Bio: Katalin Cseres is an academic researcher from University of Amsterdam. The author has contributed to research in topic(s): Competition law & Enforcement. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 6 publication(s) receiving 26 citation(s).
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the role of the consumer and the citizen in a new consumer centered governance model and its effects on law making and law enforcement in the European Union.
Abstract: Where in the past the orientation of the internal market was always on economic growth through removing trade barriers, the 21st century vision seems to be more impact driven, guided by consumers’ and citizens’ needs, not just from an economic perspective but also in terms of satisfaction of citizenship norms and values such as solidarity, inclusion and sustainability. The re-orientation also reflects on the role of the consumer and the citizen: they should be more active through participation in both the design and the enforcement of economic regulation. A parallel reflection of the re-orientation can be found in the EU ‘empowerment’ discourse linked to the consumer and citizenship concepts, as deployed by the Europe 2020 Strategy. The basic question that feeds this paper is what kind of social and economic governance model is behind the new empowerment tools and strategies? The paper is an initial attempt to explore this new consumer citizen centered governance model and its effects on law making and law enforcement. Putting citizens and consumers in the driving seat differs from the traditional way of decision-making through elected representatives and the traditional perception of consumers and citizens as passive receivers of rights and benefits.
01 Dec 2007-European Competition Journal
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the European Competition Journal of Competition Law and Policy (ECJLP) as a model for the enforcement and enforcement of competition law and policy in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs).
Abstract: On 1 May 2004, ten new Member States joined the European Union. The road to accession has been a challenge in many aspects. The former socialist countries that joined the EU on this date had to create a functioning market economy within a short period of time, which required significant legal and economic changes. Creating a competitive business environment required structural changes in the property regime, as well as trade liberalisation and privatisation. The implementation and enforcement of competition law and policy had a notable role in the transition from planned economy to market economy. Competition policy and competition authorities were the driving forces behind the reform processes and they had a demonstrative role in advocating a new economic governance structure. Although many of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) had competition legislation before World War II, these were set aside and became invalid after 1945. Therefore they had to build new competition laws from the scratch and, more importantly, create a competition culture. While many of these countries studied the competition laws of other jurisdictions, such as Germany or the US, and invited foreign experts to advise on drafting competition acts, the European competition rules provided a convincing model. In the light of these countries’ wish to join the EU, the EC Treaty rules seemed to be an obvious reference point. In the period between 1990 and 2004 the CEECs adopted new competition acts and gradually aligned the legislation to the EC rules. The competition law acquis has been imported into the domestic legal systems of the CEECs within a short period of time and with utmost accuracy. While the transfer of substantive rules could rely on well-defined EC rules and went relatively smoothly, establishing effective enforcement and institutional design have formed the most serious challenges in the post-communist transformation of the legal and economic system. Crucial questions of December 2007 European Competition Journal 465
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role of the European Competition Network in initiating harmonization of national administrative procedures and institutional settings of the Member States by analyzing the Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 and the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Commission's report, as well as through the recent work of the ECCN Working Group on cooperation issues and due process.
Abstract: As less formal institutions such as the European Competition Network or the International Competition Network are becoming generators of soft law that may harden into national, EU or international law, the importance of legitimacy in agenda-setting and in the development of best practices, rules, and standards increases. This paper discusses the legitimacy of the harmonization process which takes place in the European Competition Network(ECN) on the basis of Regulation 1/2003, with regard to the administrative procedures of the Member States the NCAs apply when they enforce EU competition rules. This harmonization process is seemingly the result of voluntary harmonization among the Member States but in fact it is being steered and dominated by the EU Commission. This paper will examine the role of the Commission in initiating harmonization of national administrative procedures and institutional settings of the Member States by analyzing the Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 and the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 , as well as through the recent work of the European Competition Network’s Working Group on cooperation issues and due process. The paper will look at the centripetal and centrifugal effects Regulation 1/2003 had on the substantive and procedural rules as well as the institutions of the Member States’ competition law. The paper critically assesses the methods of voluntary convergence that is taking place among the Member States and the way the Commission extends harmonization of the administrative procedural rules as well as certain substantive rules in the EU Member States.
17 Mar 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine examples of such national measures and practices and assesses their impact on re-nationalising EU competition law and policy, and assess the impact of renationalizing EU competition policy.
Abstract: The decentralisation of the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU under Regulation 1/2003 altered not only its institutional setup by delegating enforcement responsibilities to national competition authorities (NCAs) and courts, but also the possibilities for Member States to implement their respective national competition policies and the domestic interest considerations embedded therein. In the multilevel governance framework established by Regulation 1/2003, the enforcement of EU competition law takes place exposed to the national political, institutional and procedural context. In particular, national laws and legal and administrative practices, which bind NCAs and national courts, directly influence the application of Articles 101 and 102 in the national territory. This chapter examines examples of such national measures and practices and assesses their impact of re-nationalising EU competition law and policy.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors assess the degree of judicial scrutiny performed by administrative courts in Hungary when reviewing decisions by the Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasagi Versenyhivatal, ‘GVH’) in the light of the landmark ruling handed down by the European Court of Justice in Commission vs. Tetra Laval.
Abstract: This paper assesses the degree of judicial scrutiny performed by administrative courts in Hungary when reviewing decisions by the Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasagi Versenyhivatal, ‘GVH’) in the light of the landmark ruling handed down by the European Court of Justice in Commission vs. Tetra Laval. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part provides an outline of the Hungarian Competition Act. The second part offers a brief overview of the general principles of judicial review of the Hungarian administrative authorities’ decisions. The third part examines whether the Tetra Laval ruling has influenced the judicial scrutiny applied by Hungarian courts. The fourth part concludes that although at first sight the Hungarian courts seem to draw little or no inspiration at all from the Community Courts’ case-law, a deeper analysis suggests that - irrespective of the developments in European jurisprudence - the Hungarian courts have in essence developed a finely tuned and restrained judicial review of the GVH decisions.The conclusions of this analysis point further than the Hungarian case and provides thoughts for the general discussion on the standard of judicial review of administrative authorities’ decisions.
21 Feb 2007
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: In this article, a socio-legal research method was adopted to examine the legal and institutional frameworks for consumers' protection in the Nigerian deregulated electricity sector, and the challenges hindering electricity consumers protection and redress in Nigeria.
Abstract: Recently, the Nigerian electric utility lost its public service character following its deregulation. The electricity sector deregulation was executed despite bad consumers‘ experience in the earlier deregulated sectors on service quality, complaints handling and others. Adopting a socio-legal research method, this thesis critically examines the legal and institutional frameworks for consumers‘ protection in the Nigerian deregulated electricity sector. The thesis was motivated by the state of the extant laws and the institutional arrangements for consumer protection; the lingering regulatory failure and rising consumer exploitations in the Nigerian electricity sector. The thesis‘s objectives are to examine the frameworks; the consumer redress mechanisms; and the challenges hindering electricity consumers‘ protection and redress in Nigeria. The data was collected through the library-based approach and twenty semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from consumer protection agencies such as the Consumer Protection Council, the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria; lawyers in the academia; and the heads of consumer organisations. The thesis employed the interpretive doctrinal technique and the thematic analysis in analysing the legal materials and the interview data. The comparative analytical approach was also employed because comparison is useful in legal research. Guided by international standards and global best practices, the thesis found that the frameworks are deficient and limited in many aspects. It lacks provisions on consumer rights and remedies; its product-focused with less emphasis on services; and lacks competition law that are critical for consumer protection in deregulated environments. The thesis found that while regular courts are expensive and time consuming, the frameworks lack ideal institutional arrangements such as small claims court and consumer ombudsman. The thesis also found that consumer protection in Nigeria faces several challenges with lack of consumer awareness and underfunding of agencies being the prominent challenges. For the benefit of the consumers and industry, the thesis recommends comprehensive frameworks that integrate competition, consumer rights and remedies provisions. The thesis further recommends improvement to the legal aid scheme, the establishment of ideal consumer redress forums and efficient regulatory agencies for more effective consumer protection
TL;DR: The European Commission used the term "modernization" in referring to the important set of changes in the institutional structure and procedures of competition law that it introduced in 2004, and it has fundamentally changed important procedures for developing and applying competition law in Europe as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In European competition law, the term "modernization" has been a catchword and focus of attention since the late 1990s Usually, the reference is to "procedural" or "institutional" modernization The European Commission used the term "modernization" in referring to the important set of changes in the institutional structure and procedures of competition law that it introduced in 2004, and it has fundamentally changed important procedures for developing and applying competition law in Europe During the same period in which this form of modernization was proceeding, another form of "modernization" was also taking shape that represents a fundamental reorientation of much of the substantive law thinking in European competition law Curiously, little attention has been paid to the relationship between these two processes Yet they have taken place over roughly the same period; many of the same people have been involved in instigating the changes; and they have been driven by many of the same forces and pressures Understanding the relationship between these two processes promises not only to provide a better understanding of each, but also important insights into the current roles of competition law in the further integration of Europe Even more broadly, it helps to reveal the forces at work in this critical period of European legal and political development The Article makes two central claims One is that the two processes are related in important ways and that neither can be fully understood without understanding the other The other is that the relationships between the two reveal changes in the dynamics of European competition law that have so far been little noticed
01 Aug 2014
10 May 2015-Journal of Consumer Policy
TL;DR: In this paper, the European Parliament has adopted a Directive on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) which sets out minimum requirements for ADR entities throughout the European Union (EU) from a law and economics point of view, law enforcement is crucial to induce compliance.
Abstract: The European legislator has adopted a Directive on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) which sets out minimum requirements for ADR entities throughout the European Union (EU). From a law and economics point of view, law enforcement is crucial to induce compliance. ADR can be viewed as a means of strengthening consumer law enforcement, leading to compliance at lower costs. Certain conditions, however, have to be fulfilled to exploit the benefits of an ADR mechanism successfully. The goal of this paper is to look into these conditions more specifically and critically assess the ADR Directive in light of these requirements. It is divided into a theoretical section and the analysis of the EU Directive. The main concern results to be the fact that ADR boards with very strong links to traders are allowed under the Directive. When looking at the composition of the bodies, a complicated compromise was enacted that is able to impede the working of such ADR bodies. Given that the Directive aims at minimum harmonization, Member States have the opportunity to provide for a better design in their respective countries responding to this main concern and other critical points identified in the paper.