. I owe notice of it to Terry Penner.2 It is the distinction between a this (tode ti) and a such (toionde or sometimespoion), as Aristotle sometimes puts it. I shall assume that it is the same distinction he has in mind in charging Plato with trying to turn universals (katholou) into particulars (e.g. Met. 1038b34-1039a2, 1040b23-31, 1041a4, 1053b9-24,

Joan Kung

Papers

Aristotle on Thises, Suches and the Third Man A rgument