1. Introducing the Puzzle 2. Contextualism and the Puzzle 3. Invariantist Treatments 4. Sensitive Moderate Invariantism Bibliography

Knowledge and lotteries

Preface. Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1. The Linguistic Turn and the Conceptual Turn. 2. Taking Philosophical Questions at Face Value. 3. Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity. 4. Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity. 5. Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality. 6. Thought Experiments. 7. Evidence in Philosophy. 8. Knowledge Maximization. Afterword. Must Do Better. Appendix 1. Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic. Appendix 2. Counterfactual Donkeys. Bibliography. Index

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The Philosophy of Philosophy

Dans la cadre du debat sur la perception du monde exterieur qui oppose le scepticisme et le faillibilisme, l'A. defend une position dogmatique inspiree de l'epistemologie antisceptique de G. E. Moore. Adoptant un modele propositionnel de l'experience, l'A. developpe une approche positive de la justification de la perception.

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The Skeptic and the Dogmatist

ed from Nozick's account of knowledge and skepticism. According to SCA, the problem with my belief that I'm not a BIV-and I do have such a belief, as do most of us-is that I would have this belief (that I'm not a BIV) even if it were false (even if I were one). It is this that makes it hard to claim to know that I'm not a BIV. For, according to SCA, we have a very strong general, though not exceptionless, inclination to think that we don't know that P when we think that our belief that P is a belief we would hold even if P were false. Let's say that S's belief that P is insensitive if S would believe that P if P were false. SCA's generalization can then be restated as follows: We tend to judge that S doesn't know that P when we think S's belief that P is insensitive. As is well worth noting, this general inclination explains the operation of nonphilosophical skeptical hypotheses that are far less radical than the BIV hypothesis or even the painted mule hypothesis. Just so, it serves to explain why, even though I feel inclined to say that I know the Bulls won their game last night because I read the result in a single newspaper, I still feel strongly pulled toward admitting the (mildly) skeptical claim that I don't know that the paper isn't mistaken about which team won: I realize that my belief that the paper isn't mistaken is a belief I would hold even if it were false (even if the paper were mistaken). Indeed, after encountering a couple of instances of AI with different skeptical hypotheses plugged into the 'H' slot (for example, the BIV, the painted mules, and the mistaken paper hypotheses), one develops a sense of what makes for an effective skeptical hypothesis and, thus, an ability to construct convincing instances of Al oneself. To make AI's second premise convincing, it is usually sufficient (though not necessary) that H be incompatible with 0. But what about the first premise? To make it convincing, we instinctively look for a hypothesis that elicits in the listener both the belief that the hypothesis doesn't obtain and an acknowledgement that this belief is one she would hold even if the hypothesis did obtain. Upon hearing the hypothesis, typically one can't help but projecting oneself into it. How would things seem to me if that situation obtained? Well, pretty much (or sometimes exactly) as they actually seem to me. And, so, what would I believe if such a "strange" situation obtained? Pretty much (or exactly) what I ac-

Solving the Skeptical Problem

Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

The Case for Contextualism

The positions under discussion are both located in the area of overlap between epistemology and the philosophy of language, and they have both received a good deal of attention in recent years. But there is further reason for surprise that more has not been done to bring them together. The chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the concern that the contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of warranted assertability of knowledge attributions for a variability in their truth conditions. This strongly suggests that a serious assessment of contextualism will demand a discerning look at the question of what it takes for a speaker to make a warranted assertion. And it turns out that the knowledge account of assertion-according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows-promises to provide a large and important part of the answer to this question. It also turns out that the knowledge account of assertion dissolves the most pressing problem confronting contextualism and, on top of that, provides a powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism. Or so I will argue. It will take a bit of work to uncover contextualism's most pressing problem, since the critics of contextualism have not themselves been very proficient in identifying it. In part 1, then, after briefly explaining contextualism, I will present its main problem-the "Generality Objection," as I will call it-and show why this is such a serious concern. In part 2, after the knowledge account of assertion and the grounds that support it have been briefly explained, I will show its need for contextualism and present the positive argument for contextualism that it provides. In part 3, I will use the knowledge account of assertion to squash the Generality Objection and will also cast other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.

Assertion, Knowledge, and Context

In epistemology, “contextualism” denotes a wide variety of more-or-less closely related positions according to which the issues of knowledge or justification are somehow relative to context. I will proceed by first explicating the position I call contextualism, and distinguishing that position from some closely related positions in epistemology, some of which sometimes also go by the name of “contextualism”. I’ll then present and answer what seems to many the most pressing of the objections to contextualism as I construe it, and also indicate some of the main positive motivations for accepting the view. Among the epistemologists I’ve spoken with who have an opinion on the matter, I think it’s fair to say a majority reject contextualism. However, the resistance has to this point been largely underground, with little by way of sustained arguments against contextualism appearing in the journals, though I have begun to see various papers in manuscript form which are critical of contextualism. Here, I’ll respond the criticism of contextualism that, in my travels, I have found to be the most pervasive in producing suspicion about the view.

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Keith DeRose

Papers

Solving the Skeptical Problem

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

The Case for Contextualism

Assertion, Knowledge, and Context

Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense