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Showing papers by "Jonathan L. Zittrain published in 1999"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the costs and benefits of enforcing sales taxes on most Internet commerce and suggest that the costs of not enforcing taxes are somewhat modest and will re- main so for several years.
Abstract: Current tax law makes it difficult to enforce sales taxes on most Internet commerce and has generated considerable policy debate. In this paper we analyze the costs and benefits of enforcing such taxes including revenue losses, competition with retail , exter- nalities, distribution, and compliance costs. The results suggest that the costs of not enforcing taxes are somewhat modest and will re- main so for several years. At the same time, compliance costs and the benefits of nurturing the Internet diminish over time. When tax costs and benefits take this form, a moratorium provides a natu- ral compromise.

94 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the costs and benefits of not enforcing sales taxes on most Internet commerce and find that compliance costs are also likely to be low, while revenue losses, competition with retail, externalities, distribution, and compliance costs.
Abstract: Current tax law makes it difficult to enforce sales taxes on most Internet commerce and has generated considerable policy debate. In this paper we analyze the costs and benefits of enforcing such taxes including revenue losses, competition with retail, externalities, distribution, and compliance costs. The results suggest that the costs of not enforcing taxes are quite modest and will remain so for several years. At the same time, compliance costs are also likely to be low. There are benefits to nurturing the Internet but they tend to diminish over time. When tax costs and benefits take this form, a moratorium provides a natural compromise.

13 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The public/private challenge in a political environment is discussed in this paper, where the public and private challenges are compared in the context of Domain Naming Schemes (DNS).
Abstract: I. THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE ............................................................................. 1074 A . M arsh v. Alabam a Revisited ........................................................................ 1075 B. Quasi-private and Quasi-public Domain Naming Schemes ......................... 1076 11. EVOLUTION OF ICA N N ......................................................................................... 1077 A. Early Management of Domain Name Policy ............................................... 1077 B. From the Technical to the Political .............................................................. 1079 C. The Need for a New Governance ................................................................. 1081 D. The Public/Private Challenge in a Political Environment ............................ 1082 E. Toward Private Civil Procedure and Administrative Law ........................... 1083 1. O p enness .............................................................................................. 1084 2. R epresentation ...................................................................................... 1084 3. D ue P rocess .......................................................................................... 1087 III. W HAT IF IC A N N FAILS ........................................................................................ 1088 A . Son ofIC A N N ............................................................................................. 1088 B. A n Inter-governm ental Entity ...................................................................... 1089 C . Free M arket .................................................................................................. 1090 IV . C O NCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 109 1

12 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on what they see as the key issue in the Microsoft case, arguing that antitrust sanctions are appropriate only if the monopolist has committed some sort of extra bad behavior, behavior that might leverage the firm's monopoly power in a way that itself distorts the market, penalizing even competent, otherwise well-positioned competitors.
Abstract: In order to address the question of remedy, I would like to map out what I see as the key issue in the Microsoft case. We need to be clear about the fundamental problem alleged— and perhaps soon proven— if we are to speak a common language about a remedy. First, what’s not the central problem: simply having a monopoly. Just being a monopolist is not alone a concern to many antitrust enforcers; some markets lend themselves quite naturally to having one dominant player, and others may find themselves with only one because that player simply outclasses all others. The animating idea behind antitrust is not to “punish winners” out of some kind of arbitrary sympathy for underdog competitors. Rather, antitrust sanctions are appropriate only if the monopolist has committed some sort of extra “bad behavior,” behavior that might leverage the firm’s monopoly power in a way that itself distorts the market, penalizing even competent, otherwise well-positioned competitors. Second, behaviors that are problems but not fundamental: most of the pieces of the kitchen sink of bad monopolist behaviors that have been thrown at Microsoft at one time or another. For example, it has been

2 citations


21 Jun 1999
TL;DR: The Berkman Center as mentioned in this paper encourages cooperative work dedicated to the open domain and encourages faculty, students, staff, alumni, relatives, and friends are permitted and encouraged (though not required) to work together in the public interest.
Abstract: : The model of university as producer of knowledge-as-product-for-sale is a closed one. Knowledge is treated as property to be copyrighted, patented, classified, licensed, and litigated. Under this closed model, creative work cannot progress without negotiations about license fees (the ambit of legal "fair use" at a minimum). As faculty become work-for-hire, money becomes the currency of the campus, and legality the dominant feature of relationship. Under this model, the nature of Harvard will change fundamentally - for the worse, I think. The community of scholars at the heart of the academy trades riches for a comfortable secure environment in which to think, research, and teach. This community, comprised of intellectuals who do not hold money paramount, will be oppressed by a commercial/legal environment. The Berkman Center aspires to demonstrate a different model - open IT, we call it. We encourage cooperative work dedicated to the open domain. Faculty, students, staff, alumni, relatives, and friends are permitted and encouraged (though not required) to work together in the public interest. Intellectual community and creative process is our product, knowledge the by-product. This approach galvanizes spirit and produces educational works of great distinction and wide public utility. Furthermore, this model maintains the community of scholars while avoiding the meanness of money and licenses. It will enhance the prestige of the institutions that contribute and become part of it. But there are questions.

2 citations