Cognitive radio is viewed as a novel approach for improving the utilization of a precious natural resource: the radio electromagnetic spectrum. The cognitive radio, built on a software-defined radio, is defined as an intelligent wireless communication system that is aware of its environment and uses the methodology of understanding-by-building to learn from the environment and adapt to statistical variations in the input stimuli, with two primary objectives in mind: /spl middot/ highly reliable communication whenever and wherever needed; /spl middot/ efficient utilization of the radio spectrum. Following the discussion of interference temperature as a new metric for the quantification and management of interference, the paper addresses three fundamental cognitive tasks. 1) Radio-scene analysis. 2) Channel-state estimation and predictive modeling. 3) Transmit-power control and dynamic spectrum management. This work also discusses the emergent behavior of cognitive radio.

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Cognitive radio: brain-empowered wireless communications

One of the central problems in machine learning and pattern recognition is to develop appropriate representations for complex data. We consider the problem of constructing a representation for data lying on a low-dimensional manifold embedded in a high-dimensional space. Drawing on the correspondence between the graph Laplacian, the Laplace Beltrami operator on the manifold, and the connections to the heat equation, we propose a geometrically motivated algorithm for representing the high-dimensional data. The algorithm provides a computationally efficient approach to nonlinear dimensionality reduction that has locality-preserving properties and a natural connection to clustering. Some potential applications and illustrative examples are discussed.

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Laplacian Eigenmaps for dimensionality reduction and data representation

we would call cooperative. This theory is based on an analysis of the interrelationships of the various coalitions which can be formed by the players of the game. Our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of coalitions in that it is assumed that each participant acts independently, without collaboration or communication with any of the others. The notion of an equilibrium point is the basic ingredient in our theory. This notion yields a generalization of the concept of the solution of a two-person zerosum game. It turns out that the set of equilibrium points of a two-person zerosum game is simply the set of all pairs of opposing "good strategies." In the immediately following sections we shall define equilibrium points and prove that a finite non-cooperative game always has at least one equilibrium point. We shall also introduce the notions of solvability and strong solvability of a non-cooperative game and prove a theorem on the geometrical structure of the set of equilibrium points of a solvable game. As an example of the application of our theory we include a solution of a

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1969529.pdf

Non-cooperative games

Couplings and changes of variables.- Three examples of coupling techniques.- The founding fathers of optimal transport.- Qualitative description of optimal transport.- Basic properties.- Cyclical monotonicity and Kantorovich duality.- The Wasserstein distances.- Displacement interpolation.- The Monge-Mather shortening principle.- Solution of the Monge problem I: global approach.- Solution of the Monge problem II: Local approach.- The Jacobian equation.- Smoothness.- Qualitative picture.- Optimal transport and Riemannian geometry.- Ricci curvature.- Otto calculus.- Displacement convexity I.- Displacement convexity II.- Volume control.- Density control and local regularity.- Infinitesimal displacement convexity.- Isoperimetric-type inequalities.- Concentration inequalities.- Gradient flows I.- Gradient flows II: Qualitative properties.- Gradient flows III: Functional inequalities.- Synthetic treatment of Ricci curvature.- Analytic and synthetic points of view.- Convergence of metric-measure spaces.- Stability of optimal transport.- Weak Ricci curvature bounds I: Definition and Stability.- Weak Ricci curvature bounds II: Geometric and analytic properties.

Optimal Transport: Old and New

Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco)

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Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model

A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game In this treatment a few general assumptions are made concerning the behavior of a single individual and of a group of two individuals in certain economic environments From these, the solution (in the sense of this paper) of classical problem may be obtained In the terms of game theory, values are found for the game См также: Two-person cooperative games, автор - Джо Нэш

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The Bargaining Problem

One may define a concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. For mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expectations of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms …

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Equilibrium points in n-person games

In this paper, the autor extends his previous treatment of «The Bargaining Problem» to a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role/ A new approach is introduced involving the elaboration of the threat concept.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P172.pdf

John F. Nash

Papers

The Bargaining Problem

Equilibrium points in n-person games

Non-cooperative games

Two-Person Cooperative Games

Continuity of Solutions of Parabolic and Elliptic Equations