Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

For the last 30 years a growing number of scholars and practitioners have been experimenting with concepts and models that facilitate our understanding of the complexities of today’s business challenges. Among these, “stakeholder theory” or “stakeholder thinking” has emerged as a new narrative to understand and remedy three interconnected business problems—the problem of understanding how value is created and traded, the problem of connecting ethics and capitalism, and the problem of helping managers think about management such that the first two problems are addressed. In this article, we review the major uses and adaptations of stakeholder theory across a broad array of disciplines such as business ethics, corporate strategy, finance, accounting, management, and marketing. We also evaluate and suggest future directions in which research on stakeholder theory can continue to provide useful insights into the practice of sustainable and ethical value creation.

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Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art

This paper presents a polynomial dimensional decomposition (PDD) method for global sensitivity analysis of stochastic systems subject to independent random input following arbitrary probability distributions. The method involves Fourier-polynomial expansions of lower-variate component functions of a stochastic response by measure-consistent orthonormal polynomial bases, analytical formulae for calculating the global sensitivity indices in terms of the expansion coefficients, and dimension-reduction integration for estimating the expansion coefficients. Due to identical dimensional structures of PDD and analysis-of-variance decomposition, the proposed method facilitates simple and direct calculation of the global sensitivity indices. Numerical results of the global sensitivity indices computed for smooth systems reveal significantly higher convergence rates of the PDD approximation than those from existing methods, including polynomial chaos expansion, random balance design, state-dependent parameter, improved Sobol’s method, and sampling-based methods. However, for non-smooth functions, the convergence properties of the PDD solution deteriorate to a great extent, warranting further improvements. The computational complexity of the PDD method is polynomial, as opposed to exponential, thereby alleviating the curse of dimensionality to some extent. Mathematical modeling of complex systems often requires sensitivity analysis to determine how an output variable of interest is influenced by individual or subsets of input variables. A traditional local sensitivity analysis entails gradients or derivatives, often invoked in design optimization, describing changes in the model response due to the local variation of input. Depending on the model output, obtaining gradients or derivatives, if they exist, can be simple or difficult. In contrast, a global sensitivity analysis (GSA), increasingly becoming mainstream, characterizes how the global variation of input, due to its uncertainty, impacts the overall uncertain behavior of the model. In other words, GSA constitutes the study of how the output uncertainty from a mathematical model is divvied up, qualitatively or quantitatively, to distinct sources of input variation in the model [1].

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

This chapter is devoted to a more detailed examination of game theory. Game theory is an important tool for analyzing strategic behavior, is concerned with how individuals make decisions when they recognize that their actions affect, and are affected by, the actions of other individuals or groups. Strategic behavior recognizes that the decision-making process is frequently mutually interdependent. Game theory is the study of the strategic behavior involving the interaction of two or more individuals, teams, or firms, usually referred to as players. Two game theoretic scenarios were examined in this chapter: Simultaneous-move and multi-stage games. In simultaneous-move games the players effectively move at the same time. A normal-form game summarizes the players, possible strategies and payoffs from alternative strategies in a simultaneous-move game. Simultaneous-move games may be either noncooperative or cooperative. In contrast to noncooperative games, players of cooperative games engage in collusive behavior. A Nash equilibrium, which is a solution to a problem in game theory, occurs when the players’ payoffs cannot be improved by changing strategies. Simultaneous-move games may be either one-shot or repeated games. One-shot games are played only once. Repeated games are games that are played more than once. Infinitely-repeated games are played over and over again without end. Finitely-repeated games are played a limited number of times. Finitely-repeated games have certain or uncertain ends.

An Introduction to Game Theory

The purpose and functions of the Highway Research Board's Committee on Conduct of Research are set forth, and papers sponsored by the Committee and presented at the Annual Meetings of the Highway Research Board are mentioned. The Committee, which seeks to improve the quality and effectiveness of research, serves as a forum for the exhange of ideas and the delineation of the problems associated with the various methods of organizing and administering research programs, the consideration of project design and instrumentation, and the application of research findings in the transportation field. The Committee has sponsored Annual Meeting sessions (in 1969, 1973, and 1974) on various aspects (selection, design, and supervision of projects as well as the implementation of results and evaluation of the benefits) of research management. Papers presented at the 1969 sessions were published in Highway Research Record 338. Eight papers presented at the 1973 sessions are included in this publication.

Management of research. introduction

Project complexity and risk management (ProCRiM) : towards modelling project complexity driven risk paths in construction projects

Supply chain risk network management : a Bayesian belief network and expected utility based approach for managing supply chain risks

Bayesian belief nets (BBNs) provide an effective way of reasoning under uncertainty. They have a firm mathematical background in probability theory and have been used in a variety of application areas, including reliability. BBNs can provide alternative representations of fault trees and reliability block diagrams. BBNs can be used to incorporate expert judgement formally into the modelling process. It has been claimed BBNs may overcome some of the limitations of standard reliability techniques. This paper presents an overview of BBNs and illustrates their use through a simple tutorial on system reliability modelling. The use of BBNs in reliability to date is reviewed. The challenge of using BBNs in reliability practice is explored and areas of research are identified.

John Quigley

Papers

Project complexity and risk management (ProCRiM) : towards modelling project complexity driven risk paths in construction projects

Supply chain risk network management : a Bayesian belief network and expected utility based approach for managing supply chain risks

Bayesian belief nets for managing expert judgement and modelling reliability

Systemic risk elicitation: Using causal maps to engage stakeholders and build a comprehensive view of risks

Building prior distributions to support Bayesian reliability growth modelling using expert judgement