物件導向軟體之架構(Object-Oriented Software Construction)探討

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

National Institute of Standards and Technology における超伝導研究及び生活

Linked: The New Science of Networks

Cloud computing with its three key facets (i.e., IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS) and its inherent advantages (e.g., elasticity and scalability) still faces several challenges. The distance between the cloud and the end devices might be an issue for latency-sensitive applications such as disaster management and content delivery applications. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) may also impose processing at locations where the cloud provider does not have data centers. Fog computing is a novel paradigm to address such issues. It enables provisioning resources and services outside the cloud, at the edge of the network, closer to end devices or eventually, at locations stipulated by SLAs. Fog computing is not a substitute for cloud computing but a powerful complement. It enables processing at the edge while still offering the possibility to interact with the cloud. This article presents a comprehensive survey on fog computing. It critically reviews the state of the art in the light of a concise set of evaluation criteria. We cover both the architectures and the algorithms that make fog systems. Challenges and research directions are also introduced. In addition, the lessons learned are reviewed and the prospects are discussed in terms of the key role fog is likely to play in emerging technologies such as Tactile Internet.

A Comprehensive Survey on Fog Computing: State-of-the-art and Research Challenges

Cloud Computing is one of the leading paradigms in the IT industry. Earlier, cloud applications used to be built as single monolithic applications, and are now built using the Microservices Architectural Style. Along with several advantages, the microservices architecture also introduce challenges at the infrastructural level. Five such concerns are identified and analysed in this paper. The paper presents the state-of-art in different infrastructural concerns of microservices, namely, load balancing, scheduling, energy efficiency, security and resource management of microservices. The paper also suggests some future trends and research domains in the field of microservices.

Construing Microservice Architectures: State-of-the-Art Algorithms and Research Issues

Current computing systems comes with different power management and profiling tools to run the system in its optimal state. Though the hardware systems have advanced a lot in-terms of energy efficiency and computing power, the software's energy and resources efficiency is still lacking behind. In many cases due to poor/bad designing of software it cannot utilize the hardware efficiently and end up a system with high energy consumption. To address this issues software' s need a careful profiling in its development process to make the software efficient and less resource hungry. In this paper we compared some of the profiling tools available as Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) which are used under Linux environment. These software tools uses different strategies and have different accuracies in finding a system and software programs behavior and its resource requirements. Their performance and resource overheads such as memory, CPU, disk consumption were compared and results are summarized for making the tools selection easier to researchers and developers alike. Another important issue with these tools are that, their reporting formats are not always easy to understand and it makes them less user friendly.

Comparison of FOSS based profiling tools in Linux operating system environment

Security has always been one of the key issues of any man-made system, this paved the way for a submodule or application or a device to monitor or system for malicious activities. This system or submodule or device is known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS). As technology evolves so does the associated threats and thus the intrusion detection system needs to evolve. Game theory throws in a different perspective which have not been looked upon much. Game theory provides a way of mathematically formalizing the decision making process of policy establishment and execution. Notion of game theory can be used in intrusion detection system in assisting in defining and reconfiguring security policies given the severity of attacks dynamically. We are trying to formulate a robust model for the theoretical limits of a game theoretic approach to IDS. The most important flaw of game theory is that it assumes the adversary’s rationality and doesn’t take into consideration multiple simultaneous attacks. Therefore, a collaborative trust and Dirichlet distribution based robust game theoretic approach is proposed which will try to resolve this issue. Reinforced learning approaches using Markov Decision Process will be utilized to make it robust to multiple simultaneous attacks.

Extended Game Theoretic Dirichlet Based Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems

There are many applications such as a messaging application, teleconferencing, information service etc. which use a group communication model that provides confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the messages sent over the group. Thus, it results in a secure group communication. The most important part in deploying a secure group communication model is to reduce the number of encryption and rekeying operations. Most of the known algorithm uses LKH (logical key hierarchy) based protocol in which a key tree or graph is created in hierarchical manner that will be used to multicast the messages at a cost of O(log n), where n is the number of members in the group. Almost all the methods introduced till now are not taking full advantage of the key tree they were mainly concentrated on minimizing the rekeying operations after a leave or a join in the group. We have proposed a simple and elegant method that is based on a distribution function F(S) to multicast the messages to a subset of n members of the group G. Our method takes the full advantage of the key tree, It minimizes the rekey operations with minimum time complexity and also maintain the security requirements for the secure group communication.

Distribution function based efficient secure group communication using key tree

Nowadays, considerable attention has been given by the researchers in the field of Cloud Computing to the emerging Inter-Cloud computing paradigm, where different cloud service providers collaborate or federate to achieve better QoS and cost efficiency. In this context, in order to prevent the unauthorized access of the distributed system components, authentication and authorization functions are to be enforced effectively. In this paper, we propose the conceptual model of the agent-based approach for the identity and access management in the dynamic inter-cloud environments where the Cloud Service Providers or the partners of the inter-cloud federation join and leave the federation dynamically. We further discuss the architectural model for the agent-based approach for solving the policy conflicts in the inter-cloud scenario while dealing with the access requests of cloud consumers in the inter-cloud environments. A few open issues in the area of identity and access management in the inter-cloud environment are also discussed.

K. Chandrasekaran

Papers

Construing Microservice Architectures: State-of-the-Art Algorithms and Research Issues

Comparison of FOSS based profiling tools in Linux operating system environment

Extended Game Theoretic Dirichlet Based Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems

Distribution function based efficient secure group communication using key tree

Agent-Based Approach for the Management of Dynamic QoS Violations in the Inter-Cloud Environments