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Journal ArticleDOI

Two-Person Cooperative Games

John F. Nash
- 01 Jan 1953 - 
- Vol. 21, Iss: 1, pp 128-140
TLDR
In this paper, a new approach involving the elaboration of the threat concept is introduced involving a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role, and the autor extends his previous treatment of "The Bargaining Problem" to a wider set of situations where threats can be played a role.
Abstract
In this paper, the autor extends his previous treatment of «The Bargaining Problem» to a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role/ A new approach is introduced involving the elaboration of the threat concept.

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Citations
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Book ChapterDOI

Non-cooperative games

John F. Nash
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the set of equilibrium points of a two-person zero-sum game can be defined as a set of all pairs of opposing "good" strategies.
Journal ArticleDOI

Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model

Ariel Rubinstein
- 01 Jan 1982 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model was presented, focusing on a strategic approach adopted for the study and details of the bargaining situation used; discussion on perfect equilibrium.
Journal ArticleDOI

Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I-III

TL;DR: The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc.
Journal ArticleDOI

Stakeholder Influence Strategies

TL;DR: In this article, the authors use resource dependence theory to investigate two questions: what types of influence strategies do stakeholders have available, and what determines which type the stakeholders choose to use?
Book

The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling

TL;DR: In this article, the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining is established and the results provide a guide for the application of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.