This book is arguably the most important book to be published recently in the area of the Journal's special issue, as it sets the agenda for the ongoing study of young people's civic and political engagement with and through the internet. It comprehensively includes many of the main theorists and empirical researchers currently working in this field of study. It also poses important research questions for the future on how to best understand contemporary forms of civic engagement that are now facilitated by the internet. Luckily for readers the book is also accompanied by a web based discussion where the contributors and other invited experts debate and discuss concepts and ideas that underpinned the development of this book project Lance Bennett in the introductory chapter 'Changing citizenship in the digital age' explains how the practice of citizenship itself has changed in the contemporary epoch and that the internet amplifies how we understand this. He identifies all age groups' increasing cynicism with formal, electoral based politics

Civic Life Online: Learning How Digital Media Can Engage Youth

In this article, the introduction to a special International Journal of Press/Politics (IJPP) issue on populism, we articulate and define populism as a communication phenomenon. We provide an overview of populist political communication research and its current foci. We offer a framework for ongoing research and set the boundary conditions for a new generation of research on populist political communication, with an aim to push the research agendas and design toward a more interactive, systematic, and in particular, comparative approach to the study of populist political communication.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1940161218790035

Populism as an Expression of Political Communication Content and Style: A New Perspective.

Populist Political Communication in Europe

In the last 10 years, many canonical findings in the social sciences appear unreliable. This so-called “replication crisis” has spurred calls for open science practices, which aim to increase the reproducibility, replicability, and generalizability of findings. Communication research is subject to many of the same challenges that have caused low replicability in other fields. As a result, we propose an agenda for adopting open science practices in Communication, which includes the following seven suggestions: (1) publish materials, data, and code; (2) preregister studies and submit registered reports; (3) conduct replications; (4) collaborate; (5) foster open science skills; (6) implement Transparency and Openness Promotion Guidelines; and (7) incentivize open science practices. Although in our agenda we focus mostly on quantitative research, we also reflect on open science practices relevant to qualitative research. We conclude by discussing potential objections and concerns associated with open science practices.

/pdf/an-agenda-for-open-science-in-communication-kong3izphq.pdf

An Agenda for Open Science in Communication

This article investigates the impact of populist messages on issue agreement and readiness for action in 15 countries (N = 7,286). Specifically, populist communicators rely on persuasive strategies by which social group cues become more salient and affect people's judgment of and political engagement with political issues. This strategy is called ‘populist identity framing’ because the ordinary people as the in‐group is portrayed as being threatened by various out‐groups. By blaming political elites for societal or economic problems harming ordinary people, populist communicators engage in anti‐elitist identity framing. Another strategy is to blame immigrants for social problems – that is, exclusionist identity framing. Finally, right‐wing political actors combine both cues and depict an even more threatening situation of the ordinary people as the in‐group. Based on social identity theory, an experimental study in 15 European countries shows that most notably the anti‐elitist identity frame has the potential to persuade voters. Additionally, relative deprivation makes recipients more susceptible to the mobilising impact of the populist identity frames.

https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1475-6765.12334

The effects of populism as a social identity frame on persuasion and mobilisation: Evidence from a 15-country experiment

Although populist communication has become pervasive throughout Europe, many important questions on its political consequences remain unanswered. First, previous research has neglected the differential effects of populist communication on the Left and Right. Second, internationally comparative studies are missing. Finally, previous research mostly studied attitudinal outcomes, neglecting behavioral effects. To address these key issues, this paper draws on a unique, extensive, and comparative experiment in sixteen European countries (N = 15,412) to test the effects of populist communication on political engagement. The findings show that anti-elitist populism has the strongest mobilizing effects, and anti-immigrant messages have the strongest demobilizing effects. Moreover, national conditions such as the level of unemployment and the electoral success of the populist Left and Right condition the impact of populist communication. These findings provide important insights into the persuasiveness of populist messages spread throughout the European continent.

/pdf/start-spreading-the-news-a-comparative-experiment-on-the-1uui8yqrl8.pdf

Start Spreading the News: A Comparative Experiment on the Effects of Populist Communication on Political Engagement in Sixteen European Countries:

While the role of social media in the spread of conspiracy theories has received much attention, a key deficit in previous research is the lack of distinction between different types of platforms. ...

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/14614448211045666

Joerg Matthes

Papers

Start Spreading the News: A Comparative Experiment on the Effects of Populist Communication on Political Engagement in Sixteen European Countries:

Does the platform matter? Social media and COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs in 17 countries: