Introduction 1 Contentious politics and social movements: Part I The Birth of the Modern Social Movement: 2 Modular collective action 3 Print and association 4 Statebuilding and social movements Part II From Contention to Social Movements: 5 Political opportunities and constraints 6 The repertoire of contention 7 Framing contention 8 Mobilising structures and contentious politics Part III The Dynamics of Movement: 9 Cycles of contention 10 Struggling to reform 11 Transnational contention/conclusion: the future of social movements

Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics

https://escholarship.org/content/qt2z16222r/qt2z16222r.pdf?t=lnpv94

On the private provision of public goods

1 Front Matter 2 1 The Drama of the Commons 3 Part I: Resource Users, Resource Systems, and Behavior in the Drama of the Commons 4 2 Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability 5 3 Unequal Irrigators: Heterogeneity and Commons Management in Large-Scale 6 4 Factors Influencing Cooperation in Commons Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological Research 7 5 Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical Explanation 8 Part II: Privatization and Its Limitations 9 6 The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned? 10 7 Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances 11 Part III: Cross-Scale Linkages and Dynamic Interactions 12 8 Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale Interactions 13 9 Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the Bottom Up 14 Part IV: Emerging Issues 15 10 Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems, and the Design of Common-Pool Institutions 16 11 Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Contexts, Situations, and Events 17 12 An Evolutionary Theory of Commons Management 18 13 Knowledge and Questions After 15 Years of Research 19 About the Contributors 20 Index

The Drama of the Commons

Data from 492 college students indicated that group size and individuals' identifiability, sense of shared responsibility, and levels of individualism or collectivism influenced peer-rated cooperation in classroom groups. Levels of individualism or collectivism moderated the effects of size and identifiability on cooperation but not those of shared responsibility. These findings suggest that models of free riding and social loafing provide insights into individualistic cooperation in groups but are limited in their ability to explain the cooperation of collectivists.

Studies of Individualism-Collectivism: Effects on Cooperation in Groups

http://emiguel.econ.berkeley.edu/assets/miguel_research/42/_Paper__Ethnic_Diversity__Social_Sanctions__and_Public_Goods_in_Kenya.pdf

Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya

In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson shows how the activities of various political organizations can be fruitfully analyzed using the theory of collective goods. Several of Olson's major conclusions concern the relationship between the size of a group and its ability to provide its members with collective benefits. He concludes that as group size increases, the amount of collective benefits provided will become increasingly suboptimal, and that the absolute amount of collective benefits provided will decrease. This paper shows that Olson's conclusion concerning the relationship between group size and the absolute amount of collective benefits provided is not generally true. Within the framework of analysis used by Olson, it is demonstrated that the relationship is determined by the interaction between two effects, an “income” effect which may cause the level of benefits provided to increase as group size increases, and a “congestion” effect which may cause the level of benefits to decrease as group size increases. The final result is that for “inclusive” collective goods the relationship is an increasing one, while for “exclusive” goods it is a decreasing one. Some implications of this result for the use of the theory of collective goods in studying political processes are discussed.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400117496

Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size

The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by social choice theorists. This article redresses this neglect and provides an axiomatic study of one means of implementing proportional representation. The distinguishing feature of proportional representation is its concern for the representativeness of deliberations as well as decisions. We define a representative in a way that is particularly attentive to this feature and then define a method of selecting representatives (a variant of the Borda rule) which selects a maximally representative body. We also prove that this method of selection meets four social choice axioms that are met by a number of other important social choicefunctions (including pairwise majority decision and the Borda rule). For over two hundred years, methods of selecting representative bodies have been a major topic of debate among democratic theorists. One important view of the goals and functions of repre

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/1957270

Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule

There have been few opportunities to assess the implications of social choice theory using data from large, naturally occurring elections. We examine here five presidential elections of the American Psychological Association. These elections involve ten to fifteen thousand voters who express rank-ordered preferences over five candidates. We investigate the occurrence of the "paradox of voting," the ability of various voting systems to select majority winners, violations of subset rationality conditions, and the possibility of manipulating election outcomes through the misrepresentation of preferences. The frequent occurrence of these anomalies (with the exception of the paradox of voting) emphasizes the essential relevance of social choice theory to a theory of democratic electoral processes. T he claim by social choice theorists that developments in their field over the past thirty years require a fundamental rethinking of the role of voting in democratic societies has met with a wide range of responses from political scientists. Some, such as William Riker in his recent book Liberalism Against Populism (1982), have had their views radically altered by the "confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice" that constitutes the subtitle of Riker's book. For Riker, social choice theory has been decisive in evaluating two contending

Social Choice Observed: Five Presidential Elections of the American Psychological Association

This paper contains a study about decision making in groups. The author analyzes the manipulability of four voting systems: Borda, Coombs, Hare, and plurality. The Hare voting system was found to be the least manipulable; the Borda, the most manipulable. The results of this study indicate that the logical possibility of manipulation threatens the legitimacy of voting outcomes.

An investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems

This article develops a formal framework to aid political designers in the comparison of social choice functions. It generalizes earlier assumptions of “impartial culture” so that we may begin to investigate the effect of politically interesting variations on the probability that different social choice functions will satisfy given performance criteria. As an application of the framework, a detailed Monte Carlo study compares the ability of four different social choice functions to select a Condorcet winner when voter preference orders have been generated from a spatial representation of ideal points and alternatives. We also investigate the potential of alternative methods of selecting winners in presidential primary elections.

John R. Chamberlin

Papers

Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size

Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule

Social Choice Observed: Five Presidential Elections of the American Psychological Association

An investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems

Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions*