We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model \({\mathcal{S}}\) as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In \({\mathcal{S}}\), all definable sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Godel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace \({-\hskip-9pt\int}\) (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy.

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Tools, objects, and chimeras: Connes on the role of hyperreals in mathematics

We examine some of Connes' criticisms of Robinson's infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes' own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a "virtual theory" and a "chimera", yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes' "dart-throwing" thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S, all definable sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being "virtual" if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes' claim that a theory of the hyperreals is "virtual" is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren't definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in his Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes' criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes' argument based on Goedel's incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes' logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace (featured on the front cover of Connes' magnum opus) and the Hahn-Banach theorem, in Connes' own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover's critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy.

对《Six Ideas That Shaped Physics》（6卷本）这套优秀著作进行了深入的解读,从创作思想、课程体系安排和独到的特点3个方面,深入剖析了其为什么能够引领世界物理导论教学前沿的原因.该套丛书的六大思想对我国未来的物理教材建设和物理课堂教学改革具有重要的借鉴意义.

决定物理学发展的六大思想——《Six Ideas That Shaped Physics》赏析

The scientific revolution, as understood to be the rise of modern science, began in the late Renaissance and took firm hold during the Enlightenment.

Boundaries of Scientific Thought

Is the universe digital or analog? In this essay I argue that both classical and quantum physics include limits that prevent us from definitively answering that question. That quantum physics does so is no surprise. That classical physics does so is rather unexpected. In fact, I argue that classical physics is itself really nothing more than a convenient approximation. Either way, it turns out that our knowledge of the universe is discrete and so it is extraordinarily difficult, perhaps even impossible, to determine the underlying continuity of the universe itself.

Lawrence B. Brod

Papers

In search of continuity: thoughts of an epistemic empiricist