Distinguishing four sources of power in human societies – ideological, economic, military and political – The Sources of Social Power traces their interrelations throughout human history In this first volume, Michael Mann examines interrelations between these elements from neolithic times, through ancient Near Eastern civilizations, the classical Mediterranean age and medieval Europe, up to just before the Industrial Revolution in England It offers explanations of the emergence of the state and social stratification; of city-states, militaristic empires and the persistent interaction between them; of the world salvation religions; and of the particular dynamism of medieval and early modern Europe It ends by generalizing about the nature of overall social development, the varying forms of social cohesion and the role of classes and class struggle in history First published in 1986, this new edition of Volume 1 includes a new preface by the author examining the impact and legacy of the work

The sources of social power

Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players. Yet the context of interaction, perceptions, and strategies is also important. Issues are linked to one another through multilevel games, which may be compatible or incompatible. Whether reciprocity constitutes an effective strategy depends both on linkages among issues and on the institutions within which negotiations take place. Perceptions are always significant and often decisive. Decision makers often actively seek to change the contexts within which they act by linking issues, trying to alter others' perceptions, establishing institutions, and promoting new norms. This finding suggests the importance of linking the upward-looking theory of strategy with the downward-looking theory of regimes.

/pdf/achieving-cooperation-under-anarchy-strategies-and-25xj1gu1p5.pdf

Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies And Institutions

In recent years, a great deal has been written about a `constructivist' approach in International Relations, which argues that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures ...

Seizing the Middle Ground:: Constructivism in World Politics

Structure of International Politics I F o r more than three hundred years, the drama of modern history has turned on the rise and fall of great powers. In the multipolar era, twelve great powers appeared on the scene at one time or another. At the beginning of World War 11, seven remained; at its conclusion, two. Always before, as some states sank, others rose to take their places. World War I1 broke the pattern; for the first time in a world of sovereign states, bipolarity prevailed. In a 1964 essay, I predicted that bipolarity would last through the century.’ On the brow of the next millennium, we must prepare to bid bipolarity adieu and begin to live without its stark simplicities and comforting symmetry. Already in the fall of 1989, Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger expressed nostalgia for the ”remarkably stable and predictable atmosphere of the Cold War,“ and in the summer of 1990, John Mearsheimer gave strong reasons for expecting worse days to come.2 For almost half a century it seemed that World War I1 was truly ”the war to end wars” among the great and major powers of the world. The longest peace yet known rested on two pillars: bipolarity and nuclear weapons. During the war, Nicholas Spykman foresaw a postwar international order no different ”from the old,” with international society continuing ”to operate within the same fundamental power pattern^.\"^ Realists generally shared his

/pdf/the-emerging-structure-of-international-politics-5dsqdqbxvw.pdf

The Emerging Structure of International Politics

The collapse of the Soviet Union produced the greatest change in world power relationships since World War II. With Moscow’s headlong fall from superpower status, the bipolar structure that had shaped the security policies of the major powers for nearly half a century vanished, and the United States emerged as the sole surviving superpower. Commentators were quick to recognize that a new “unipolar moment” of unprecedented U.S. power had arrived.1 In 1992 the Pentagon drafted a new grand strategy designed to preserve unipolarity by preventing the emergence of a global rival.2 But the draft plan soon ran into controversy, as commentators at home and abroad argued that any effort to preserve unipolarity was quixotic and dangerous.3 Ofacials quickly backed away from the idea and now eschew the language of primacy or predominance, speaking instead of the United States as a “leader” or the “indispensable nation.”4 The rise and sudden demise of an ofacial strategy for preserving primacy lends credence to the widespread belief that unipolarity is dangerous and unstable. While scholars frequently discuss unipolarity, their focus is always on its demise. For neorealists, unipolarity is the least stable of all structures because any great concentration of power threatens other states and causes them to take action to restore a balance.5 Other scholars grant that a large

The Stability of a Unipolar World

PREFACE 1. The Landscape of History 2. Time and Space 3. Structure and Process 4. The Interdependency of Variables 5. Chaos and Complexity 6. Causation, Contingency, and Counterfactuals 7. Molecules with Minds of Their Own 8. Seeing Like a Historian NOTES INDEX

The landscape of history : how historians map the past

When Strategies of Containment was first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente, and now a comprehensive assessment of how Reagan-- and Gorbachev-- completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end. He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world."

Strategies of containment : a critical appraisal of postwar American national security policy

Beginning with World War II and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this is an account of the strategic dynamics that drove the age, with portraits of its major personalities and insight into its most crucial events. Drawing on newly opened Soviet, East European, and Chinese archives and the reminiscences of the major players, John Lewis Gaddis explains not just what happened but why -- from the months in 1945 when the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. went from alliance to antagonism to the barely averted holocaust of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the maneuvers of Nixon and Mao, Reagan and Gorbachev.

The Cold War: A New History

I Pr inces have always sought out soothsayers of one kind or another for the purpose of learning what the future holds. These hired visionaries have found portents in the configurations of stars, the entrails of animals, and most indicators in between. The results, on the whole, have been disappointing. Surprise remains one of the few things one can count on, and very few princes have succeeded in avoiding it, however assiduous the efforts of their respective wizards, medicine men, counselors, advisers, and think tank consultants to ward it off. Surprise is still very much with us. The abrupt end of the Cold War, an unanticipated hot war in the Persian Gulf, and the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union astonished almost everyone, whether in government, the academy, the media, or the think tanks. Although there was nothing inherently implausible about these eventsthe Cold War did have to end sometime, war had always been a possibility in the Middle East, and communism’s failures had been obvious for years-the fact that they arose so unexpectedly suggests that deficiencies persist in the means by which contemporary princes and the soothsayers they employ seek to discern the future course of world affairs. No modern soothsayer, of course, would aspire to total clairvoyance. We have no equivalent of Isaac Asimov’s famous character, the mathematician Hari Seldon, whose predictive powers were so great that he was able to leave precise holographic instructions for his followers, to be consulted at successive intervals decades after his death.’ But historians, political scientists, economists, psychologists, and even mathemati-

International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War

"Strategies of Containment" is a classic synthesis of American security policy, widely read and assigned in courses despite it not being updated since its original publication in 1982. This new edition will include substantial new material, discussing international affairs and American policy since the Carter administration. It will analyze the foreign policy of President Bush and current military action, and assess current national security policy.

John Lewis Gaddis

Papers

The landscape of history : how historians map the past

Strategies of containment : a critical appraisal of postwar American national security policy

The Cold War: A New History

International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War

Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War