Series Editor's Preface. Introduction by John Breuilly. Acknowledgements. 1. Definitions. State and nation. The nation. 2. Culture in Agrarian Society. Power and culture in the agro-literature society. The varieties of agrarian rulers. 3. Industrial Society. The society of perpetual growth. Social genetics. The age of universal high culture. 4. The Transition to an Age of Nationalism. A note on the weakness of nationalism. Wild and garden culture. 5. What is a Nation. The course of true nationalism never did run smooth. 6. Social Entropy and Equality in Industrial Society. Obstacles to entropy. Fissures and barriers. A diversity of focus. 7. A Typology of Nationalisms. The varieties of nationalist experience. Diaspora nationalism. 8. The Future of Nationalism. Industrial culture - one or many?. 9. Nationalism and Ideology. Who is for Nuremberg?. One nation, one state. 10. Conclusion. What is not being said. Summary. Select bibliography. Bilbliography of Ernest Gellner's writing: Ian Jarvie. Index

Nations and Nationalism

Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy

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Modern Social Imaginaries

The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …

The Law of Peoples

of distinguished and rather senior economists – makes at the end of the book. Their priorities tend to be quick-fixes of problems that might, at least partly, be caused by some other challenge. More importantly, the panellists tend to disregard some of the evidence assembled by the authors. The reactions to the excellent chapter on armed conflict by Collier & Hoeffler illustrate that Nobel awards are no protection against bias. One member of the panel dismisses the economic sources of war that the Oxford economists analyse and points out that free trade is the main pacifying force, while another famous panellist mentions ethnic or religious hatred as a source of conflict. Gerald Schneider

At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict:

The liberal peace project has dominated state-building operations since the end of the Cold War, including in Timor-Leste. However, the attempt to institutionalise the liberal peace faced significant challenges in Timor-Leste's fragmented subsistence-based society. This resulted in the creation of shallowly rooted and poorly-understood liberal state institutions that were disconnected from the majority of Timorese, who continued to follow their local sociopolitical practices. In response, the state has increasingly engaged with these local practices in order to create state institutions that make sense to the people they seek to govern. This engagement has occurred through the formalisation of local sociopolitical institutions, the recognition of local justice systems and the utilisation of local ceremonies and practices. Therefore, this article argues that a liberal-local hybrid peace project has emerged to guide state-building in Timor-Leste, which may indicate how similar projects could develop in the future.

A liberal-local hybrid peace project in action? The increasing engagement between the local and liberal in Timor-Leste

In recent years, the study and practice of political reconciliation has experienced a turn to hybridity. This turn has been defined by the increased rate at which liberal international and local peacebuilding practices, and their underlying ideas, have become merged, integrated or co-located in time and space. While hybrid approaches to reconciliation have been praised as an effective means of engaging local populations in peacebuilding operations, little attention has been paid to examining whether or not they also bring unintended negative consequences. Drawing on the cases of Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville, this article examines the potentially dark side of hybridity. It demonstrates that, in each of these cases, hybrid approaches to political reconciliation have brought both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side of the equation, hybridity has seen imported international approaches to reconciliation adapted to meet local demands and ensure resonance with local ...

Political reconciliation in Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville: the dark side of hybridity

‘Hybridity’ has become a prominent notion in international peacebuilding and development circles in recent years, attracting both enthusiastic supporters and vociferous critics. As a concept it has a long and varied lineage. The term ‘hybrid’ was used originally in the biological and zoological sciences to refer to the product of mixing different elements. Since then, the concept has travelled across various social sciences in discussions around identity, culture, and aspects of political and economic order, particularly in colonial and postcolonial settings. Postcolonial scholars used hybridity to examine interactions between colonisers and colonised subjects. Their studies sought to counter monolithic depictions of colonial domination by emphasising active agency and resistance on the part of colonial subjects.

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Hybridity on the ground in peacebuilding and development

Part I. Normative Justification for Participatory Constitution Making: 1. The normative justification 2. A constituent process Part II. Minimal Participation in Timor-Leste: 3. State building and constitution making in Timor-Leste 4. Constituent power in Timor-Leste 5. Constituted power in Timor-Leste Part III. Extensive Participation in Bougainville: 6. State building and constitution making in Bougainville 7. Constituent power in Bougainville 8. Constituted power in Bougainville Part IV. Evidence for and against Participatory Constitution Making: 9. Comparing the constitution-making processes 10. Role in state building.

Constitution Making during State Building

In 2006 a security crisis in Timor-Leste caused the collapse of the police force, dismissal of almost half of the army and the internal displacement of 150,000 people. The roots of the crisis lay in a range of societal divisions that became salient owing to the weak nature of Timorese national identity. The government responded to the security crisis by creating schemes to provide cash payments to certain groups. This article considers how these schemes fit into—and potentially exacerbate—societal divisions and emerging competition over the ownership of Timorese national identity. It concludes by arguing that an ethno-symbolist approach to building national identity, combined with generally available social assistance schemes, may offer Timor-Leste the best chance of ameliorating societal division and conflict.

Joanne Wallis

Papers

A liberal-local hybrid peace project in action? The increasing engagement between the local and liberal in Timor-Leste

Political reconciliation in Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville: the dark side of hybridity

Hybridity on the ground in peacebuilding and development

Constitution Making during State Building

Victors, Villains and Victims: Capitalizing on Memory in Timor-Leste