This article explores the copula approach for econometric modeling of joint parametric distributions. Although theoretical foundations of copulas are complex, this paper demonstrates that practical implementation and estimation are relatively straightforward. An attractive feature of parametrically specified copulas is that estimation and inference are based on standard maximum likelihood procedures, and thus copulas can be estimated using desktop econometric software. This represents a substantial advantage of copulas over recently proposed simulationbased approaches to joint modeling.

/pdf/copula-modeling-an-introduction-for-practitioners-1fcatpzmuu.pdf

Copula Modeling: An Introduction for Practitioners

During the roughly four decades since the end of World War II, the health care system in the United States has experienced historically unprecedented change in three dimensions. First, new technologies have revolutionized the ways in which health care is capable of being practiced. Almost all of today's armamentarium of disease diagnosis and treatment devices and techniques were unknown 40 years ago. In the case of prescription drugs, for example, about 10 percent of the 200 largest-selling drugs are new each year; and only 25 percent of the 200 top-selling drugs in 1972 remained in the group 15 years later (David Cleeton, Valy Goepfrich, and Burton Weisbrod 1990).

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1853814_code1653585.pdf?abstractid=1853814&mirid=1&type=2

The Health Care Quadrilemma: An Essay on Technological Change, Insurance, Quality of Care, and Cost Containment

https://escholarship.org/content/qt6sz2h5qt/qt6sz2h5qt.pdf?t=o9nw56

The impact of hospital market structure on patient volume, average length of stay, and the cost of care.

The for-profit hospital is in the minority numerically in all developed countries Although the for-profits' market share has been quite stable for decades, for-profit chains have grown in share and influence in the United States By contrast, for-profit chains have made few inroads in other countries The literature on hospital ownership addresses three fundamental questions First, why do private not-for-profit organizations dominate the hospital industry? Second, how do private not-for-profits differ from for-profits in their behavior? Third, is the private not-for-profit form more efficient in this industry? The main difference between for-profit and private not-for-profit organizations is in the distribution of accounting profit The latter do not distribute profits to equity holders and enjoy some competitive advantages, including tax exemptions and the ability to receive private donations Various reasons for why the not-for-profit form is dominant are explored Reasons involve: transactions costs of various ownership forms; fiduciary relationships between patients and providers; public goods; implicit and explicit subsidies; inertia; cartelization; and lack of profit opportunities The review concludes that there is merit in an number of explanations, but no single explanation works perfectly Certainly the transactions cost of various ownership forms must provide a partial explanation for observed patterns of hospital ownership There is a rich empirical literature on hospital behavior This chapter discusses comparative evidence by hospital ownership form on hospital cost, profitability, pricing and cost-shifting, uncompensated care, diffusion of technology, quality of care, and hospital capital funds and investment In recent years, changes in hospital ownership have been common in the United States Changes have occurred in all directions — from private not-for-profit to for-profit and the reverse, for example Comparing hospital behavior before and after the conversion, the fact that a hospital converted seems to be more important than the type of ownership change that occurred As competition among hospitals increases, differences in behavior among hospitals with different ownership forms should narrow Privately owned hospitals in the US were more alike than different Private not-for-profit hospitals will have less latitude than previously to produce outputs they deem to be socially worthy The chapter ends with the author's agenda for future research

Chapter 21 Not-for-profit ownership and hospital behavior

This article interprets literature examining union effects on economic performance. Production function studies indicate small overall union impacts on productivity; positive effects, where they exist, appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations and from a natural selection process. Lower profitability among unionized firms is well established; more interesting is the possibility that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long-lived tangible and intangible capital. The connection between unions, investment behavior, and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful line of empirical inquiry, although it does not encourage a sanguine view of unionism's long-run impact.

/pdf/union-effects-on-productivity-profits-and-growth-has-the-fm5iz2pzx9.pdf

Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?

Diffusion of surgical technology. An exploratory study.

Unions and hospitals: some unresolved issues

Until recently, there have been no attempts to measure the influence of the income tax system on fringe benefits. A model is specified that links the tax system to fringe benefits. In addition, other determinants of the demand for and supply of fringe benefits are discussed. Using a time-series cross-section of establishment data, the influence of income taxes and other determinants on employer contributions to "voluntary" nonwage compensation is estimated. Using Tobit analysis, we find that higher marginal tax rates increase employer contributions to pensions and to life, accident, and health insurance. We also link our results to losses in federal tax revenues due to fringe benefits.

Taxation and the Growth of Nonwage Compensation

An expectation-maximum (EM) likelihood algorithm is used to estimate two seemingly unrelated Tobit regressions in which the dependent variables are truncated normal. An illustrative example on the determination of the life-health insurance and pension benefits is also given.

/pdf/estimation-of-seemingly-unrelated-tobit-regressions-via-the-dc0ftnogk5.pdf

Killard W. Adamache

Papers

Diffusion of surgical technology. An exploratory study.

Unions and hospitals: some unresolved issues

Taxation and the Growth of Nonwage Compensation

Estimation of Seemingly Unrelated Tobit Regressions via the EM Algorithm

Competition between non-profit and for-profit health insurers