A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

A Treatise on the Family

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Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis Modeling Change And Event Occurrence

IN THE WESTERN WORLD it is not difficult to identify areas where families and family ties are relatively "strong" and others where they are relatively '"weak." There are regions where traditionally the family group has had priority over the individual, and others where the individual and individual values have had priority over everything else. The strength and resilience of family loyalties, allegiances, and authority can be seen most clearly within the coresidential domestic group and among persons from the same conjugal family, although they extend to the larger kin group as well. These differences may well have characterized the European family for centuries, and there are few indications that convergence is occurring today. The way in which the relationship between the family group and its members manifests itself has implications for the way society itself functions. Politicians and public planners would do well to consider the nature of existing family systems when designing certain social policies. The geography of these strong and weak family systems does not appear to follow the classic division of Europe into stem-family and nuclearfamily regions. The dividing line, in some ways, is actually much simpler, with the center and north of Europe (Scandinavia, the British Isles, the Low Countries, much of Germany and Austria), together with North American society, being characterized by relatively weak family links, and the Mediterranean region by strong family ties.' The specific boundaries of different family systems are often not crystal clear, and subregional differences abound. Eor example, in some respects Ireland does not fit well into northern European family patterns, northern and southern Erance often appear to walk divergent paths, and the southern fringes of Spain, Italy, or Portugal often show characteristics distinct from the northern parts of those same countries. Within individual societies, there is also much room for heterogeneity affecting families and family life. This multiplicity of forms

Family Ties in Western Europe: Persistent Contrasts

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STUDY OBJECTIVES: In the UK, studies of socioeconomic differentials in mortality have generally relied upon occupational social class as the index of socioeconomic position, while in the US, measures based upon education have been widely used. These two measures have different characteristics; for example, social class can change throughout adult life, while education is unlikely to alter after early adulthood. Therefore different interpretations can be given to the mortality differentials that are seen. The objective of this analysis is to demonstrate the profile of mortality differentials, and the factors underlying these differentials, which are associated with the two socioeconomic measures. DESIGN: Prospective observational study. SETTING: 27 work places in the west of Scotland. PARTICIPANTS: 5749 men aged 35-64 who completed questionnaires and were examined between 1970 and 1973. FINDINGS: At baseline, similar gradients between socioeconomic position and blood pressure, height, lung function, and smoking behaviour were seen, regardless of whether the education or social class measure was used. Manual social class and early termination of full time education were associated with higher blood pressure, shorter height, poorer lung function, and a higher prevalence of smoking. Within education strata, the graded association between smoking and social class remains strong, whereas within social class groups the relation between education and smoking is attenuated. Over 21 years of follow up, 1639 of the men died. Mortality from all causes and from three broad cause of death groups (cardiovascular disease, malignant disease, and other causes) showed similar associations with social class and education. For all cause of death groups, men in manual social classes and men who terminated full time education at an early age had higher death rates. Cardiovascular disease was the cause of death group most strongly associated with education, while the non-cardiovascular non-cancer category was the cause of death group most strongly associated with adulthood social class. The graded association between social class and all cause mortality remains strong and significant within education strata, whereas within social class strata the relation between education and mortality is less clear. CONCLUSIONS: As a single indicator of socioeconomic position occupational social class in adulthood is a better discriminator of socioeconomic differentials in mortality and smoking behaviour than is education. This argues against interpretations that see cultural--rather than material--resources as being the key determinants of socioeconomic differentials in health. The stronger association of education with death from cardiovascular causes than with other causes of death may reflect the function of education as an index of socioeconomic circumstances in early life, which appear to have a particular influence on the risk of cardiovascular disease.

https://jech.bmj.com/content/jech/52/3/153.full.pdf

Education and occupational social class: which is the more important indicator of mortality risk?

At least three kinds of hypothesis may be invoked to interpret religious differ- entials in mortality. They are (i) hypotheses that refer to characteristics, (ii) those that refer to lifestyle, and (iii) those that refer to the social isolation of minorities. This paper tests all three kinds of hypothesis using data on urban child mortality from The Hague just before and dur- ing the demographic transition. A hazard analysis suggests that economic and demographic characteristics do not account for much of the variation by religion. An analysis of seasonal mortality suggests that some of the variation may be explained by differences in lifestyle. The third kind of hypothesis is presented here for the first time. We suggest that the social isolation of small religious groups lowered their exposure to certain kinds of infectious disease. We use a simulation study to show that this hypothesis could account for part of the variation.

Religious differentials in infant and child mortality in Holland, 1855-1912.

Previous studies of the marital fertility transition in Europe have found religious differentials. Using data collected from the population registers of The Hague, our aim in this study is to search for answers to the following questions: whether religious differentials result from socio-economic characteristics; to what extent religious ideology explains the behaviour of religious groups; which proximate determinants account for the religious differentials; and whether the Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition in Europe. The results provide some evidence of relatively low levels of parity-dependent fertility control among Jews before the transition and among Catholics during the transition. Religious ideology probably accounts for the low level of fertility control among Catholics. The ultimate reason for the relatively high marital fertility among Jews before the transition remains unclear. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition.

Religious differentials in marital fertility in The Hague (Netherlands) 1860¿1909

The authors test whether socioeconomic variables in England and Wales between 1850 and 1900 are significantly related to decline in fertility during a transitional period marked by no family planning at the onset. In contrast Carlsson study of Swedish fertility decline ascribes the decline to the diffusion approach from urban to rural and adjustment perspective which emphasizes societal setting and boundaries. Knodel and van de Walles macro analysis within the Princeton European Fertility Project (PEFP) presents the view that simultaneity occurs despite a variety of socioeconomic and demographic conditions. Lesthaeghe followed the innovative argument and reports that within the diffusion process cultural barriers put limitations on the extend of fertility. Conversely socioeconomic interpretations have been developed by Teitelbaum who also used the PEFP data and Friedlander in his analysis of 600 districts of England and Wales. Teitelbaum identifies the significance as socioeconomic with cultural variables having separate significant effects at later stages. Friedlanders somewhat different theory indicates that nuptiality marital fertility and migration are micro-interrelated and result from socioeconomic change. Crafts analysis of the 1911 fertility census in England and Wales reveals that spacing and stopping contributed to fertility decline instead of Knodel and van de Walles thesis of stopping being the only significant determinant. The authors analysis of 600 districts of England and Wales validates the adjustment hypothesis by showing that socioeconomic and demographic timing account for variation in timing of marital fertility (R2 = .50). In explaining the diffusion process again with R2 = .54 socioeconomic variables entirely account for the fertility change dependent variable with no effect from the cultural variable. This was substantiated in repeated trials at regional levels also testing the strength of the language variable. Further testing of the mode of transmission from urban to rural indicated the fertility change variable was not negatively related to the urban proximity variable including a separate regression for just London and environs. The Carlsson diffusion hypothesis is rejected. 24 repeated stepwise regressions were performed confirming the importance of the socioeconomic and demographic variables in explaning fertility decline with a minimum of 50% (range 70 - 90%) of the variation explained. Cultural and diffusion variables explain no more than 50% (range 5 - 25%). The largest beta coefficients for all equations with demographic and socioeconomic variables. The Lesthaeghe border hypothesis is also not substantiated. The Framework of Social Structure and Fertility is advanced as the significant analytical construct for understanding fertility decline. Notwithstanding the English experience other recent studies are reviewed which support the socioeconomic interpretation and suggestion is made to further research effort in this direction.

The Transition from High to Low Marital Fertility: Cultural or Socioeconomic Determinants?

Previous studies of the fertility decline in Europe are often limited to an earlier stage of the marital fertility decline, when the decline tended to be slower and before the large increase in earnings in the 1920s. Starting in 1860 (before the onset of the decline), this study follows marital fertility trends until 1939, when fertility reached lower levels than ever before. Using data from the Historical Sample of the Netherlands (HSN), this study shows that mortality decline, a rise in real income, and unemployment account for the decline in the Netherlands. This finding suggests that marital fertility decline was an adjustment to social and economic change, leaving little room for attitudinal change that is independent of social and economic change.

/pdf/marital-fertility-decline-in-the-netherlands-child-mortality-3xv8wwjt20.pdf

Marital Fertility Decline in the Netherlands: Child Mortality, Real Wages, and Unemployment, 1860–1939

The "wealth flows" theory of fertility decline developed by Caldwell was used as the basis for examining reproductive behavior among the working class in Victorian England and Wales. The hypothesis was that fertility did not start to decline among the working class until real wages rose and parents were not dependent on support flows from their older children at later stages of the life cycle as evidenced in the 1911 Fertility Census. The cause was the life cycle drop off in adult productivity that created the need for additional income at later stages of the life cycle. Child and adolescent labor helped with the inadequacy of single wages of many workers to support a family. Mens wages unskilled laborers and older workers wages were particularly low. Wives were also added to the labor force to supplement low wages of the father. In England and Wales the timing of rises in real wages came during most of the 1870s and 1880s; a decline in child mortality but not infant mortality began before fertility decline and may explain part of the marital fertility decline. Fertility decline may have been related not just to rises in real wages but to child mortality costs of children and costs of contraception. Pooled time series and cross sectional data for working class marriage cohorts were used in the multiple regression analysis. The dependent variable was completed fertility of women by marriage cohort (married at ages 20-24 and 25-59) and husbands occupational group. The results of a set of multiple regressions which did not include child mortality revealed that real wages explained more than 50% of the variance. The addition of cohort dummy variables added 25 percentage points to 79% for women married at ages 20-24 and added 27 percentage points to 82% for women married at ages 25-29. The unexplained temporal variance was almost all accounted for by child mortality. Because of the intercorrelation of child mortality and real wages the amount each contributes to the variation cannot be computed. Differential mortality was added into the analysis and the results were unchanged. The results are considered tentative because social diffusion theory could explain the mechanism through which real wages affect reproductive behavior. The impact of child labor on family income is a neglected but very important variable and may explain why Egypt still has high fertility rates.

Jona Schellekens

Papers

Religious differentials in infant and child mortality in Holland, 1855-1912.

Religious differentials in marital fertility in The Hague (Netherlands) 1860¿1909

The Transition from High to Low Marital Fertility: Cultural or Socioeconomic Determinants?

Marital Fertility Decline in the Netherlands: Child Mortality, Real Wages, and Unemployment, 1860–1939

Wages secondary workers and fertility: a working-class perspective of the fertility transition in England and Wales.