https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02132147/document

New advances in the Clinica software platform for clinical neuroimaging studies

Threshold-free cluster enhancement: Addressing problems of smoothing, threshold dependence and localisation in cluster inference

I NCENTIVES ARE the essence of economics. Despite many wide-ranging claims about their supposed importance, there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers. The purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives. Since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned, a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm's interest. This literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers. These include piece rates, options, discretionary bonuses, promotions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, deferred compensation, and so on. My objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation. Where possible, I will address the literature from two perspectives. First, an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance. Accordingly, I consider whether agents behave in this way, and whether these responses are always in the firm's interest. Second, I address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind. In other words, do contracts look like the predictions of the theory? Incentives are provided to workers

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The Provision of Incentives in Firms

This paper compares the perspectives of transaction costs and strategic behavior in explaining the motivation to joint venture. In addition, a theory of joint ventures as an instrument of organizational learning is proposed and developed. Existing studies of joint ventures are examined in light of these theories. Data on the sectoral distribution and stability of joint ventures are presented.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2486268.pdf

Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives

This paper develops and estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices and wages for the euro area. The model incorporates various other features such as habit formation, costs of adjustment in capital accumulation and variable capacity utilisation. It is estimated with Bayesian techniques using seven key macro-economic variables: GDP, consumption, investment, prices, real wages, employment and the nominal interest rate. The introduction of ten orthogonal structural shocks (including productivity, labour supply, investment, preference, cost-push and monetary policy shocks) allows for an empirical investigation of the effects of such shocks and of their contribution to business cycle fluctuations in the euro area. Using the estimated model, the paper also analyses the output (real interest rate) gap, defined as the difference between the actual and model-based potential output (real interest rate).

An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the euro area. NBB Working Paper Nr. 35

The process of selling assests and enterprises to the private sector raises questions about natural monopolies, the efficiency and equity of state-owned versus privately owned enterprises, and industrial policy. This comprehensive analysis of the British privatization program explores these questions both theoretically and empirically.

Privatization: An Economic Analysis

Is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth? This question is addressed in the context of an endogenous growth model with "step-by-step" innovations, in which technological laggards must first catch up with the leading-edge technology before battling for technological leadership in the future. In contrast to earlier Schumpeterian models in which innovations are always made by outsider firms who earn no rents if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do innovate, here we find: first, that the usual Schumpeterian effect of more intense product market competition (PMC) is almost always outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape competition, so that PMC has a positive effect on growth; second, that a little imitation is almost always growth-enhancing, as it promotes more frequent neck-and-neck competition, but too much imitation is unambiguously growth-reducing. The model thus points to complementary roles for competition (anti-trust) policy and patent policy.

/pdf/competition-imitation-and-growth-with-step-by-step-18p1n2z1up.pdf

Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation

The use of thugs or sadists for the collection of extortion or the guarding of prisoners, or the conspicuous delegation of authority to a military commander of known motivation, exemplifies a common means of making credible a response pattern that the original source of decision might have been thought to shrink from or to find profitless, once the threat had failed. Schelling (1960, pp. 142–3). If control of my decisions is in the hands of an agent whose preferences are different from my own, I may nevertheless prefer the results to those that would come about if I took my own decisions. This has some interesting implications for the theory of the firm. For example, in markets where firms are interdependent, it is not necessarily true that maximum profits are earned by firms whose objective is profit-maximization. This can be seen in a simple example of entry deterrence. Firm A is deciding whether or not to enter a market currently monopolized by firm B . If A enters, B (or rather its managers) must decide whether to respond aggressively or in an accommodating fashion. Entry is profitable for A if and only if B does not fight. Faced with the fact of entry, it is more profitable for B to accommodate than to fight, but B 's profits are greater still if there is no entry.

Delegation and the theory of the firm

Regulatory reform had its beginnings in the United States in the 1970s, and today it is taking place around the globe. One of the central questions for industrial policy is how to regulate firms with market power. Regulatory Reform tackles this important policy issue in two parts: it describes an analytical framework for studying the main issues in regulatory reform, and then applies the analysis to the British experience in four utility industries - telecommunications, gas, electricity, and water supply. Britain's utility industries, state-owned monopolies just ten years ago, offer a dramatic example of comprehensive reforms with parallels elsewhere: industries have been restructured, markets have been liberalized, and new regulatory methods and institutions have been created. The authors focus on common policy questions that arise in each industry while taking into account the considerable diversity between the industries and the different reform policies adopted. The analysis and experience in Britain's utility industries also provides a rich variety of issues concerning monopolistic and anticompetitive practices that are of interest for competition policy in general.

Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience

Despite being one of the most fundamental issues in political economy, the question of the appropriate boundary between public and private enterprise received relatively little attention in mainstream economic analysis until quite recently. In the 1980s, however, programs of ownership reform were started in many developed and developing countries. Dramatic though some of these policies have been, they are likely to be overshadowed in the 1990s by even greater privatization in the reforming socialist economies. The opening sections of this paper are organized around three broad and interrelated questions. How does ownership matter for the efficiency of enterprise performance? What is the role for privatization in financing public debts and deficits? What are the distributional and political implications of privatization? Finally we examine privatization in practice in three countries: Britain, Chile, and Poland.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/1942688

John Vickers

Papers

Privatization: An Economic Analysis

Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation

Delegation and the theory of the firm

Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience

Economic Perspectives on Privatization