Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The stor- age and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components - not at the level of holistic perceptual expe- riences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a com- mon frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspec- tion (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and ab- stract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinato- rially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a per- ceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal sym- bol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.

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Perceptual symbol systems.

The measurement of meaning

List of figures and tables Preface Part I Introduction: 1 What is to be explained? some preliminaries Part II The Basic Model: 2 Model 1: conscious representations are internally consistent and globally distributed 3 The neural basis of conscious experience Part III The Fundamental Role of Context: 4 Model 2: unconscious contexts shape conscious experience 5 Model 3: conscious experience is informative - it always demands some degree of adaptation Part IV Goals and Voluntary Control: 6 Model 4: Goal contexts, spontaneous problem solving, and the stream of consciousness 7 Model 5: volition as ideomotor control of thought and action Part V Attention, self, and conscious self-monitoring: 8 Model 6: attention as control of access to consciousness 9 Model 7 Self as the dominant context of experience and action Part VI Consciousness is Functional: 10 The functions of consciousness Part VII Conclusion: 11 A summary and some future directions Glossary and guide to theoretical claims References Name index, Subject index

A cognitive theory of consciousness

I. PRELIMINARIES 1. Two Concepts of Mind 2. Supervenience and Explanation II. THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 3. Can Consciousness be Reductively Explained? 4. Naturalistic Dualism 5. The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment III. TOWARD A THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 6. The Coherence between Consciousness and Cognition 7. Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia 8. Consciousness and Information: Some Speculation IV. APPLICATIONS 9. Strong Artificial Intelligence 10. The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics Notes Bibliography

The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Valid across-group comparisons with labeled scales: the gLMS versus magnitude matching.

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Sensory Processes: The New Psychophysics

of Violins," by Carleen Maley Hutchins, provides basic technical information regarding the violin family and its historic development. She explains the new violin family of eight instruments which she was largely instrumental in designing and constructing. These instruments are scientifically designed as a well-integrated family ranging from a large bass to a small treble violin. The seventh article, "The Physics of the Bowed String," by John C. Schelleng, explains what actually happens when a violin string is bowed. Using modern concepts and laboratory apparatus he shows the interaction between the bow, the string, and the instrument. This thorough study contributes greatly to a better understanding of how bow technique, the string, and the instrument influence the production of both normal violin tones and '%volf notes." The last article, "Architectural Acoustics," by Vern C. Knudsen, deals with an important link in the chain of musical production and enjoyment. The fundamentals of reflection, deftaction, and decay of sound waves in rooms are clearly presented along with the influence of resonances in rooms. The authors demonstrate a thorough understanding of their subjects and make important contributions toward an accurate understanding of the physics of music that could be very helpful to musicians and music lovers. The articles also can create a better

The Unity of the Senses: Interrelations Among the Modalities

https://psycnet.apa.org/journals/bul/82/3/303.pdf

Lawrence E. Marks

Papers

Valid across-group comparisons with labeled scales: the gLMS versus magnitude matching.

Sensory Processes: The New Psychophysics

The Unity of the Senses: Interrelations Among the Modalities

On colored-hearing synesthesia: cross-modal translations of sensory dimensions.

Sensory Processes: The New Psychophysics