物件導向軟體之架構(Object-Oriented Software Construction)探討

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

National Institute of Standards and Technology における超伝導研究及び生活

Linked: The New Science of Networks

Cloud computing with its three key facets (i.e., IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS) and its inherent advantages (e.g., elasticity and scalability) still faces several challenges. The distance between the cloud and the end devices might be an issue for latency-sensitive applications such as disaster management and content delivery applications. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) may also impose processing at locations where the cloud provider does not have data centers. Fog computing is a novel paradigm to address such issues. It enables provisioning resources and services outside the cloud, at the edge of the network, closer to end devices or eventually, at locations stipulated by SLAs. Fog computing is not a substitute for cloud computing but a powerful complement. It enables processing at the edge while still offering the possibility to interact with the cloud. This article presents a comprehensive survey on fog computing. It critically reviews the state of the art in the light of a concise set of evaluation criteria. We cover both the architectures and the algorithms that make fog systems. Challenges and research directions are also introduced. In addition, the lessons learned are reviewed and the prospects are discussed in terms of the key role fog is likely to play in emerging technologies such as Tactile Internet.

A Comprehensive Survey on Fog Computing: State-of-the-art and Research Challenges

Nowadays the Cloud Computing paradigm has become the defacto platform for deploying and managing user applications. Monolithic Cloud applications pose several challenges in terms of scalability and flexibility. Hence, Cloud applications are designed as microservices. Application scheduling and energy efficiency are key concerns in Cloud computing research. Allocating the microservice containers to the hosts in the datacenter is an NP-hard problem. There is a need for efficient allocation strategies to determine the placement of the microservice containers in Cloud datacenters to minimize Service Level Agreement violations and energy consumption. In this paper, we design a Reinforcement Learning-based Microservice Allocation (RL-MA) approach. The approach is implemented in the ContainerCloudSim simulator. The evaluation is conducted using the real-world Google cluster trace. Results indicate that the proposed method reduces both the SLA violation and energy consumption when compared to the existing policies.

Fuzzy Reinforcement Learning based Microservice Allocation in Cloud Computing Environments

Sentiment Extraction from Naturalistic Video

Wireless ad hoc networks rely on the cooperation of participating nodes to undertake activities such as routing. Malicious nodes participating in the network may refuse to forward packets and instead discard them to mount a denial-of-service attack called a packet drop or blackhole attack. Blackhole attacks can however be easily detected using common networking tools like trace route as all packets passing through the malicious node is dropped. A gray hole attack on the other hand accomplishes denial of service by selectively dropping packets thus escaping detection. In this paper, a novel two player incomplete information extensive form game is used to model the defender and the attacker both of whom are considered rational agents in an effort to determine their optimal (equilibrium) strategies under different values for the parameters true detection rate, false alarm rate, packet value, packets forwarded per unit time, probability of the node being a gray hole, cost of exposure of the attacker and cost of not using a node for the defender. The respective equilibrium strategies if followed guarantee maximum possible protection for the defender and maximal possible damage potential for the attacker.

Game Theoretic Modeling of Gray Hole Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

The demand for cloud computing is increasing rapidly because of the advantages it provides to the customers like, pay as you use, self-serving, elastic, sharing of resources, ease of use, and accessibility. Due to the increase in the usage of the technology, there exists a high chance of compromising the security of the data being stored on the cloud. The major hindrance in the usage of the technology is the security concerns which accompany it. This increases the demand for a robust security mechanism to protect the data on the cloud. So as to overcome this drawback of cloud computing, encrypting the data to be stored on the cloud is one of the solutions. As part of this paper, a security mechanism to improve the security of data in cloud storage is suggested. The security mechanism used is inspired by the bio-inspired genetic algorithm. The inspiration behind the proposed security model is an amalgamation of genetic algorithm and attribute based encryption. As per the methodology proposed the data need to be encrypted before being stored on the cloud. This way the cloud service provider is unaware of the data being stored and even if the data is compromised to some third party, there is no information leakage.

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel7/7838006/7857572/07857617.pdf

A bio-inspired model to provide data security in cloud storage

With the emergence of cloud computing, Big Data has caught the attention of many researchers in the area of cloud computing. As the Volume, Velocity and Variety (3 Vs) of big data are growing exponentially, dealing with them is a big challenge, especially in the cloud environment. Looking at the current trend of the IT sector, cloud computing is mainly used by the service providers to host their applications. A lot of research has been done to improve the network utilization of WAN (Wide Area Network) and it has achieved considerable success over the traditional LAN (Local Area Network) techniques. While dealing with this issue, the major questions of data movement such as from where to where this big data will be moved and also how the data will be moved, have been overlooked. As various applications generating the big data are hosted in geographically distributed data centers, they individually collect large volume of data in the form of application data as well as the logs. This paper mainly focuses on the challenge of moving big data from one data center to other. We provide an efficient algorithm for the optimization of cost in the movement of the big data from one data center to another for offline environment. This approach uses the graph model for data centers in the cloud and results show that the adopted mechanism provides a better solution to minimize the cost for data movement.

/pdf/an-efficient-approach-for-cost-optimization-of-the-movement-4uq8vidahf.pdf

K. Chandrasekaran

Papers

Fuzzy Reinforcement Learning based Microservice Allocation in Cloud Computing Environments

Sentiment Extraction from Naturalistic Video

Game Theoretic Modeling of Gray Hole Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

A bio-inspired model to provide data security in cloud storage

An Efficient Approach for Cost Optimization of the Movement of Big Data