The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

Two Treatises of Government.

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

The Social Psychology of Groups. J. W Thibaut & H. H. Kelley. New York: alley, 1959. The team of Thibaut and Kelley goes back to 1946 when, after serving in different units of the armed services psychology program, the authors joined the Research Center for Group Dynamics, first at M.LT and then at the University of Michigan. Their continued association eventuated in appointments as fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 19561957. It is during these years that their collaboration resulted in the publication of The Social Psychology of Groups. The book was designed to "bring order and coherence to present-day research in interpersonal relations and group functioning." To accomplish this aim, the authors introduced, defined, and illustrated basic concepts in an effort to explain the simplest of social phenomena, the two-person relationship. These basic principles and concepts were then employed to illuminate larger problems and more complex social relationships and to examine the significance of such concepts as roles, norm, power, group cohesiveness, and status. The lasting legacy of this book is derived from the fact that the concepts and principles discussed therein serve as a foundation for one of the dominant conceptual frameworks in the field of family studies today-the social exchange framework. Specifically, much of our contemporary thinking about the process of interpersonal attraction and about how individuals evaluate their close relationships has been influenced by the theory and concepts introduced in The Social Psychology of Groups. Today, as a result of Thibaut and Kelley, we think of interpersonal attraction as resulting from the unique valence of driving and restraining forces, rewards and costs, subjectively thought to be available from a specific relationship and its competing alternatives. We understand, as well, that relationships are evaluated through complex and subjectively based comparative processes. As a result, when we think about assessing the degree to which individuals are satisfied with their relationships, we take into consideration the fact that individuals differ in terms of the importance they attribute to different aspects of a relationship (e.g., financial security, sexual fulfillment, companionship). We also take into consideration the fact that individuals differ in terms of the levels of rewards and costs that they believe are realistically obtainable and deserved from a relationship. In addition, as a result of Thibaut and Kelley's theoretical focus on the concept of dependence and the interrelationship between attraction and dependence, there has evolved within the field of family studies a deeper appreciation for the complexities and variability found within relationships. Individuals are dependent on their relationships, according to Thibaut and Kelley, when the outcomes derived from the existing relationship exceed those perceived to be available in competing alternatives. Individuals who are highly dependent on their relationships are less likely to act to end their relationships. This dependence and the stability it engenders may or may not be voluntary, depending on the degree to which individuals are attracted to and satisfied with their relationships. When individuals are both attracted to and dependent on their relationships, they can be thought of as voluntarily participating in their relationship. That is, they are likely to commit themselves to the partner and relationship and actively work for its continuance. Thibaut and Kelley termed those relationships characterized by low levels of satisfaction and high levels of dependence "nonvoluntary relationships. …

The Social Psychology of Groups

Nonaka's paper [1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organ. Sci.5(1) 14--37] contributed to the concepts of “tacit knowledge” and “knowledge conversion” in organization science. We present work that shaped the development of organizational knowledge creation theory and identify two premises upon which more than 15 years of extensive academic work has been conducted: (1) tacit and explicit knowledge can be conceptually distinguished along a continuum; (2) knowledge conversion explains, theoretically and empirically, the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge. Recently, scholars have raised several issues regarding the understanding of tacit knowledge as well as the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge in the theory. The purpose of this article is to introduce and comment on the debate about organizational knowledge creation theory. We aim to help scholars make sense of this debate by synthesizing six fundamental questions on organizational knowledge creation theory. Next, we seek to elaborate and advance the theory by responding to questions and incorporating new research. Finally, we discuss implications of our endeavor for organization science.

Perspective---Tacit Knowledge and Knowledge Conversion: Controversy and Advancement in Organizational Knowledge Creation Theory

Much of the recent literature on interfirm relationships has focused on strategies for controlling opportunism. Somewhat surprisingly, little attention has been paid in this literature to the opportunism construct itself. Specifically, prior research has failed to recognize the different types of behavior that are hidden behind the general opportunism label. As a consequence, the knowledge of strategies for managing opportunism remains incomplete. The authors review the original and emergent conceptualizations of opportunism and illustrate them using actual industry cases. The authors also develop a conceptual framework of governance strategies that can be used to manage different forms of opportunism.

Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions

Specific investments, which are tailored to a particular company or value-chain partner, are important components of firms’ marketing strategies. At the same time, extant theory suggests that such investments pose considerable risk, because they put the receiver in a position to opportunistically exploit the investor. In this article, the authors examine this “expropriation” scenario but also consider whether specific investments, because of their specialized nature, may actually “bond” the receiver and reduce opportunism under certain conditions. These conditions involve a focal relationship’s time horizon (i.e., its extendedness) and particular norms. The key theoretical argument is that the effect of specific investments on opportunism will shift in a nonmonotonic fashion over the range of these relationship conditions. The authors test their research hypotheses empirically through parallel analyses on each side of 198 matched buyer–supplier dyads. The empirical tests provide general support f...

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Specific Investments in Marketing Relationships: Expropriation and Bonding Effects:

The authors examine how a firm’s strategy in a (downstream) customer relationship is contingent on how a related relationship outside of the focal dyad is organized. Drawing on emerging perspectives on interfirm governance and networks, the authors propose that the ability to show flexibility toward a (downstream) customer under uncertain market conditions depends on the governance mechanisms that have been deployed in an (upstream) supplier relationship. The governance mechanisms take the form of (1) supplier qualification programs and (2) incentive structures based on hostages. The authors develop a set of contingency predictions and test them empirically in the context of vertical supply chain networks in the apparel industry. The tests show good support for the hypotheses. The authors discuss the implications of the findings for marketing theory and practice.

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Relationship Governance in a Supply Chain Network

This article examines the effects of monitoring on interfirm relationships. Whereas some research suggests that monitoring can serve as a control mechanism that reduces exchange partner opportunism, there is also evidence showing that monitoring can actually promote such behavior. The authors propose that the actual effect of monitoring depends on (1) the form of monitoring used (output versus behavior) and (2) the context in which monitoring takes place. With regard to the form of monitoring, the results from a longitudinal field study of buyer–supplier relationships show that output monitoring decreases partner opportunism, as transaction cost and agency theory predict, whereas behavior monitoring, which is a more obtrusive form of control, increases partner opportunism. With regard to the context, the authors find that informal relationship elements in the form of microlevel social contracts serve as buffers that both enhance the effects of output monitoring and permit behavior monitoring to s...

Interfirm Monitoring, Social Contracts, and Relationship Outcomes:

Recent research has documented how exchanges between buyers and sellers are frequently embedded in social relationships. An unresolved question, however, is the extent to which such relationships protect incumbent suppliers from new competitors and their marketing programs. The authors develop a conceptual framework of how relationship and marketing variables influence choice of supplier and test the framework empirically in the context of business-to-business services. The results show that interpersonal relationships between buyers and suppliers serve as a switching barrier but are considerably less important than both firm-level switching costs and marketing variables. Moreover, unlike switching costs, interpersonal relationships do not play the frequently mentioned role of a buffer against price and product competition. Finally, the authors show that buyers and suppliers hold systematically different views of the determinants of switching.

Kenneth H. Wathne

Papers

Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions

Specific Investments in Marketing Relationships: Expropriation and Bonding Effects:

Relationship Governance in a Supply Chain Network

Interfirm Monitoring, Social Contracts, and Relationship Outcomes:

Choice of Supplier in Embedded Markets: Relationship and Marketing Program Effects: