Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

https://www.motherjones.com/files/emotional_dog_and_rational_tail.pdf

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Objectives: Lao Juan (LJ, 劳倦) is a syndrome described in Chinese medicine (CM) that manifests with : Lao Juan (LJ, 劳倦) is a syndrome described in Chinese medicine (CM) that manifests with fatigue, fever, spontaneous sweating, indigestion, work-induced pain, weakness of the limbs, and shortness of breath. fatigue, fever, spontaneous sweating, indigestion, work-induced pain, weakness of the limbs, and shortness of breath. The present study was conducted to examine the reliability and validity of a Lao Juan Questionnaire (LJQ). The present study was conducted to examine the reliability and validity of a Lao Juan Questionnaire (LJQ). Methods: A total of 151 outpatients and 73 normal subjects were asked to complete the LJQ. Seventy-three normal subjects A total of 151 outpatients and 73 normal subjects were asked to complete the LJQ. Seventy-three normal subjects were additionally asked to complete the Chalder Fatigue Scale (CFS). Twelve clinicians determined whether the were additionally asked to complete the Chalder Fatigue Scale (CFS). Twelve clinicians determined whether the 151 outpatients exhibited LJ or not. The internal consistency and construct validity for the LJQ were estimated using 151 outpatients exhibited LJ or not. The internal consistency and construct validity for the LJQ were estimated using data from the outpatient subjects. The CFS data were used to examine the concurrent validity of the LJQ. Total LJQ data from the outpatient subjects. The CFS data were used to examine the concurrent validity of the LJQ. Total LJQ scores and the clinicians' diagnoses of the outpatients were used to perform receiver operating characteristics (ROC) scores and the clinicians' diagnoses of the outpatients were used to perform receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve analyses and to defi ne an optimum cut-off score for the LJQ. curve analyses and to defi ne an optimum cut-off score for the LJQ. Results: The 19-item LJQ had satisfactory internal : The 19-item LJQ had satisfactory internal consistency (α=0.828) and concurrent validity, with signifi cant correlations between the LJQ and the CFS subscales. consistency (α=0.828) and concurrent validity, with signifi cant correlations between the LJQ and the CFS subscales. In the test of construct validity using principal component analysis, a total of six factors were extracted, and the overall In the test of construct validity using principal component analysis, a total of six factors were extracted, and the overall variance explained by all factors was 59.5%. In ROC curve analyses, the sensitivity, specifi city, and area under the variance explained by all factors was 59.5%. In ROC curve analyses, the sensitivity, specifi city, and area under the curve were 76.0%, 59.2%, and 0.709, respectively. The optimum cut-off score was defi ned as six points. curve were 76.0%, 59.2%, and 0.709, respectively. The optimum cut-off score was defi ned as six points. Conclusions: Our results suggest that the LJQ is a reliable and valid instrument for evaluating LJ. Our results suggest that the LJQ is a reliable and valid instrument for evaluating LJ. KEYWORDS Chinese medicine, chronic fatigue syndrome, Chinese medicine-pattern Chinese medicine, chronic fatigue syndrome, Chinese medicine-pattern

Development and Validation of A

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

▪ Abstract We review empirical and conceptual developments over the past four years (1992–1995) on attitudes and persuasion. A voluminous amount of material was produced concerning attitude structure, attitude change, and the consequences of holding attitudes. In the structure area, particular attention is paid to work on attitude accessiblity, ambivalence, and the affective versus cognitive bases of attitudes. In persuasion, our review examines research that has focused on high effort cognitive processes (central route), low effort processes (peripheral route), and the multiple roles by which variables can have an impact on attitudes. Special emphasis is given to work on cognitive dissonance and other biases in message processing, and on the multiple processes by which mood influences evaluations. Work on the consequences of attitudes focuses on the impact of attitudes on behavior and social judgments.

Attitudes and attitude change

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Two experiments provided evidence for a disconfirmation bias in argument evaluation such that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are scrutinized longer, subjected to more extensive refutational analyses, and consequently are judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. The idea that people are unable to evaluate evidence independently of prior beliefs has been documented elsewhere, including in the classic study by C. G. Lord, L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper (1979). The present findings contribute to this literature by specifying the processes by which prior beliefs affect the evaluation of evidence. The authors compare the disconflrmation model to several other models of how prior beliefs influence current judgments and present data that provide support for the disconfirmation model. Results indicate that whether a person's prior belief is accompanied by emotional conviction affects the magnitude and form of the disconfirmation bias. When evaluating an argument, can one assess its strength independently of one's prior belief in the conclusion? A good deal of evidence indicates the answer is an emphatic no (e.g., Batson, 1975; Chapman & Chapman, 1959; Darley & Gross, 1983; Geller & Pitz, 1968; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sherif & Hovland, 1961). This phenomenon, which we refer to as the prior belief effect, has important implications. Given two people, or groups, with opposing beliefs about a social, political, or scientific issue, the degree to which they will view relevant evidence as strong will differ. This difference, in turn, may result in a failure of the opposing parties to converge on any kind of meaningful agreement, and, under some circumstances, they may become more extreme in their beliefs. Perhaps the most renowned study documenting the prior belief effect is one conducted by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979); this study served as the starting point for our work. Lord et al. were concerned with people's evaluations of arguments about

A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of arguments.

In two experiments, affect-based and cognition-based attitudes towardaperson wereinduced by varyingthesequenceofaffective and cognitive information presented to subjects while holding the content of these communications constant. In Experiment 1, affective and cognitive persuasive appeals were created by means of a similar order manipulation, whereas in Experiment 2, affective and cognitive persuasive appeals were induced through a focus manipulation. Results indicated that affect-based attitudes were most effectively changed by affective persuasive appeals, whether these appeals were produced by an order manipulation or a focus manipulation. Affect-based attitudes also tended to be expressed with greater confidence than cognition-based attitudes.

Hearts and Minds: The Priority of Affective Versus Cognitive Factors in Person Perception

Two studies examined the consequences of instructing people to ignore emotionally charged information. Hypotheses were examined in the context of simulated juror decision making Results indicate that emotional information is more difficult to ignore than nonemotional information and that efforts to ignore such information can magnify its influence on related judgments. Thus, for participants exposed to emotionally charged incriminating evidence, the impact of this evidence was enhanced by instructions to disregard it. This paradoxical effect of disregard instructions was not observed for participants presented with otherwise equivalent, nonemotional evidence. Findings extend research on thought suppression and social judgment by suggesting that rebound effects may be more pronounced when information is emotional in nature. They also bridge a gap between the two literatures by suggesting that suppression-induced hyper accessibility of thoughts can lead to systematic biases not only in the quantity of cogni...

Judgmental Biases Produced by Instructions to Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information

https://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/33251.pdf

Kari Edwards

Papers

A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of arguments.

Hearts and Minds: The Priority of Affective Versus Cognitive Factors in Person Perception

Judgmental Biases Produced by Instructions to Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information

A simple laboratory method for inducing anger: A preliminary investigation☆