This paper discusses the discounted utility (DU) model: its historical development, underlying assumptions, and "anomalies" - the empirical regularities that are inconsistent with its theoretical predictions. We then summarize the alternate theoretical formulations that have been advanced to address these anomalies. We also review three decades of empirical research on intertemporal choice, and discuss reasons for the spectacular variation in implicit discount rates across studies. Throughout the paper, we stress the importance of distinguishing time preference, per se, from many other considerations that also influence intertemporal choices.

/pdf/time-discounting-and-time-preference-a-critical-review-47don96ek5.pdf

Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a survey of 84 participants at the 1969 meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Society and the American Psychological Association (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The respondents, including several authors of statistics texts, were asked realistic questions about the robustness of statistical estimates and the replicability of research results. The article commented tongue-in-heek on the prevalence of a belief that the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well: Respondents placed too much confidence in the results of small samples, and their statistical judgments showed little sensitivity to sample size. The mathematical psychologists who participated in the survey not only should have known better – they did know better. Although their intuitive guesses were off the mark, most of them could have computed the correct answers on the back of an envelope. These sophisticated individuals apparently had access to two distinct approaches for answering statistical questions: one that is spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast; and another that is deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and slow. The persistence of large biases in the guesses of experts raised doubts about the educability of statistical intuitions. Moreover, it was known that the same biases affect choices in the real world, where researchers commonly select sample sizes that are too small to provide a fair test of their hypotheses (Cohen, 1969, 1992).

Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.

UNTVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY Department of Economics Berkeley, CaHfornia 94720-3880 Working Paper No. 97-251 Psychology and Economics Matthew Rabin Department of Economics University of California, Berkeley January 1997 Key words: bounded rationality, decision making, fairness, framing effects, heuristics and biases, preferences, psychology, reciprocity, reference-dependent utility JEL Classification: A12, B49, D i l , D60, D81, D83, D91 This is a longer version of an essay under preparation for possible publication in the Journal of Economic Literature. I thank John Pencavel and anonymous referees for earlier comments on its structure and content. For comments on this draft, I thank Steven Blatt, Colin Camerer, Peter Diamond, Erik Eyster, Ernst Fehr, Danny Kahneman, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue, and John Pencavel. For helpful conversations over the past several years on topics covered in this essay, I thank George Akerlof, Gary Chamess, Eddie Dekel, Peter Diamond, David Laibson, David I. Levine, George Loewenstein, Rob MacCoun, James Montgomery, Vai-Lam Mui, Drazen Prelec, and especially Colin Camerer, Danny Kahneman, and Richard Thaler. Co-authors on research related to the topics of this essay include David Bowman, Deborah Minehart, Ted O'Donoghue, and Joel Schrag. Helpful research assistance was provided by Gadi Barlevy, Nikki Blasberg, Gail Brennan, Paul Ellickson, April Franco, Marcus Heng, Bruce Hsu, Jin Woo Jung, and especially Steven Blatt, Jimmy Chan, Erik Eyster, and Clara Wang. I am extremely grateful for financial support from the Russell Sage and Alfred P. Sloan Foundations.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2564950.pdf

Psychology and Economics

The authors describe a method for the quantitative study of anchoring effects in estimation tasks. A calibration group provides estimates of a set of uncertain quantities. Subjects in the anchored condition first judge whether a specified number (the anchor) is higher or lower than the true value before estimating each quantity. The anchors are set at predetermined percentiles of the distribution of estimates in the calibration group (15th and 85th percentiles in this study). This procedure permits the transformation of anchored estimates into percentiles in the calibration group, allows pooling of results across problems, and provides a natural measure of the size of the effect. The authors illustrate the method by a demonstration that the initial judgment of the anchor is susceptible to an anchoring-like bias and by an analysis of the relation between anchoring and subjective confidence.

Measures of Anchoring in Estimation Tasks

https://www1.montpellier.inra.fr/lameta/articles/5.6.2_GREEN_ANCHORING.pdf

Referendum contingent valuation, anchoring, and willingness to pay for public goods

In the contingent valuation method for the valuation of public goods, survey respondents are asked to indicate the amount they are willing to pay (WTP) for the provision of a good. We contrast economic and psychological analyses of WTP and describe a study in which respondents indicated their WTP to prevent or to remedy threats to public health or to the environment, attributed either to human or to natural causes. WTP was significantly higher when the cause of a harm was human, though the effect was not large. The means of WTP for 16 issues were highly correlated with the means of other measures of attitude, including a simple rating of the importance of the threat. The responses are better described as expressions of attitudes than as indications of economic value, contrary to the assumptions of the contingent valuation method.

Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods: A Psychological Perspective

This study reports on experiments that examine anchoring in single referendum questions in contingent valuation surveys on willingness to pay for public goods, and on objective estimation. Strong anchoring effects are found that lead to systematically higher estimated mean responses from Yes/No referendum responses than from open-ended responses. This response pattern is similar for contingent valuation questions and for objective estimation questions. The paper concludes that psychometric anchoring effects, rather than incentive effects, are the likely cause of results commonly found in contingent valuation studies, and that the currently popular single referendum elicitation format is highly vulnerable to anchoring.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Karen E. Jacowitz

Papers

Measures of Anchoring in Estimation Tasks

Referendum contingent valuation, anchoring, and willingness to pay for public goods

Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods: A Psychological Perspective

Referendum Contingent Valuation, Anchoring, and Willingness to Pay for Public Goods