Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The topic of dynamic pricing and learning has received a considerable amount of attention in recent years, from different scientific communities. We survey these literature streams: we provide a brief introduction to the historical origins of quantitative research on pricing and demand estimation, point to different subfields in the area of dynamic pricing, and provide an in-depth overview of the available literature on dynamic pricing and learning. Our focus is on the operations research and management science literature, but we also discuss relevant contributions from marketing, economics, econometrics, and computer science. We discuss relations with methodologically related research areas, and identify directions for future research.

Dynamic pricing and learning: Historical origins, current research, and new directions

To the Editor.— The editorial by Samuel Vaisrub, MD, "To the Best of Our Knowledge, Which Is Limited at Best" (241:278, 1979), was delightful, and its point was unhappily correct. It brought to my mind that demolisher of analytical studies, "to the best of our knowledge," or "as far as we know." It goes like this: We treated so many people, and we know this many are well, and so many have died; and this many,from whom we have not heard, are alive and well,as far as we know. Someone from whom you have not heard is more likely to be dead than alive.

To the Best of Our Knowledge

https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/files/5090800/memo2025.pdf

Dynamic pricing and learning: historical origins, current research, and new directions

Intertemporal Price Discrimination

A survey on risk-averse and robust revenue management

While flexible products have been popular for many years in practice, they have only recently gained attention in the academic literature on revenue management. When selling a flexible product, a firm retains the right to specify some of its details later. The relevant point in time is after the sale, but often before the provision of the product or service, depending on the customers' need to know the exact specification in advance. The resulting flexibility can help to increase revenues if capacity is fixed and the demand to come difficult to forecast. We present several revenue management models and control mechanisms incorporating this kind of flexible products. An extensive numerical study shows how the different approaches can mitigate the negative impact of demand forecast errors.

Using flexible products to cope with demand uncertainty in revenue management

This paper provides an overview of the literature on dynamic pricing with strategic customers In the past, research on dynamic pricing was mostly concerned with optimally pricing products over time in a market with myopic customers In recent years, the consideration of strategic customers, who can delay a purchase to take advantage of a future discount, has dramatically increased This paper’s main contribution is the development of a comprehensive classification scheme to structure the field of research and, based upon this, a systematic overview of all relevant papers We then present in detail the various aspects considered in the literature together with their motivation from industry and state the major findings of the most relevant papers Further attention is given to important problem extensions proposed in the literature that have been considered in only a few papers and are usually motivated by specific practical applications Finally, promising directions for future research are indicated

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2150160_code1391543.pdf?abstractid=1979477

Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers

This paper provides an overview of the literature on dynamic pricing with strategic customers. In the past, research on dynamic pricing was mostly concerned with optimally pricing products over time in a market with myopic customers. In recent years, the consideration of strategic customers, who can delay a purchase to take advantage of a future discount, has dramatically increased. This paper’s main contribution is the development of a comprehensive classification scheme to structure the field of research and, based upon this, a systematic overview of all relevant papers. We then present in detail the various aspects considered in the literature together with their motivation from industry and state the major findings of the most relevant papers. Further attention is given to important problem extensions proposed in the literature that have been considered in only a few papers and are usually motivated by specific practical applications. Finally, promising directions for future research are indicated.

Jochen Gönsch

Papers

A survey on risk-averse and robust revenue management

Using flexible products to cope with demand uncertainty in revenue management

Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers

Dynamic pricing with strategic customers

Integrated revenue management approaches for capacity control with planned upgrades