Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The aim of this article is to clarify the apparent confusion in the literature about the impact of a revenue sharing arrangement on the competitive balance in a sports league. A crucial factor in the discussion seems to be the impact of the absolute rather than the relative quality of the teams on the clubs' revenues. The analysis shows that revenue sharing improves the competitive balance under both the profit- and the utility-maximizing hypotheses.

Revenue sharing and competitive balance in professional team sports

Background: The goals of participation youth sports are primarily concerned with the facilitation of positive youth development as opposed to outright success Consequently, there are strong theoretical and empirical links between sports coaching and athlete development Transformational leadership behaviours, in particular, have been theoretically linked to positive developmental outcomes within a youth sport context, while the coach–athlete relationship is a key tool used by coaches who aim to teach life skills to young athletes Outright team success has also been shown to correlate with important developmental variables such as a mastery climate and athlete perception of youth sports coachesAims: The purpose of this study was to test the relationship between coach transformational leadership behaviours, the perceived quality of the coach–athlete relationship, team success, and the positive developmental experiences of adolescent soccer playersMethod: Cross-sectional data were taken from 455 adolesce

/pdf/the-relationship-between-coach-leadership-the-coach-athlete-9b9pxqeivx.pdf

The Relationship between Coach Leadership, the Coach-Athlete Relationship, Team Success, and the Positive Developmental Experiences of Adolescent Soccer Players.

Throughout the book, my colleagues and I have endeavored to address the DEA theory needed by the end-users, key model design issues, correct interpretation of DEA results, and advanced concepts of current research focused on further development of DEA. The examples are chosen from the service sector. Specifically represented areas are banking, education, property management, hospitality, tourism, health insurance, socially responsible investments, public transportation, pension funds, information technology, public hospitals, Olympics, telecommunications, public library, police stations, energy, retail, and research centers. Chapter titles follow the naming convention of providing the topic or purpose of the chapter first, followed by the listing of the industries or areas where illustrations have been set.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2627576_code562976.pdf?abstractid=2627576&mirid=1

Productivity Analysis in the Service Sector with Data Envelopment Analysis

Professional football clubs are unusual businesses, their performance judged on and off the field of play. This study is concerned with measuring the efficiency of clubs in the English Premier League. Information from clubs’ financial statements is used as a measure of corporate performance. To measure changes in efficiency and productivity the Malmquist non-parametric technique has been used. This is derived from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) linear programming approach, with Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) being used to ensure the cohesion of the input–output variables. The study concludes that while clubs operate close to efficient levels for the assessed models, there is limited technological advance in their performance in terms of the displacement of the technological frontier.

/pdf/measuring-efficiency-and-productivity-in-professional-4l9cqqlrlt.pdf

Measuring efficiency and productivity in professional football teams: evidence from the English Premier League

The data envelopment analysis technique is used to measure franchise payroll efficiency in the National Football League (NFL) from 1981 to 2000 and Major League Baseball (MLB) from 1985 to 2001. This article shows that there is a significant difference in the level of franchise inefficiency between MLB and the NFL because of the different financial structure in these leagues. MLB franchises, with little revenue sharing and no salary cap, tend to be less efficient than NFL franchises. Big spending and inefficient MLB franchises tend to come from large media markets, although this is not the case in the NFL. This article also shows that NFL franchise efficiency significantly improved after the salary cap was introduced in 1994.

Is Winning Everything? A Data Envelopment Analysis of Major League Baseball and the National Football League

An economy can produce and consume a fixed-cost excludable public good only if its members fully fund the cost of the good In this paper, we characterize the entire class of mechanisms for the provision of the public good and its cost that are Pareto optimal among the set of strategy-proof, voluntarily-participatory, budget-balancing, non-bossy, and replacement-monotonic mechanisms We demonstrate that this class of mechanisms is quite small and can be characterized as simple step-price mechanisms

Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs

This sixth compilation of year-to-year information on U.S. industry R&D spending and performance reveals that revenue from both new products and R&D investment is increasing. OVERVIEW: Data from the annual survey for fiscal year 1997, when added to that of the previous five years, suggests that Industrial Research Institute member companies have restructured their R&D efforts in ways that have increased innovation performance, as indicated by an upturn in the New Sales Ratio, and that their R&D expenditures grew more rapidly than sales revenues in FY '97-the first time in six years. The increase in the NSR is clearly good news, while the increase in R&D intensity sends a mixed signal in that R&D expenditures grew by 17 percent as sales revenues declined by an average of 1.5 percent. Company participation in the survey increased, with 81 firms providing usable data in FY '97 compared with 78 in FY '96. However, reporting on business segments declined from 141 to 137, and the diversity of business segments reported upon also declined. As a result, fewer business segments met the "five-firm minimum" than in prior years. On the other hand, laboratory reporting increased from 49 in FY '96 to 57 in '97. CIMS and the IRI are beginning a concerted effort to increase the depth of coverage of research/technology management issues in specific business segments. For the first time in six years, the results of the IRI/CIMS Annual Survey indicate an upward trend in the average R&D intensity of IRI member firms. This increase in R&D intensity, a significant contributor to productivity growth, resulted from a substantial increase in R&D expenditures and only a slight decrease in sales (1). Last year, we also reported the first increase in the IRI membership's "New Sales Ratio." The NSR is the percent of total annual sales that can be attributed to new and improved products commercialized in the last five years. We are pleased to report that the increase in NSR continued again in FY '97 for our sample of IRI companies. The increase in R&D intensity, along with the increase in the NSR, suggest that IRI companies have become more effective at product innovation and in capturing the resulting benefits in the marketplace. The average R&D intensity of 57 IRI member companies that reported data in both 1996 and 1997 increased from 2.6 percent in 1996 to 2.9 percent in 1997. Thirty of these companies actually reported data over the last five years (from 1993 to 1997). Their average R&D intensity declined from 3.1 percent in 1993 to 2.8 percent in 1996. In 1997, the average R&D intensity of these 30 companies recovered to 3.1 percent! The average NSR of 18 IRI member companies that reported new sales data in both 1996 and 1997 increased from 19.2 percent in 1996 to 21.2 percent in 1997. Only eight of these companies reported their ratios for each of the last five years (from 1993 to 1997). The average NSR for these companies dropped from 18.8 percent in 1993 to 14.8 percent in 1995. By 1997, their average NSR increased to 16.4 percent. Source of the Data This information derives from six years of data collected by the IRI/CIMS Annual R&D Survey, established by the Database Subcommittee of IRI's Research-on-- Research Committee. The original intent was to build a unique database that would allow R&D executives and general managers to benchmark and track information on R&D spending and the performance of firms, laboratories, and business segments in specific industries. The resultant database is also a valuable source of data for anyone wishing to study the impact of R&D management decisions and practices on the financial performance of industrial firms (see "How to Access the Data," below). The survey has now been carried out for six years and contains IRI company data for fiscal years 1992-1997. The survey is done in cooperation with the Center for Innovation Management Studies (CIMS) at Lehigh University. …

Karl W. Einolf

Papers

Is Winning Everything? A Data Envelopment Analysis of Major League Baseball and the National Football League

Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs

Benchmarking Your R&D: Results from IRI/CIMS Annual R&D Survey for FY '97

EconFantasy.com: Where Fantasy Becomes Reality in an Economics-of-Sports Simulation