The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides access to information on a variety of topics related to the environment and strives to inform citizens of health risks. The EPA also has an extensive library network that consists of 26 libraries throughout the United States, which provide access to a plethora of information to EPA employees, scientists, and researchers. The EPA implemented a reorganization project to digitize their materials so they would be more accessible to a wider range of users, but this plan was drastically accelerated when the EPA was threatened with a budget cut. It chose to close and reduce the hours and services of some of their libraries. As a result, the agency was accused of denying users the “right to know” by making information unavailable, not providing an adequate strategic plan, and discarding vital materials. This case study explores the background of the digitization project, the practices implemented, and the critiques of the project.

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The Environmental Protection Agency

Ecological Engineering: Journal of Ecotechnology. Editor-in-chief William J. Mitsch. Elsevier. 4/yr. DFL 361, $195.

Science in action

13 EADERS of Mr. Bertrand Russell's philosophical £v works know that one of his pupils before the outbreak of the war, an Austrian, Mr. Ludwig Wittgenstein, caused him to change his views in some important particulars. Curiosity can now be satisfied. The “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus “which Mr. Ogden has included in his new library of philosophy is a remarkable and strikingly original work. It is published in German and English in parallel pages. It is difficult to appreciate the reason for this, seeing that the author is evidently familiar with our language and has himself carefully revised the proofs of the translation. Also we should have liked to have the Tractatus without Mr. Russell's Introduction, not, we hasten to add, on account of any fault or shortcoming in that introduction, which is highly appreciative and in part a defence of himself, in part explanatory of the author, but for the reason that good wine needs no bush and that Mr. Russell's bush has the unfortunate effect of dulling the palate instead of whetting the appetite. In his penultimate sentence Mr. Russell says; “To have constructed a theory of logic which is not at any point obviously wrong is to have achieved a work of extraordinary difficulty and importance.” We agree, but how uninspiring when compared with Mr. Wittgenstein's own statement of aim: “What can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) Pp. 189. (London: Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1922.) 10s. 6d. net.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

This is the advice of a committee of leading American experts, chaired by Harvey Fineberg from the Harvard School of Public Health. It represents the fifth report in a series, commissioned by the US National Research Council, that considers how society can understand and cope with decisions about risks. The Committee's remit was to provide advice on risk characterisation, defined by the Research Council as the translation of `the information in a risk assessment ... into a form usable by a risk manager, individual decision maker, or the public'. In this book, the Committee has responded to the challenge clearly and authoritatively, beginning with a profound re-definition of `risk characterisation' that forms the basis for all that follows. In the view of the Committee, risk characterisation is a process. It is a process which starts before quantitative analysis of the risks, because it includes defining what risks to assess, and how most appropriately to assess them. It is an iterative process, in which assumptions are challenged and re-worked, and new information may be incorporated. It is a process in which qualitative judgements contribute to the fuller understanding of the problem; where quantitative scientific estimates, although important, contribute only a part. Most fundamentally, it is a process which, in a democratic society, needs to involve all those affected by the perceived problem and consequent decision. In the words of the Committee: `Experience shows that analyses, no matter how thorough, that do not address the decision-relevant questions, use reasonable assumptions, and meaningfully include the key affected parties can result in huge expenses and long delays and jeopardise the quality of understanding and the acceptability of the final decisions.' In other words, until or unless we expand our understanding of risk characterisation to include the process of defining the assessment itself, we are unlikely to make progress in gaining public acceptance for major decisions on health or environmental issues. For those without sufficient time to read the book, the ten-page summary provides a succinct overview of the Committee's advice, complete with bullet points and emboldened key phrases. However, the main body of the book (and particularly Appendix A, which discusses a number of case studies) is well worth scanning for its well-reasoned and well-structured discussion of the issues and the suggested way forward. Nor is the Committee lost in an `academic ivory tower'. It recognises that involvement of all those with vested interests cannot ensure a rapid or consensus solution or preclude some groups `dropping out' and choosing the route of litigation. It also recognises that allowing a `voice' for a wide range of interest groups can be time consuming and difficult to manage. However, the Committee argues: `While we are sensitive to concerns about cost and delay, we note that huge costs and delays have sometimes resulted when a risk situation was inadequately diagnosed, a problem misformulated, key interested and affected parties did not participate, or analysis proceeded unintegrated with deliberation. We believe that following [our] principles can reduce delays and costs as much as or more than it increases them.' So what are the Committee's principles? Getting the science right - any quantitative science that is undertaken must be of the highest standards. Getting the right science - this ensures that all the relevant risks are considered. Getting the right participation - this ensures that all those affected have a `voice' in the process. Getting the participation right - this ensures that the process is responsive to the needs of all the participants. Developing an accurate, balanced and informative synthesis - this should include a balanced understanding of the uncertainties in current knowledge, encompassing ignorance and indeterminacy as well as more quantifiable uncertainties. Again, in the words of the Committee: `These criteria are related. To be decision-relevant, risk characterisation must be accurate, balanced and informative. This requires getting the science right and getting the right science. Participation helps ask the right questions of the science, check the plausibility of assumptions, and ensure that any synthesis is both balanced and informative.' In order to set up an appropriate risk characterisation process, the Committee recommends that those responsible for it should `begin by developing a provisional diagnosis of the decision situation' in order to identify potential participants, allocate resources and structure the process. However, in doing so, they should `treat the diagnosis as tentative and remain open to change, always keeping in mind that their goal is a process that leads to a useful and credible risk characterization'. The Committee also stresses the need for those responsible for the process to `develop the capability to cope with attempts by some interested and affected parties to delay decision, and to develop a range of strategies for reaching closure'. This is likely to require the development of new skills and may require organisational changes `to improve communication across sub-units and to allow for the flexibility and judgement necessary to match the process to decision'. This balanced, reasoned and authoritative book is, in my opinion, a `must for all those involved in informing societal decision on risks.

Understanding Risk - Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society

Science as Social Knowledge. Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry

Ciencia y política del riesgo

This article presents the results of a study of public perception recently completed in Spain which questioned citizens about their views on the precautionary principle, the role of science in policy making, as well as their level of trust in science. The results show that Spanish citizens, by a significant margin, consider that scientists may be influenced by economic interests, that values play a key role in policy making, and that policy should be guided by precaution. Two groups were identified, one with a moderate and the other one with a more stringent interpretation of precaution. The results indicate that public policies that do not sufficiently take into account precaution and exclude values from decision making are likely to encounter resistance among many citizens.

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Precaution in public: the social perception of the role of science and values in policy making

This paper analyzes the study of the public perception of biotechnology, comparing different studies made on the European and the Spanish national levels. It aims at testing the applicability of these kinds of studies, and describes some of their limits. The analysis shows clear ambivalence in the public response to distinct applications of this technology, pointing out the crucial differences between general moral valuation and attitude towards specific products. Taking into account this difference appears fundamental for the design of future perception studies able to more accurately reflect public understanding.

Perceptions, attitudes and ethical valuations: the ambivalence of the public image of biotechnology in Spain

This article examines the relationship between the general public's understanding of science and the attitude towards public funding of scientific research. It applies a multivariate and discriminant analysis (Wilks' Lambda), in addition to a more commonly used bivariate analysis (Cramer's V), to data compiled from the Third National Survey on the Social Perception of Science and Technology in Spain (FECYT, 2006). The general conclusion is that the multivariate analysis produces information complementary to the bivariate analysis, and that the variables commonly applied in public perception studies have limited predictive value with respect to the attitude towards public funding of scientific research.

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Who is willing to pay for science? On the relationship between public perception of science and the attitude to public funding of science.

In this paper we propose a typology of three interpretations of the precautionary principle, each with its associated philosophical and policy implications. We found that these different interpretations of precaution are closely related to variations in the understanding of scientific uncertainty, as well as varying ways of assessing possible (but uncertain) impacts of scientific–technological development. There is a direct link to the question of what scientific knowledge is and what role it plays in regulation and decision-making. The proposed typology permits a conceptual systematization of the current controversies related to the precautionary principle, while facilitating understanding of some of the deeper roots of science and technology policy debates.

José Luis Luján

Papers

Ciencia y política del riesgo

Precaution in public: the social perception of the role of science and values in policy making

Perceptions, attitudes and ethical valuations: the ambivalence of the public image of biotechnology in Spain

Who is willing to pay for science? On the relationship between public perception of science and the attitude to public funding of science.

Precaution: A taxonomy: