In Aristotle's teleological view of the world, natural things come to be and are present for the sake of some function or end (for example, wings are present in birds for the sake of flying). Whereas much of recent scholarship has focused on uncovering the (meta-)physical underpinnings of Aristotle's teleology and its contrasts with his notions of chance and necessity, this book examines Aristotle's use of the theory of natural teleology in producing explanations of natural phenomena. Close analyses of Aristotle's natural treatises and his Posterior Analytics show what methods are used for the discovery of functions or ends that figure in teleological explanations, how these explanations are structured, and how well they work in making sense of phenomena. The book will be valuable for all who are interested in Aristotle's natural science, his philosophy of science, and his biology.

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Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature

This paper traces the development of our understanding of the development of different approaches to estimating the strength of reproductive competition and sexual selection in the two sexes, based on measures of the operational sex ratio, the opportunity for sexual selection and contrasts in selection gradients between the sexes. It argues that different approaches provide complementary insights into the causes of sex differences in reproductive competition, the operation of sexual selection and the evolution of secondary sexual characters and that improvements in our understanding of the evolution of secondary sexual characters will require a more comprehensive understanding of the ways in which social and ecological conditions modify reproductive competition and development in females and males.This article is part of the themed issue 'Adult sex ratios and reproductive decisions: a critical re-examination of sex differences in human and animal societies'.

https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rstb.2016.0310

Reproductive competition and sexual selection

Phronesis and the Virtues ( NE vi 12–13)

This book offers a resolution of the paradox posed by the pleasure of tragedy by returning to its earliest articulations in archaic Greek poetry and its subsequent emergence as a philosophical problem in Plato's Republic. Socrates' claim that tragic poetry satisfies our 'hunger for tears' hearkens back to archaic conceptions of both poetry and mourning that suggest a common source of pleasure in the human appetite for heightened forms of emotional distress. By unearthing a psychosomatic model of aesthetic engagement implicit in archaic poetry and philosophically elaborated by Plato, this volume not only sheds new light on the Republic's notorious indictment of poetry, but also identifies rationally and ethically disinterested sources of value in our pursuit of aesthetic states. In doing so the book resolves an intractable paradox in aesthetic theory and human psychology: the appeal of painful emotions.

Tragic Pleasure from Homer to Plato

Introduction 1. Against the Strawsonian interpretation: the negative argument 2. Aristotle on ethical ascription: the positive argument 3. The definitions of violence 4. Coercion as justification and excuse 1: the Ethica Eudemia 5. Coercion as justification and excuse 2: the Ethica Nicomachea 6. Factual error and the source of blame 7. The pain condition.

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Aristotle's ethics and moral responsibility

Part I. Ethical First Principles: 1. Aristotle on principles in ethics: political science as the science of the human good Karen Margrethe Nielsen 2. Practical and theoretical knowledge in Aristotle James V. Allen 3. Aristotle on practical and theoretical knowledge David Charles 4. Virtue and reason in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Mary Louise Gill Part II. Enquiry and Explanation: 5. Endoxa, facts, and the starting points of the Nichomachean Ethics Joseph Karbowski 6. Scientific and ethical methods in Aristotle's Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics Daniel Devereux 7. The search for definitions of justice in Nichomachean Ethics 5 Carlo Natali 8. Holding for the most part: the demonstrability of moral facts Devin Henry Part III. Ethics and the Natural Sciences: 9. Aristotle on the biological roots of virtue: the natural history of natural virtue James G. Lennox 10. Aristotle on knowing natural science for the sake of living well Mariska Leunissen 11. The science of soul in Aristotle's Ethics Christopher Shields 12. Luck in Aristotle's Physics and Ethics Monte Ransome Johnson 13. 'As if by convention alone': the unstable ontology of Aristotle's Ethics Charlotte Witt.

Bridging the Gap Between Aristotle's Science and Ethics

The analysis of 'mixed acts' in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 has led scholars to attribute a theory of 'dirty hands' and 'impossible oughts' to Aristotle. Michael Stocker argues that Aristotle recognizes particular acts that are simultaneously 'right, even obligatory', but nevertheless 'wrong, shameful and the like'. And Martha Nussbaum commends Aristotle for not sympathizing 'with those who, in politics or in private affairs, would so shrink from blame and from unacceptable action that they would be unable to take a necessary decision for the best'. In this paper I reexamine Aristotle's analysis of putatively 'mixed acts' in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1, maintaining that Aristotle denies that there are acts that are (i) voluntary under the circumstances, (ii) right, all things considered, under the circumstances, but nevertheless (iii) shameful or wrong for moral or prudential reasons under the circumstances. The paper defends this interpretation with reference to Aristotle's discussion of shame in EN IV, 9 and Rhetoric II, 6, as well as his overall meta-ethical commitment to a position I call 'mitigated circumstantial relativism'. By focusing on Aristotle's analysis of putatively 'mixed acts', we come closer to a true appreciation of Aristotle's ethical theory, even though 'mixed act' is not, I argue, a category in Aristotle's considered ontology of action.

Dirtying Aristotle's Hands? Aristotle's Analysis of 'Mixed Acts' in the Nicomachean Ethics III, 1

"Deliberation as Inquiry: Aristotle's Alternative to the Presumption of Open Alternatives"

The Magna Moralia has long been the ugly duckling in the Aristotelian pond, shunned on account of its ungainly composition, flat-footed argument, and peculiar linguistic habits. In this essay, I examine one influential argument against its authenticity, namely the hypothesis that the author of the MM was a student or a later compendium writer, attempting to reconstruct the argument of the Eudemian Ethics or Nicomachean Ethics. My test case is the analyses of deliberation (bouleusis) and decision (prohairesis) in the three ethics. I argue that the MM diverges on important points from the EE and the EN, and that even an inept compendium writer or note taker could not have extracted the analysis in the MM from the other treatises. I conclude that the MM may resemble the EE because the former is an early and immature version of the latter.

Deliberation and Decision in the Magna Moralia and Eudemian Ethics

In this paper I examine Aristotle's account of sexual difference in Generation of Animals , arguing that Aristotle conceives of the production of males as the result of a successful teleological process, while he sees the production of females as due to material forces that defeat the norms of nature. My suggestion is that Aristotle endorses what I call the "degrees of perfection" model. I challenge Devin Henry's attempt to argue that Aristotle explains sex determination exclusively with reference to material necessity (in particular, levels of "vital heat" in the male semen), for Aristotle's notion of "sufficient" or "deficient" vital heat is itself teleological. If, as Aristotle is aware, male and female embryos appear with approximately equal frequency in most species, how, in light of Physics II, can he conceive of the former as in accordance with nature, and the latter as somehow contrary to nature? My proposal is that Aristotle's notion of what happens usually (ως eπi τo πoλυ) is bifurcated: the usual need not be more frequent.

Karen Margrethe Nielsen

Papers

Bridging the Gap Between Aristotle's Science and Ethics

Dirtying Aristotle's Hands? Aristotle's Analysis of 'Mixed Acts' in the Nicomachean Ethics III, 1

"Deliberation as Inquiry: Aristotle's Alternative to the Presumption of Open Alternatives"

Deliberation and Decision in the Magna Moralia and Eudemian Ethics

The Private Parts of Animals: Aristotle on the Teleology of Sexual Difference